Bina Gupta
In this section, I would like to draw special attention to the epistemological problem of perception versus inference, and the bearing it has on the respective metaphysical theories of Hume and Carvaka[i]. There exists a basic similarity between Hume and Carvaka in that for
both thinkers theory of perception form the basis of their skepticism on
many related matters such as substance, assumptions about the nature of
causality, status of the causality, status of the external world and
belief in the supernatural and other related issues. For the sake of
clarity, this section of my paper is further divided into four parts.
The first part provides a brief explanation of the importance of the
relation between impressions and ideas in Hume's epistemology. The
second part discusses the status of the world independent of
consciousness in Hume and Carvaka. The third part discusses the
question of how the Carvaka arrived at the view that the knowledge can be obtained from perception
only, and the question of the relationships between perception and inference in
Hume and Carvaka. The fourth part analyzes the striking parallel between
Carvaka’s and Hume’s treatment of causality.
In the Treatise, Hume begins his study of the human
understanding with a careful investigation of the contents of our minds. In the
opening lines, Hume gives us a classification of what he call “perceptions of
the human mind”. He holds that “everything which appears to the mind is nothing
but a bundle of perception”, and that “to hate, to love, to think, to feel, to
see; all this is nothing but to perceive”.[ii] He then divides the perceptions of the mind
into impressions and ideas. An impression for him is the immediate datum of
experience: for example, sensations, passions, as they make their first appearance
in our minds. An idea, for Hume, is a “faint copy of an impression.” These
ideas and impressions always correspond to each other. In other words, there can be no idea in our
mind, if we do not have a corresponding impression; a blind man cannot have any
notion of color, nor a deaf man sound. He makes a further distinction between
simple and complex impressions and simple and complex ideas. However, the
important distinction between impressions and ideas is that the former appear
first in consciousness and the latter are copies of the former. All knowledge
is derived from impressions and the way to ascertain the truth of any simple or
complex idea is to trace its origin to the impression or impression from which
it is derived.
This relationship between impression and ideas is very
important in Hume’s philosophy. His purpose is to show that we cannot have any
idea corresponding to which there is no impression. For example, he asks, from
what impression the idea of substance is derived? And, he concludes that we
have no idea of substance apart from the idea of a mere collection of
particular qualities. He states: “When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion
that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but
too frequent), we need but to inquire, from what impression is that supposed
idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm
our suspicion.”[iii]
Thus, Hume rejects the notion of substance, whether material or spiritual.
The Carvaka philosophers, like Hume, stressed the validity of
perception as the main avenue of knowledge. As such, they thought that only the
four elements, earth, fire, water, and air constituted the whole of reality for
these and only these are the things we perceive. The infinite variety in this
world is explained by different combinations and proportions of the four
elements. Mind, as well, is but a
certain ordering of earth, water, fire and air. This emphasis on perception has
its parallel in the importance Hume puts on impressions. Just as Carvaka would
deny the existence of anything which cannot be perceived, in the same way, Hume
would deny the meaningfulness of an idea which cannot be broken down into its
constituent impressions. However, it is
obvious that there is a great difference in the point of view between the two
positions. The Carvaka is making a sweeping metaphysical claim, while Hume is
making an epistemological claim. In this sense, the Carvaka is more optimistic
about man’s capacity for knowledge. Although our knowledge is limited by what
we can perceive we nevertheless can perceive the only reality namely, matter,
whereas Hume’s epistemological point of view claims it is impossible for us to
know things in themselves. One never comes into contact with the physical
object, but only with the impressions of what we believe to be caused by
physical objects. This is not to suggest that Hume outrightly denies the
existence of external physical objects. Rather, he is denying that our natural
belief that objects exists outside of consciousness is philosophically
defensible. Hume, unlike Berkeley, did not begin with the intention of denying
the existence of the objective world independent of human consciousness and
perception but nevertheless reached the same conclusion. In his words:
Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless
esteemed it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain
reasoning and speculation. We may well ask, what causes induces us to believe
in the existence of body? That is a point, which we must take for granted in
all our reasoning.[iv]
In summary, for Hume there is no rational justification for
saying that bodies or things have a continued and independent existence
external to us.
Let us now consider the question of how the Carvakas arrive
at the view that knowledge can be obtained only by perception. They argue for
perception by a process of elimination. Indian philosophers generally recognize
four sources of knowledge – perception, inference, verbal testimony and
comparison. The Carvaka claims to have shown that the last three means have
serious defects and, therefore, perception is the only valid source of
knowledge. They reject inferential knowledge because for a valid inference to
be possible, the truth of the universal connection must be established. From a
statement like “if A exists then B exists”, we cannot infer B’s existence on
the basis that we know that A exists unless A and B are universally connected.
