Specimens of Philosophico-Religious Literature in Tamil: The Maṇimēkalai and the Nīlakēci

Ramkrishna Bhattacharya

North-South Divide

The story of Agastya, a north Indian sage, crossing the Vindhya hills and visiting south India (never to return), is well known. It has given rise to a proverb, Agstya-yātrā in Bangla and maybe in other north Indian languages. Like all legends it is without date. So, it has been interpreted as an allegory of the ingress of the north to the south, or, as a recent historian has said, ‘evidence of Aryan speakers’  movement towards the south’ (Noboru Karashima,  ‘Beginnigs of south Indian history’ in: Noboru Karashima (ed.), A Concise History of South India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014, p.26). From about the third century BCE, religions that were born in north India spread to the south. Interestingly enough, two heterodox religions, Buddhism and Jainism were first to reach the Deccan and further south; the brahmanical religion (Vedist) was to reach later. There are enough archaeological findings to suggest so. The most conspicuous of the north Indian religions was Buddhism, though traditionally Jain migration is said to have started as early as the time of King Chandragupta Maurya (fourth century BCE).

The reflection of both Buddhism and Jainism is found in old Tamil literature. There are several long narrative poems that seek to establish the superiority of either Buddhism or Jainism. The brahmanical religion did not find roots in the south before the first century BCE. Consequently, in the Common Era we find specimens of works belonging to these three religions, written not in Sanskrit, but in Tamil.

Historians of Tamil literature or of Indian literature as a whole (one such ambitious work is Sisir Kumar Das’s A History of Indian Literature 500-1399, New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 2005) seldom, if at all, mention the fact that the polemics in the Manimēkalai (The Jewel Belt) , the Nilakēci  (The Blue-Haired), and similar works contain strong denunciation of several philosophical systems that came from the north to the south. Tolerance is now projected as the hall mark of Indian culture. Contrary to this notion, there seems to have been no love lost between the Indian philosophical systems and Jainism as well as Buddhism in the south. Apparently, Buddhism and Jainism were both imported in their northern garb. Nevertheless, in the course of time, south India produced most eminent Buddhist logicians, such as Diṅnāga (c 480-540 CE). The Jains too in their turn gave birth to such theologians and philosophers as Kundakunda (first century BCE), who earned all-India fame in the Common Era.

Tamil Literature: Its Antiquity and Variety

It is to be kept in mind that ‘Tamil can claim one of the longest unbroken literary tradition of any of the world’s living languages’ (Kamil Veith Zvelebil, Tamil Literature (A History of Indian Literature, Volume X Fascicule 1, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1974), p.2). Nota Bene (Note Well): ‘the world’s living languages’, not just India’s.

Jean Filliozat, in his essay, ‘The Jaina narrative literature in South India and its counterparts’ (Indologica Taurinensia, Vol. XI, 1983, pp.97-107), provides an account of the rich narrative tradition in Tamil. What is noteworthy is that, besides entertaining their audience with interesting stories, the narratives are also highly tendentious: they indulge in undisguised propaganda in favour of their respective religions and philosophical systems. No counterpart of these narratives is to be found in the north. Historians of Tamil literature have called them ‘epics’, although they do not conform to either the Sanskrit criteria laid down in the books of poetics and rhetoric nor judged by European standards. As Zvelebil has explained:

To express this terminologically, we may say that Tamil epic texts are not itihāsas, i.e. large narrative poems (large in character, in events, in setting, in effect) of the traditional heroic past, but rather longer or shorter mahākāvyas. . . . They are very different from each other and, strictly speaking, some of them should hardly be called epics in the narrower and more technical sense at all. But they are not as radically different from the accepted concept of the epic as, say, Dante’s Divine Comedy which has also been called an epic. (Zvelebil, 1974, p.16).

