Ramkrishna
Bhattacharya
The
Lion of Upsetting of all Principles (Tattvopaplava-siṃha) by
Jayarāśibhaṭṭa has been claimed by some scholars to be the only
surviving Cārvāka work. Others have challenged this view.i
Since there is no external evidence to settle the question, the
debate continues solely on the basis of internal evidence and
intrinsic probability. No near-unanimous (total unanimity is seldom
found) conclusion has been reached to date. Instead of summarizing
the whole debate (which is of a technical nature), a few issues are
raised below. They go against branding Jayarāśi a Cārvāka, but
identify him rather as a founder/follower of a totally new doctrine,
which is quite distinct from both materialism on the one hand and any
form of illusionism
(māyāvāda)
or nihilism
(śūnyavāda) on
the other.
His is ‘the
doctrine of upsetting principles,’
tattvopaplava-vāda. This
is the name used by Jayarāśi’s critics; nowhere is he called a
Cārvāka or ‘one belonging to a section of the Cārvāka’
(Cārvākaikadeśīya).ii
It is basically an annihilationist doctrine. Although Jayarāśi is
called a skeptic, there is no room for such a thing as doubt in his
work. He is convinced that there can be no principles, tattvas,
because there is no such thing as pramāṇa.
Now, Vātsyāyana in the
exordium of his Nyāya
Aphorisms
(Nyāyasūtra)
states at
the outset (on 1.1.1) that one has to admit not only pramāṇa,
but also the other three, pramātṛ
(knower),
prameya (the
object rightly known),
and pramiti
(right
knowledge of the object): ‘With these four, tattva
reaches its fulfillment.’ M.K. Gangopadhyaya suggests that, as
opposed to tattvopaplavavāda,
Vātsyāyana’s view may be called ‘the doctrine of establishing
the principles,’ tattva-vyavasthāpana-vāda.iii
It seems
Vātsyāyana had a predecessor of Jayarāśi in mind,
and against such an opponent he felt it necessary to assert all the
four elements stated above. This assertion can be understood only
against the backdrop of an opponent who denied pramāṇa
as such.
‘Skepticism’ has a
definite significance in western philosophy; it is improper to use it
in the Indian context.iv
A skeptic has no axe to grind; he or she merely doubts the veracity
of all views. Jayarāśi however has a definite view of his own. At
the end of his work he claims that even those (questions) which could
not become the object of knowledge of even the preceptor of the gods
have been raised by Bhatta Sri Jayarāśi, for the shake of removing
the pride of the infidels.v
On the
basis of this declaration, and the Cārvāka aphorisms quoted at the
beginning of the work, he has been called a Bārhaspatya (follower of
Bṛhaspati, the legendary founder of materialism) or a Cārvāka/
Lokāyata. To this facile identification D. Chattopadhyaya objects,
‘[A]ccording to the Indian philosophical tradition no real
representative of a system would ever dream of boasting intellectual
superiority to the founder of the system itself. Jayarāśi, who
claims to be intellectually superior to Bṛhaspati, could thus
hardly be a follower of Bṛhaspati himself, i.e., could hardly be
the leader of any imaginary offshoot of the Cārvāka or Bārhaspatya
system.’vi
Gangopadhyaya endorses this
view and adds: the way Jayarāśi uses honorific plural in mentioning
his own name along with Bṛhaspati, bhaṭṭaśrījayarāśi-devagurubhiḥ…,
places him in the seat of the preceptor of the gods,
which goes
against the Indian tradition. Jayarāśi further claims that all his
opponents will be defeated by his arguments. This too is not the
style of the explicators of Indian philosophy. The way of writing of
later writers, even if they express views of their own, is suave and
modest, as if they mean to suggest that this significance was
inherent in the text itself.vii
Chattopadhyaya
adduced another argument against the identification of Jayarāśi as
a Cārvāka:
It is moreover necessary to
remember that Jayarāśi claims as his final achievement the
annihilation of the vanity of the Pāṣaṇḍin
[pākhaṇḍin]-s
([Tattvopaplava-siṃha
Baroda ed.] p.125). Now whatever might have been the exact meaning of
the word pāṣaṇḍin,viii
it could by no stretch of imagination have excluded the Lokāyatikas
and Cārvākas.ix
Gangopadhyaya
further elucidates:
According to the
lexicographers pā
in the word pākhaṇḍa
means trayīdharma
[i.e., the
Vedas];
those who
refute (khaṇḍayati)
that dharma
are
pākhaṇḍa,
i.e.
anti-Vedic nāstikas.