In concrete terms, we cannot say that it is going to rain by perceiving black
clouds and rain are invariably related. But how, the Carvaka asks, is the
universal connection known? As perception is confined to the present we cannot
perceive universal connection. The senses give us only the particulars. In
order for us to infer the one from the presence of the other, we must apply it
to the past (experiencing its similarity with the situation), present as well
as to the future and on this make a prediction the mind perceives the
universal connection because the mind cannot perceive external objects like
clouds and rain except through the sense-organs. Nor is it correct to claim
that we can establish universal connection by inspecting a large number of
cases in which we perceive a connection between things, since there is nothing
which necessarily prevents a failure of connection in the future, that is,
incongruence with the past experience. In summary, the existence of inference
as a source of valid knowledge is equally unfounded, as the essential condition
for the possibility of inference cannot be established.
Hume derives the content of his skepticism on the basis of
his analysis of the limitation of sense-perception. He shows that all our
ideas, simple or complex, can be reduced to original impressions. The idea of
the ‘golden mountain’, though not derived directly from experience, is formed
by combining the idea of a ‘mountain’ with the idea of ‘gold’, both of which
are objects of experience. The Carvaka also wants to claim that objects of
experience, in whatever combination, can be the only objects of knowledge.
However, the Carvaka do not give an adequate account of the multiplicity of
experience, for surely, perception alone does not tell us that everything we
experience is composed of either earth, water, fire and air or any combination
thereof. Only on the basis of perception one would naturally make a very
important distinction between the four basic elements in Carvaka ontology and
the human body. Nothing in the unaided perception can persuade us that there is
an underlying identity between the human body and these elements. Hume’s point
of view, it should be obvious, avoids this difficulty. There are, of course,
difficulties of a different sort in Hume’s position, but I will not discuss
them here as they do not fall within the scope of this paper.
The Carvaka’s criticism of inference is quite similar to Hume’s
criticism of causality as a necessary connection. True to his method, Hume
accounts for our idea of causal necessity as purely a result of certain experiences.
We say that A causes B because A and B are always experienced together as
either temporally or spatially connection with one another. Hume, like the
Carvaka, rejects the notion that because two things have always been
experienced together that they must necessarily be so connected. He
says:
If we define a cause to be an object precedent and contiguous
to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are placed in a
relation of priority and continuity to those objects, that resemble the latter,
we may easily conceive, that there is no absolute or metaphysical necessity,
that every beginning of existence should be attended with such an object[v]
Hume and the Carvaka are therefore in complete accord in
their skeptical views on necessary connection in causality. The Carvakas, like
Hume, assert that necessary connection cannot be established even by the
observation of several instances because by observing several instances we
cannot know that there is no smoke in the absence of fire. However, as for the
problem of the origin of this idea of necessary connection, Hume and the
Carvaka give very different answers. Hume argues that this is a false idea by
stressing the subjective elements of our ideas. The constant conjunction of two
things is the objective element of our experience, while necessary connection
is the subjectively contributed element. As with the belief in the external and
independent existence of objects, the belief in a causal necessity is a natural
belief but one which is found to be without any real empirical justification.
The Carvakas, on the other hand, naturally did not accept this kind of
explanation of false idea, as one of their central concerns was the refutation
of the idea of a universal moral law which states “as you sow, so shall you
reap.” According to Carvaka, the best
way to refute this idea was to undermine its basis presupposition, namely that
there is a necessary connection between one’s status (or condition) in this
life and one’s karma as accumulated from previous lives. To admit that
the idea of causal necessity has at least a subjective base would obviously not
have served the Carvaka’s claim. Such an admission would have conceded entirely
too much to the opposition. They wanted to prove the falsity of Vedic religion
not simply its unjustifiability. But then the problem remains: how to account
for the origin of false ideas? Hume posits a kind of natural disposition in
human nature to account for them. However, he does not call them false ideas
but merely empirically unprovable one. The Carvakas, on the other hand, and
this is perhaps the most salient difference between Hume and Carvaka, is quick
to assign a more insidious cause to false ideas. Any opinion which is not in
conformity with what we directly experience is either due to a deliberate and
selfishly motivated distortion of experience or else the result of some kind of
gross mental deficiency. But in no way is it natural to believe in things which
are not met within sense-perception, if ‘natural’ is taken to mean
psychologically natural in Hume’s sense.