Philosophical Debates in the Epics

The Maṇimēkalai [Ilanko Ādigāl and Sattanar, Maṇimēkalai, trans. Prema Nandakumar, Thanjavur: Tamil University, 1989] (± 550 CE) is what in Tamil tradition is called an epic. So is the Nīlakēci (± 950 CE). The first is the story of the wanderings of a Buddhist lady ascetic called Maṇimēkalai. It is said to reflect ‘almost exactly the ideas of Diṅnāga, the founder of Buddhist logic’ (Zvelebil, p.141). Among other things the epic Maṇimēkalai contains the first known list of ṣaṭ-tarkī, six systems of philosophy based on argument: Lokāyata, Buddhism, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā (27.78-80). Instead of the āstika/nāstika division of the philosophical systems (based on the brahmanical criterion of adhering or not adhering to the Veda), here is a secular division of systems founded, on the one hand, on argument and the other (presumably) on faith. Maṇimēkalai, the heroine, enquires of the basic tenets of all philosophical systems – Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā, etc. – and finds all of them wanting in substance. In the debates, Buddhism ultimately proves to be the victor over all Veda-abiding systems as also Jainism and materialism with its two schools, Bhūtavāda and Lokāyata (27.272-73). The Maṇimēkalai then, besides its other merits, is the earliest work of doxography (collection of views of ancient philosophical schools, now lost). The earliest doxographical work in Sanskrit so far known to us is the Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya by a Jain savant, Haribhadra, which was composed in the eighth century CE, long after the Maṇimēkalai. The Nīlakēci, too, is a doxographical work of some importance, for it records several doctrinal aspects of southern Buddhism, probably not to be found anywhere else. The inclusion of the Ᾱjīvikas is also significant. No other heterodox view that was current in the Buddha’s lifetime is mentioned. All of them seem to have become extinct in the Common Era.

With the passage of time, religious and philosophical systems that had their origin in north travelled to the south. It has already been mentioned that Jainism perhaps came first with Chandragupta Maurya (fourth century BCE), followed closely by Buddhism (third century BCE); brahmanism with its emphasis on varṇāśrama-dharma  was late to arrive (first century BCE). The Ācārakkōvai  ‘belongs to the brahmanical school and is a digest of ideas from the dharmasastra’ (Y. Subbarayalu, ‘Sangam and Post-Sangam Literature’ in: Noboru Karashima (ed.), A Concise History of South India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014, p.46). There is also a Jain work called Silappatikāram,  also spelt Cilappatikāram (The Lay of the Anklet) (c.450 CE) by Ilangovadigal, supposed to be a Chera prince. ‘Unlike the Silappatikāram [a Jain kāvya], the Maṇimēkalai [a Budddhist kāvya] is quite outspoken in religious propagation and underlines the fact that there were lots of polemical disputes and discussions developing among adherence of rival religions’ (ibid., pp.46-47).

The Jains, however, were not to be left behind: the author of the Nīlakēci (Neelakesi, edited, translated into English and published by A. Chakravarti, Kumbhakonam, 1936), although Jain and hence tolerant by conviction, spares no religion or philosophical system. In the last part of the work (Section IV Chapters 1-10, pp.136-336), Nīlakēci, the Jain nun, deals with no fewer than ten doctrines: 1. Dharma Urai (Tarumavurai, exposition of the [Jaina] dharma), 2. Kuṇḍalakēci-vāda (the doctrine of Kuṇṭalakēci, i.e., the Buddhist doctrine preached by a lady Buddhist ascetic), 3. Arka-candra-vāda (another Buddhist doctrine), 4. Mokkala-vāda (the doctrine of Mokkalaṉ, Pali Moggallāna, Sanskrit Maudgalyāyana, refers to the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, kṣaṇikavāda), 5. Buddha-vāda, 6. Ājīvika-vāda (doctrine of the Ājīvikas, a heterodox sect, now extinct), 7. Sāṃkhya-vāda, 8. Vaiśeṣika-vāda, 9. Veda-vāda (Mīmāṃsā), and 10. Bhūta-vāda (Pūtavātam, materialism).

Referring to (and apparently agreeing with) the view of Chakravarti), Filliozat writes:

It has been observed by the editor, A. Chakravarti, who contributes a detailed introduction to the work, that the major non-Jaina schools of philosophy: Śaṅkara, the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava Saints, Nāyaṉmār and Āḻvār, are not mentioned in the work. Chakravarti thinks that this is because they did not yet exist as opponents of the Jaina doctrine, so that the polemical work Nīlakēci must belong to the period before their emergence. This may place the composition of the Nīlakēci in the 5th or 6th centuries’ (Filliozat p. 105).

Modern scholars, however, prefer to date the work much later (tenth century CE. See Zvelebil p.139).

Materialist Schools Expounded in the Epics

What is most noteworthy is the mention of bhūtavāda in both the epics. The Maṇimēkalai refers to another materialist school called Lokāyata (27.272-73). Curiously enough, the Nīlakēci does not mention Lokāyata at all; it speaks of bhūtavāda alone. [One caveat: Appaswami Chakravarti Nayanar in his translation of the Nīlakēci 4.10 often uses such expressions as ‘the Lôkâyata teacher’ (p.322)or ‘the Chârvâka teacher’ (p.335 thrice, p.336 twice). But the text (checked and confirmed by A. Mahalingam) invariably refers to Pūtavātam and Pūtavāti.  Similarly, a quotation from Shakespeare’s Hamlet is inserted (p.336), which is obviously not in the original. Barring these, Chakravarti’s translation, I am assured, is fairly faithful to the original.]