The Cārvākas in Indian philosophy are well-known by the appellation
nāstikaśiromaṇi
[vide
Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha,
ed. Abhyankar, chap.1, p.2]. Then how can Jayarāśi be a supporter
of Cārvāka?x
The derivation of pākhaṇḍa
is of
course an instance of folk etymology, but such derivations, however
absurd, are pointers to actual usage. Unless pākhaṇḍa
was once current in this sense, such a derivation would not be
proposed at all. The etymology is required to conform to common
understanding, justifying the sense in which it was already in use.
Did
the Cārvākas or the earlier bhūtavādins
and lokāyatas
(mentioned in the Tamil epic, Manimekalai,
27.264-277) call themselves bārhaspatyas,
thereby giving a stamp of approval to the Purāṇic origin of their
philosophical system which in its turn takes its cue from a legend in
the Maitrī
Upaniṣad (7.9)?
No available fragment suggests so. On the other hand, from Purandara
we learn that the new materialists used to call themselves Cārvākas
and we also know from other sources that the base text of their
school was known as the Paurandaraṃ
sūtram,
and there was also a commentary (an auto-commentary) called
Pauraṃdariya
vitti as
well.xi
The very idea of referring to their origin to the suraguru
(devaguru)
or calling him bhagavān,
as found in theTattvopaplava-siṃha,
would be anathema to them.
There
is indeed a Cārvāka at the very beginning of the
Tattvopaplava-siṃha.
But he is not Jayarāśi, but another person who is presented as a
Cārvāka out to challenge Jayarāśi’s doctrine of upsetting
tattva
as such. This objector has to be a Cārvāka, for who but a Cārvāka
would refer to the basic premises of materialism and stand upon them?
The presence of this objector and the way Jayarāśi gets into
controversy with him clearly indicate that Jayarāśi himself was not
a Cārvāka or did not even belong to ‘a section of the Cārvāka’
(cārvākaikadeśya).
He prided in claiming that he could understand Bṛhaspati’s sūtras
better than the Cārvākas themselves. Jayarāśi always refers to
Bṛhaspati, the mythical guru of the gods, never to a real-life
philosopher like Purandara or Aviddhakarṇa, as Kamalaśīla,
Karṇakagomin, Anantavīrya, Cakradhara, and Vādidevasūri do. Thus
Jayarāśi supports the purāṇic story of the origin of
materialism. Sāyaṇa-Mādhava too refers to Bṛhaspati as the
author of a number of verses that are found in the Viṣṇu
Purāṇa
and Buddhist and Jain sources.xii
Notes:
i
Eli Franco (Perception, Knowledge and
Disbelief: A Study of Jayarāśi’s Scepticism
(Delhi: MLBD, 1994) )modifies this assertion by calling Jayarāśi
a sceptic Lokāyata rather than a materialist (XII-XIII), but very
few pay attention to his distinction. They call Jayarāśi a Cārvāka
or a Lokāyata, apparently meaning a materialist.