The Carvaka emphasis on the validity of sense-perception is
primarily a way of combating the kind of inferential knowledge needed to
support spiritualism. These ancient Indian skeptics do not seem to have been
troubled by the problem which preoccupies Descartes in his First Meditation. Although the Carvaka is aware of the
limitation of knowledge derived from the senses, they do not give a
thoroughgoing critique of knowledge as such. They simply assume that what the
senses immediately represent to us possesses external physical reality. The
materialism of the Carvaka School, then, has a touch of what is sometimes called
naïve realism. In this connection, the term ‘lokayata’, the Indian
equivalent for materialism, is especially interesting. One of its meanings is “prevalent in the world
or the opinion of the common people”. It would seem then, that naïve realism or
the intuitive belief in the existence of objective reality is not solely a
western phenomenon. However, Indian materialism is much more than common sense
speaking the language of philosophy. In the first place there is no hint of
dualism in it. Not only is the physical world real, but anything which is not
physical is unreal. In the second place, although the Carvakas do not go so far
as to turn skepticism on the presupposition of materialism itself it is unique
in disposing, solely by the use of logical arguments, the major alternatives to
materialism. But, again, a notion which the Carvakas did not entertain and one
which Hume did, is the possibility of complete ontological skepticism, at least
in its theoretical aspect. However, in terms of its practical application the
Carvaka skepticism is unequalled in its consistency. Hume had many reservations
about the nature of religious beliefs, but nevertheless, he seems to have had
some sympathy for religion. In contrast, the Carvaka held that religion is a
moral and philosophical pestilence because or ostensibly because it is faulty
in its logic. So, considering its time and place the Carvaka skepticism is
amazingly bold in the extent to which it criticizes Vedism and without any
doubt much bolder than the skepticism of Hume.
In conclusion, we can see that Hume’s skepticism is making a
much stronger claim about the impossibility of valid inference than Carvaka.
Although Carvaka accepted perception as the primary source of knowledge, they
did not want to claim the impossibility of knowing the nature of things. They
rejected not only verbal testimony, comparison, as a source of valid knowledge
but rejected inference as well. However, their skepticism contains an important
inconsistency: on the one hand, they maintain perception to be the only source
of valid knowledge, but, on the other, also assert that everything is composed
of earth, water, fire and air, which cannot be known from perception. That is
why some materialist like Purandara allowed inference, but only from what is
perceivable to what is also in principle perceivable. In contrast, Hume denies the possibility of
knowing the thing in itself independent of experience, which is the result of
his extreme idealistically oriented empiricism. He state:
Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but
perceptions, and since all our ideas are derived from something antecedently
present to the mind, it follows, that it is impossible for us so much as to
conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and
impressions.[vi]
Thus, the mind does not have anything present to it except
perception and therefore cannot experience any universal connection between
objects. The assumption of such a connection, for Hume, does not have any
rational foundation. He admits limited skepticism as both “durable” and “useful”. By questioning the soundness of popular
notions, the skeptic sets new problems, directly supplies different fresh
philosophical problems and saves philosophers from dogmatism to a large
extent. On the Indian scene, for
example, the influence of materialism was considerable at one time and both the
astika and nastika schools took great pains to refute the Carvaka
materialism and skepticism before proceeding to establish their own view. In Western philosophy Kant states, “I openly
confess my recollection of David Hume was the very thing which many years ago
first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigation in the field of
speculative philosophy a quite new direction.”[vii] However, Hume rejected excessive skepticism
of the Jayarasi type as untenable in practice. He writes:
Fore here is the chief and most confounding objection to
excessive skepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it while it
remains in its full force and vigor. We only ask such a skeptic, What his
meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious researches? He is immediately
at a loss and knows not what to answer.[viii]
I would contend that although Hume correctly noted the danger
of extreme skepticism of the Jayarasi type and made a distinction between his
own skeptical outlook and extreme skepticism, his own skepticism presents as
great a threat to philosophy. Though Hume believes from the standpoint of
common sense that an independent world exists outside of our minds his
epistemological skepticism rules out the possibility of our mind “really” knowing objects external to us,
which forces him to concede that this system leaves open the possibility of
solipsism, the impossibility of disproving religion and, most importantly, the
impossibility of obtaining objective knowledge.
[1] In this section of the
paper the term “Carvaka” will be used synonymously with materialism
[ii]
David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, edited with an analytical index
by L.A.Shelby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), P. 67.
[iii]
David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, edited with an
introduction Charles W. Hendel (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc.,
1975), p. 30.
[iv]
Treatise, p. 187
[v]
Ibid., p. 172
[vi]
Ibid., p. 67
[vii]
Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, with an
introduction by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: The Bobb-Merrill Company, Inc.,
1976), p. 8
[viii]
Inquiry, p. 168
This essay was first published in Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. IX, No.1, October 1981
At the time of publication of this essay, the author, Bina Gupta, was with Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Columbia.