The doctrinal aspect of materialism (of the pre-Cārvāka kind) is more or less the same in both the epics: unlike the Cārvākas, earlier materialists in India relied on one instrument of cognition only, namely, perception, while the Cārvākas admitted the validity of inference up to a certain extent (in so far as it was based on and/or was verifiable by perception). There are other differences between the pre-Cārvākas and the Cārvākas, which can be discerned from later evidence (for details see R. Bhattacharya, ‘Development of Materialism in India: the Pre-Cārvākas and the Cārvākas’, Esercizi Filosofici 8, 2013, pp.1-12. (2013a). ISSN 1970-0164. Link: http://www2.units.it/eserfilo/art813/bhattacharya813.pdf).

The Maṇimēkalai contains the first ever description of Lokāyata as a philosophical system, not a mere śāstra of disputation. In the Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist tradition disputatio is the only meaning of Lokāyata. The Maṇimēkalai refers to no book of disputation but specifically mentions Lokāyata as a separate school of materialism, different from bhūtavāda.

Predominance of Women

One word more. Tamil epics have no heroes; they have heroines. There are no scenes of bloody battles, but only battles of ideals, both religious and philosophical. The heroines, whether Buddhist or Jain, are self-confident, vocal, and always prepared to take part in a debate. They roam about the whole Tamil land, disguised as male. Social historians have detected ‘indications of matrifocal and matripedestal traditions in the sources, indicating different cultural practices within the Tamil macroregion. The post-Sangam literature (c. fourth-sixth centuries CE), marked by the didactic works and the epics, points to influences from outside the region in the form of Jainism and Buddhism. . . . However, the new ideas presented by the Sramanic traditions were eclipsed in the early medieval period with the growth of the Brahmanical religion in the region’ (R. Mahalakshmi, ‘Women in premodern south Indian society’ in: Karashima (ed.), p.115).

[‘Matrifocal societies are those that are centred on the mother as the pivotal figure in the social organization, while matripedestal refers to the idolization and worship of the mother.’ Ibid., p.115 n39.]

Appendix A

The bhūtavādī in the Maṇimēkalai is made to declare the basic doctrine of the system he adheres to in the following terms (as translated by Prema Nandakumar):

When aathi (?) flowers, sugar and the restAre mixed, wine is made. Life too appearsBy the mixing of elements, vanishesWhen they separate as sounds from a drum.Conscious elements produce life withinAnd unconscious one produces the bodyEach appearing through their elements.This is the truth. Words different from thisAnd other facts are from Materialists [Lokāyatas].Sense perception is valid. InferenceIs false. This birth and its effect concludeNow. Talk of other birth is falsity. (27.265-76, p. 154)

The words of the bhūtavādī have been paraphrased by a late medieval commentator in the following way:

When certain flowers and jaggery are boiled together, liquor is born which produced intoxication. Just as when elements combine, consciousness arises. Consciousness dissolves with the dissolutions of the elements composing them like the disintegration of sound. Elements combine to produce living Bhūtas and from them other living Bhūtas will be born. Life and consciousness are synonymous. From non-living Bhūtas consisting of two or more elements rise non-living Bhūtas of the same type. Lokāyata is a variant of this system that agrees in fundamental with this system. Observation is the method by knowledge is obtained. Inferential thinking is illusion. This worldly life is real. Its effect is experienced in this life only. The theory that we enjoy the fruits of our action in our next birth or in another world is false. (Quoted and translated by N. Vanamamalai)

Appendix B

There are at least two recent translations of the Maṇimēkalai  in English, one in prose and other in verse:

Maṇimēkalai (The Dancer with the Magic Bowl), trans. Alain Danielou with the collaboration of T.V. Gopala Iyer, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1993.

Maṇimēkalai, trans. Prema Nandakumar, Thanjavur: Tamil University, 1989.

There is also an abridged version of the epic:

Lakshmi Holmstörm, Manimekalai/Silappattikasam, Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1996.

No other edition or translation of the Nīlakēci excepting the ones by A.Chakravarti is available. The 1936 edition has ben reprinted several times. Both the text and the translation are available on the net.

The following articles are of interest:

Miyamoto Jō, Lōkāyata in Tamil, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. 55, No.3, March 2007, pp.1131-1135.

G. Suryanaryana Sastri, The Manimekalai Account of the Sankhya, Journal of Indian History 8 (1929) pp.322-327.

G. Suryanaryana Sastri, Buddhist Logic in Manimekalai, Journal of Indian History 9 (1930) part iii.

N. Vanamamalai, Materialist Thought in Early Tamil Literature, Social Scientist, Vol.2  No.4 (November 1973), pp.25-41, also available on the net (JSPOR).