ii For
instance, Vidyānandasvāmin, Aṣṭasahasrī
(Mumbapuri: Nirnayasagara Press, 1915) 37:
tadime tattvopaplavavādinaḥ… ;
idem,Tattvārthaślokavārttika (Mumbapuri:
Nirnayasagara Press ,1918) 80, 195;
Anantavīrya, Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā
(Kashi: Bharatiya Jnanapith,1959) 277-278 – all treat the
Cārvāka and tattvopaplava-vāda
separately. – For a
survey of the Jayarāśi controversy, see Sukhlalji Sanghvi and
Rasiklal Parikh, Introduction to the Tattvopaplavasiṃha
of Jayarāśibhaṭṭa (Baroda: Oriental
Institute, 1940) i-xiv, reprinted in Cārvāka/Lokāyata
(n28 above), 492-504 and Eli Franco (n34
above), XI-XIII, 4-8. For the other view see Walter Ruben (reprinted
in Cārvāka/Lokāyata,
505-519), and K. K. Dixit (reprinted in Cārvāka/Lokāyata,
520-530), D. Chattopadhyaya, Indian
Philosophy: A Popular Introduction (New
Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1964), 222-223, and In
Defence of Materialism in Ancient India (New
Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1989) 36-41. See also R.
Bhattacharya in an interview with Krishna Del Toso, “The Wolf’s
Footprints: Indian Materialism in perspective,” Annali
71 (2011): 183-204 (particularly 188-191), and Tattvopaplavasiṃha
of Jayarāśibhaṭṭa, trans. V. N. Jha
(Ernakulam: Chinmaya International
Foundation Shodha Sansthan, 2013) xi.
iii
“Mukhavandha” (Foreword ) to D. K. Mohanta , Tattvopaplavasiṃha:
Jayarāśibhaṭṭer Saṃśayavāda (
Kolkata: Sanskrita Sahitya Bhandar, 1998)
[xiii].
iv
It is also improper to translate nāstika
as ‘agnostic’ (as Goldman has done in his translation (The
Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki,
vol. 1, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984) 136), for a nāstika
in its earliest use is a non-believer in the other-world, later one
who denies the authority of the Veda; then one who says there is no
god or gods (atheist). In short he or she is a typical neinsager
(one who says no). But he or she is neither a doubter nor undecided
about acquisition of knowledge as such. See R. Bhattacharya,
“Development of Materialism in India: the Pre-Cārvākas and the
Cārvākas,” Esercizi
Filosofici
8 (2013): 1-12.
v
Sanghvi and Parikh (see n34 above) 124; V. N. Jha (n34 above) 464.
vi
Indian Philosophy: A Popular Introduction,
(see n34 above) 222-23. Even earlier, in two essays in Bangla
published in 1963 (see his Saṃghaṃ
Śaraṇaṃ Gacchami ityādi agranthita racanā
(Kolkata: Ababhas, 2010) 74-84) Chattopadhyaya stated the same
point.
vii
M. K. Gangopadhyaya , “Mukhavandha,” [xi].
viii
The Śabda-kalpa-druma
(Kalikata: Hitavadi Karyyalaya, 1836 Saka era (1924 CE)) glosses
pāṣaṇḍa as one
who behaves contrary to the Veda, one who bears all the marks (i.e.,
a heretic) ; the Buddhists, the Jains and others (some commentators
on the lexicons name these two communities in particular); The
Sanskrit-Wörterbuch
(Eds. O. Böhtlingk and R. Roth (Delhi: MLBD, 1990 reprint)) glosses
pāṣaṇḍa as Irrlehre
(untaught), Ketzerei
(heresy), also Ketzer
(heretic).
ix
D. Chattopadhyaya, Indian Philosophy,
223.
x
M. K. Gangopadhyaya, Foreword, [xi]. The etymology of pākhaṇḍa
as suggested is found in an anonymous verse quoted in Bhānuji
Dīkṣita’s Rāmāśramī (Vyākhyāsudhā),
a commentary on the Nāmaliṃgānuśasana
(Amarakoṣa) (Varanasi: Chaukhambha
Sanskrit Sansthan, Vikrama era 2099),
Brahmavarga, 44d.
xi
R. Bhattacharya, Studies,
Chap. 5.
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Ramkrishna
Bhattacharya taught English at the University
of Calcutta, Kolkata and
was an Emeritus Fellow of University Grants Commission. He is now a Fellow
of PAVLOV Institute, Kolkata.
Email
ID: ramkrishna.bhattacharya@gmail.com)
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