Other sources have been mentioned in the text of the lecture within parentheses.

Acknowledgements Chayan Samaddar, Prabir Gangopadhyay, Sunish Kumar Deb. The usual disclaimers apply.

Ramkrishna Bhattacharya taught English at the University of Calcutta, Kolkata and was an Emeritus Fellow of University Grants Commission. He is now a Fellow of Pavlov Institute, Kolkata.

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Development of Logic in India: Significance of ‘The Duologue between Pāyāsi and Kassapa’ (“Long Discourses”)

Ramkrishna Bhattacharya

ABSTRACT ‘The Duologue of King/Governor Pāyāsi’ (“Long Discourses”) has long been recognised as a source for the proto-materialism current at the time of the Buddha. What needs to be stressed is the significance of the text as a pointer to the development of Logic in India. Perception (observation and experiment employing the joint method of agreement and difference), which is an accepted method of experimental enquiry, and reasoning from analogy, which can lead at best to a probable conclusion – these two are the only means employed to settle the dispute concerning the existence of the other-world. The Jain version of the same duologue-cum-parable, though varying in minor detailsregarding the name and identity of the monk refuting the king/governor, contains the same contrast, namely, perception versus analogical reasoning. There can be little doubt that the original parable was conceived with a view to asserting the existence of the other-world. In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (sixth century BCE), an earlier Brahmanical text, however, instead of argument by analogy, verbal testimony (śabda) was invoked to settle the same point. Naciketas is assailed by doubt about the existence of a person after his or her death. The authority of Yama, the Pluto of Indian mythology, is invoked to convince him that the other-world does exist. Thus, the three parables taken together exhibit three means of knowledge in operation: verbal testimony and argument by analogy pitted against perception.

In the sixth/fifth century BCE, India was inundated by several new doctrines and strange ideas, unheard-of before. They were proposed and, in turn, challenged by opposite ideas, each one claiming to refute the doctrines of others. We hear of no fewer than sixty-two itinerant philosophers, belonging to different strata of life, moving from one place to another throughout the length and breadth of North India. They are accompanied by a sizeable number of disciples. Six names are often mentioned in Buddhist (Pali and Sanskrit) and Jain (Prakrit and Sanskrit) works. Of them Erich Frauwallner has taken Purana Kassapa (Pūraṇa Kāśyapa in Sanskrit), Ajita Kesakambala (Keśakambalin in Sanskrit), and Kakuda Kaccāyana (Kātyāyana in Sanskrit) as representatives of the ‘oldest materialist doctrine’ (Frauwallner, 1971, pp. 219-221). But, even before mentioning the doctrines of these three, Frauwallner projects King Pāyāsi (Paesi in Prakrit) as ‘the first materialist’(Frauwallner, 1971, p. 216). It is not clear whether he regards Paesi as younger or elder than these itinerant preachers. However, he proposes Paesi to be ‘an old Indian Materialist on the King’s throne,’ and adds in the very next sentence: ‘And Paesi was certainly not the only one of his kind’ (Frauwallner, 1971, pp. 218- 19). Frauwallner treats Purana, Ajita, and Kakuda as materialists because ‘the three are unanimous in the fact that they deny continuance after death and the moral consequences arising therefrom, and are, in this sense, genuine materialistic doctrines’(Frauwallner, 1971, pp. 220-21). It is difficult to agree with this view. The text of the ‘Discourse on the Fruits of Being a Monk’ (‘Sāmāñña-phala-sutta’) in the “Long Discourses” (Dīghanikāya) reveals that among the three only Ajita has the claim to be a materialist (to be more exact, a proto-materialist), and the other two, Purana and Kakuda, are basically immaterialists.

However, it will be improper to identify even Ajita or any one of the itinerant gurus as a full-fledged materialist, for the expositions of their respective doctrines made by all the six preachers are too brief to be considered an adequate description of their worldviews. Frauwallner himself notes: ‘But however interesting and characteristic such accounts are, they can rarely claim a place of the same kind in a history of Indian philosophy. Materialism gains for it an importance from the moment only when it emerged in the form of a regular doctrine and took up arms against the remaining philosophical schools’ (Frauwallner, 1971, p. 221).

The genesis of materialism in India can be traced in, besides the Upaniṣads, some tales found in both Buddhist and Jain works. One such tale, the duologue between King/Governor Pāyāsi and a Buddhist or a Jain monk, has often been cited as an instance of materialism.[i]  The tale, found both in Buddhist and Jain sources,[ii]  however, merely testifies to the prevalence of a non-conformist attitude that denied the idea of the immortal soul surviving after the death of the body in which it previously resided. That is all that is to be found in the Pāyāsi duologue. The legend was presumably composed with a definite view of discrediting those heretics who refused to believe in the existence of the other-world (paraloka), and hence in the immortality of the soul. This task of converting or defeating such a non-believer is accomplished by a Buddhist monk in the Pali Pāyāsi duologue, and by a Jain monk in the two Prakrit versions of the same legend. A duologue between the king and a Buddhist or a  Jain monk is a well-known and oft-used narrative device encountered in many later works.[iii]

Pāyāsi is represented as a non-believer in the existence of the other-world, rebirth, and reward and recrimination of one’s deeds after death, the three axioms of the Buddha’s philosophy as recorded in the canonical Discourses. His assertion, ‘Neither is there any other-world, nor are there beings reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit of deeds, well done or ill done’ (natthi paro loko, natthisattā opapātikā, natthisukatadukkaṭānaṃ kammānaṃ phalaṃ vipāko),[iv]  is quoted and re-quoted in other Buddhist canonical texts, although his name is not mentioned.[v]  A distinction is made between the affirmativist doctrine (atthikavāda) and the negativist doctrine (natthikavāda) on the basis of the existence and non-existence of the other-world.[vi]

It forms the essence of Ajita Kesakambala’s doctrine of annihilation (ucchedavāda), the first known formulation of the proto-materialist doctrine in India.[vii]  Ajita’s exposition of his ‘worldview’ is more elaborate than Pāyāsi’s, but the essence of their teachings is similar, if not the same, in all respects.

Pāyāsi states his conclusion on the basis of his own observations and experiments, whereas the Buddhist monk offers a series of analogues, and we are told that by means of the argument by analogy he succeeds in converting the king to a faithful believer in after-life, rebirth, and the consequence of one’s deeds.

Here we have not only the conflict between a non-believer and a believer (not however on the existence of god or gods, but on that of the other-world) but also one of the earliest instances of the inductive method in settling a dispute: actual observation and experiment on the one side, and use of analogy on the other. Not in this duologue alone, but in all the dialogues found in other works, the contraposition of sense perception and argument by analogy is a notable feature in the early history of Indian logic.

Dasgupta (1975, pp. 32-33) observes that the Cārvākas – presumably meaning materialists of all sorts before and after the eighth century BCE – admitted perception alone as the valid source of knowledge; the Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣika admitted two, perception and inference; Sāṃkhya added śabda (verbal testimony) as the third source; and Nyāya the fourth, upamāna (comparison). This kind of statement found in earlier sources (see ibidem) is but the enumeration of the means of knowledge admitted by different systems of philosophy arranged in ascending order, not in a chronological order attested by evidence. However, besides comparison, there are no fewer than twenty four different analogues in the Nyāya tradition (for a brief summary of these see Vidyabhusana, 1988, pp. 67 et seq.) which qua argument are not valid, and hence regarded as ‘futile rejoinder’ (jāti) in the Nyāya tradition.[viii]  The point to be remembered is that, long before such analogues were identified, named and included in books of Logic, these were already current in practice. Any simile or metaphor carries within it the rudiments of logic, in so far as comparison is meant to establish a point in recognizing a particular aspect, common to the object of comparison (upameya) and the otherwise dissimilar object that has been brought from outside (upamāna) on the basis of a common point of resemblance (sādhāraṇa dharma). A parable is but an extended simile, didactic and elucidative in nature. Such parables are abundantly found in the whole of Vedic literature as also in the sacred books of the Buddhists and the Jains (Gonda, 1949, pp.4-92). As Gonda observes:

I have made a simile for you that you may understand what I mean, by means of a simile many a wise man understands the meaning of the argumentation are sayings of the Buddha…. [V]ery often these Buddhist similes are broadly elaborated and made into real parables, told in a lively and illustrative way and more than once couched in the form of dialogue. (Gonda, 1949, p. 90, emphasis added)

The ‘Pāyāsi suttanta’ is the most appropriate instance of such a parable ‘couched in the form of dialogue’. It is not the account of an actual argument that took place between a king/governor and a Buddhist Master, but only an imaginary tale with a view to driving home an article of faith of Buddhism, namely, the existence of the other-world.

In this parable Pāyāsi is posited as a heartless and unscrupulous ruler, capable of performing diabolical experiments in order to locate the so-called soul. One of the experiments he undertook was to weigh a felon and then have him strangled with a bow string and weigh him again. The purpose was to see whether there was any difference in the weight of the body. Jayatilleke (1980, p. 105) and echoing his words Franco and Preisendanz (1998, p. 179) refer to such experiments as ‘gruesome’, as if such an experiment was ever actually performed. In a recent article Franco (2011, p. 634) has refrained from using any such qualifier. Refusal to discriminate between a fictitious narrative and an actual event, or rather considering every fictive account to be an unimpeachable fact, is a common blunder that both the wise and the naïve often fall prey to. Jayatilleke, anticipated by Jacobi (1970, p. 770), himself says that “the teachings ascribed to [Yājñavalkya] in different places in the Upaniṣads do not seem to be of a piece, consistent with each other.…The probable explanation for this is that several incompatible doctrines were put in the mouth of an outstanding teacher [viz., Yājñavalkya]” (Jayatilleke, 1980, p. 40).[ix]  Why then an exception is to be made in case of Pāyāsi is not clear. The intention of the authors of this parable in Pali and Prakrit was to portray Pāyāsi in a bad light, which is why he is made to appear as a ruthless ruler, his motto being fiat experimentum, ‘Let the experiment be made’ (in Bacon’s words), totally a-moral and unscrupulous.

The fact of the matter is that all these were mere ‘thought experiments,’ Gedanken experiments, as Albert Einstein used to call them, that is, experiments conceived in thought only, never carried out actually. The so-called ‘gruesome experiments’ of Pāyāsi were similarly imagined, or rather conjured up, by the author of the legend solely to denigrate the king/governor. It is also worth noting that neither the Buddhist monk Kassapa nor the Jain monk Kesi criticizes or censures Pāyāsi or Paesi for undertaking such cruel experiments, nor does either of them challenge the validity of their protocols. Kassapa himself suggests such ‘thought experiments,’ hypothetical situations and events (Cārvāka/Lokāya, 1990, sections 9-28, pp. 13-29). Not being able to offer the results of any counterexperiments (actual or mental) conducted by himself, Kassapa has to resort to analogical reasoning. He uses the word upamā (comparison, also meaning simile and parable) and claims that by ‘by a simile some intelligent persons will recognize the meaning of what is said’ (Cārvāka/Lokāya, 1990, p. 14 et seq.). The Buddha in the Discourses is also made to utter these very words (see Gonda, 1949, p. 90, quoted above). Now, all arguments by analogy can at best be probable, as any college textbook of logic would say. Of course, some arguments or inferences by analogy are rigorous, some non-rigorous, and some downright false (Germanova, 1989, pp. 205-08). The analogues in the two parables belong to the third category. Yet, they prove to be (to be exact, are told to be) more effective than empirical observations and experiments applying the joint method of agreement and difference; Pāyāsi decides to accept the analogical arguments and jettisons the results he had previously obtained by empirical investigation. He is made to declare that he was pleased with Master Kassapa’s very first simile; he was in fact charmed by it. But just because he wished to hear more of the Master’s ready wit, he continued to argue (Cārvāka/Lokāya, 1990, p. 29). Perception (pratyakṣa), the Nyāya philosophers affirm unanimously, is the eldest of all instruments of cognition (pramāṇa-jyeṣṭha). In this parable, however, analogical reasoning is made to appear superior to perception.

More interesting is the way in which the controversy is conducted. Pāyāsi is made to adhere strictly to perceptible evidence, and the Buddhist monk sticks to argument by analogy. Since rebirth and karmic retribution are two pillars of both Jain and Buddhist faiths, their opposition to any form of protomaterialism is understandable.[x] What is striking is the resort to analogical reasoning which was not admitted as an instrument of cognition in later Buddhist logic. In spite of their subtle differences, the four main Buddhist philosophical schools (Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, Sautrāntika, and Vaibhāṣika) were unanimous in admitting only two instruments of cognition, namely, perception and inference, and nothing else (such as, comparison, verbal testimony, etc.). Yet in their rebuttal to the proto-materialist dependence on perception alone, the redactor/s of the Pāyāsi legend opted for argument by analogy, as exemplified in both the Pali and Prakrit versions. The common origin of the story manufactured to denounce the negativists is apparent in the use of analogues by the early redactor/s.

An earlier and parallel instance of fabricating a story with a view to disparaging the disbelievers in the other-world, that is, a parable, is first noticed in the Brahmanical tradition. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad (sixth century BCE) is the Brahmanical version of the Pāyāsi duologues. Admittedly there are several differences: the chief of which is that, instead of a Buddhist or a Jain monk, Yama, the Pluto of Indian mythology, and Naciketas, a young doubter (though not a denier) of the after-world, are made to face each other in this Upaniṣad. Second, there is no argument; Yama acts as the guru and Naciketas, the disciple. However, word (śabda) or verbal testimony takes the place of analogy in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad: Yama is projected as the authority (āpta) and it is his assurance alone that convinces Naciketas that the other-world does exist. Who but the Lord of the Land of the Dead could be a better authority to speak on what happens to a human after his/her death? Whatever doubt (vicikitsā) the young Brahmana boy had (Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads, 1958, Kaṭha 1.1.20) was dispelled by him for good. But in order to make his expertise established in the mind of the listener/reader, an elaborate story starting with a sacrifice (yajña) is introduced; Naciketas is brought step by step in the presence of Yama. Yama is shown to be extremely reluctant to part with ‘the secret knowledge’ he carried within himself. Even the gods, he says, are not conversant with what happened after the death of a person (Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads, 1958, Kaṭha 1.1.21). Thus, without resorting to any argument by analogy, Yama imparts to Naciketas the ultimate affirmativist (āstika) view – not of any god or idea, but of the other-world.

In spite of all this, the point to be noted is that the refusal to accept the continuance of the extra-corporeal soul has been, from the outset, the hallmark of materialist thinking in India.[xi] It is found in a Brahmanical sacred book as well as in the Buddhist and Jain canonical or paracanonical works.

Thus the believers in the other-world, whether a Vedist, a Buddhist or a Jain, combat the negativist (nāstika) view either with the help of argument by analogy or by producing the testimony of an authoritative person. The King/Governor called Pāyāsi is as much imaginary as Yama and Yājñavalkya in the Upaniṣads; Master Kassapa and Kesi too are equally fictive characters like Naciketas and his father. Together they are brought to perform only one task: defeat any sceptic or non-believer in the actual existence of heaven and hell.

Some are of the opinion that Pāyāsi’s experiments reveal Greek influence. Balcerowicz has convincingly shown that experiment was as much a part of the Indian tradition as of the Greek.[xii] He has referred to Uddālaka Āruṇi’s experiments as stated in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads, 1958, 6.12.1-2, 13.1-2) in support of this view. One interesting point is that, while speaking about arche, Uddālaka too resorts to analogy: the fig fruit and its seeds (Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads, 1958, Chāndogya 6.12.1-3). Argument by analogy is known in the Upaniṣadic times, but in the case of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, verbal testimony has been considered a better form of argument than analogical reasoning.

The Pāyāsi parables as well as the Yama-Naciketas duologue then do not concern ontology alone; they are no less significant in tracing the development of Logic in India as well. In all the different versions of the parables we come across three specific instruments of cognition employed. They are perception, analogy, and verbal testimony.

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[i] SeeFrauwallner (1971, p. 216). Apparently Frauwallner (and those who follow him in this regard) took it to be a real-life account. It is a glaring example of mistaking fiction for fact. There is no evidence of the existence  of a king or governor called Pāyāsi, who had conducted some experiments to find out the nature of the soul. Moreover, the narrative highlights only one aspect of materialist thought, namely, denial of the existence of any immortal soul, and hence of the doctrine of karma and its consequence, rebirth. The most significant aspect of any philosophical system in India is epistemology, more particularly the instrument/s of cognition (pramāṇa) a system admits. Nothing is stated directly regarding this vital issue in any of the canonical works contained in The Three Baskets (Tipitaka), although the duologue of Pāyāsi implies that only ocular proof or perception (pratyakṣa) is what Pāyāsi was prepared to accept. Therefore, it will not be justified to treat the Pāyāsi legend as a true exposition of the materialist doctrine as a whole. Frauwallner (1971, p. 221) – quoted below – too admits this.

[ii] Although the names and hence the characters in the narratives in the ‘The Discourse of King/Governor Pāyāsi’ (‘Pāyāsi(rājañña)-suttanta’) in The Long Discourses (Dīghanikāya) and the two Jain secular works, Dialogue of King Prasenajit (Rāyapasenaijja) and Haribhadra’s Story of Samarāditya (Samarāiccakahā), vary widely, yet the original story (now lost) from which all the three seem to have been derived must have been the same. Tucci (1971, p. 389) rightly observes: “The analogies which the Pāyāsisuttanta shows to have with the Jaina Rāyapaseṇiya and some passages of Samarāiccakahā cannot be explained as mutual borrowings but, rather, as various derivations from real doctrines followed in ancient times.

[iii] We may think of such works as Āryaśūra’s The Garland of Birth Stories (Jātakamālā), Somadeva’s long poem dealing with various religious and philosophical issues from the Jain point of view (Yaśastilaka-campū), and the Jain scholar Hemacandra’s Lives of Sixty-Three Eminent Persons (Triṣaṣṭi-Śalākā-Puruṣa-Carita). The same device is found even earlier in Saṅghadāsagaṇi (sixth/seventh century CE)’s The Wanderings of Vasudeva (Vasudevahiṃḍī). For further details see Bhattacharya (2009, pp. 102-09).

[iv] 4 Dīghanikāya 2:10.1.2 p.23.6.

[v] 5 See, for instance, ‘Apaṇṇakasuttaṃ’ 10.1.3,4, (Majjimanikāya, Part 2, pp. 78-79); ‘Sandakasuttaṃ’ 26.1.3.12-23, (Majjimanikāya, p. 213).

[vi] 6 ‘Sandakasuttaṃ’, Majjimanikāya, p. 213) cf. also sace kho natthi paro loko evam ayaṃ, sace kho atthi paro loko evam ayaṃ. ‘Apaṇṇakasuttaṃ’, (Majjimanikāya, 2.10.1.4, 14-15, pp.79-80).

[vii] Ajita explained his ‘worldview’ to king Ajātasattu as follows:

“O King, there is no (consequence to) alms-giving, sacrifice or oblation. A good or bad action produces no result. This world does not exist, nor does the other world. There is no mother, no father. There is no rebirth of beings after death. In this world, there are no samanas [Śramaṇas] or brāhmaṇas established in the Noble Path and accomplished in good practice, who, through direct knowledge (i.e., magga insight) acquired by their own efforts, can expound on this world and the other world. This being is but a compound of the four great primary elements; after death, the earth-element (or element of extension) returns and goes back to the body of the earth, the water-element (or element of cohesion) returns and goes back to the body of water, the fire-element (or element of thermal energy) returns and goes back to the body of fire, and the air-element (or element of motion) returns and goes back to the body of air, while the mental faculties pass on into space. The four pall-bearers and the bier (constituting the fifth) carry the corpse. The remains of the dead can be seen up to the cemetery where bare bones lie graying like the colour of the pigeons. All almsgiving ends in ashes. Fools prescribe alms-giving; and some assert that there is such a thing as merit in alms-giving; but their words are empty, false and nonsensical. Both the fool and the wise are annihilated and destroyed after death and dissolution of their bodies. Nothing exists after death”. (‘Discourse on the Fruits of Being a Monk’, ‘Sāmañña-phala-sutta’, 2.4.21-23, Dīghanikāya, 1: p. 48-49; Ten Suttas from Dīgha Nikāya, 1987, p.83, translation modified). Cf. Pāyāsi’s words quoted above.

[viii] 8 Nyāyasūtra Va 1-3 in Ruben (1928, pp. 129-31); 5.1.1-3 in Gangopadhyaya (1982, pp. 375-78).

[ix] Jayatilleke (1980, p. 40). The way some eminent scholars (not to speak of the devotees) speak of the gods and seers and kings, in short, the dramatis personae in the sacred books of any religion, inevitably reminds me of what has been said of J. J. Bachofen (1815-87), author of Das Mutterecht (1851): “This new but absolutely correct interpretation of the Oresteia is one of the best and most beautiful passages in the whole book. But it shows at the same time that Bachofen himself believes in the Erinyes, Apollo and Athena at least as much as Aeschylus did in his day; he, in fact, believes that in the Heroic Age of Greece they performed the miracle of overthrowing mother right and replacing it by father right. Clearly such a conception – which regards religion as the decisive lever in world history – must finally end in sheer mysticism” (Engels, n. d., p. 15).

[x] For the views of later Buddhist philosophers in relation to the other-world and its deniers, see, e.g., Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta (1953, pp. 52-67). For a general survey of the pramāṇavādin tradition of ‘proving the existence of the other-world’ (paralokasādhana or -siddhi) directed to the refutation of materialist philosophy, see Namai (1991, pp. 227-41).

[xi] It is interesting to note that Dante places Epicurus, not in the first circle of Hell to which many Pre-Socratics (some of whom were proto-materialists) are assigned (Alighieri, n. d., Inferno canto 4), but to the sixth circle, along with similar sinners, ‘who make the soul die with the body’ (Alighieri, n. d., Inferno 10.13-14). Thus the denial of the immortality of the soul is as much an essential part of proto-materialism (a heresy) in non-Indian cultures as in the Indian.

[xii] 12 For details see Balcerowicz (2005), pp. 575-76.

References

ALIGHIERI, D. “The Divine Comedy. Carlyle-Wicksteed translation”. New York: Vintage Books, n. d.

BALCEROWICZ, P. “Monks, Monarchs and Materialists. Review of Bollée, W. The Story of Paesi (Paesi-kahaṇayaṁ). Soul and Body in Ancient India. A Dialogue on Materialism. Text, Translation, Notes and Glossary. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2002”. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 33, pp. 571-582, 2005.

BHATTACHARYA, R. “Pre-Cārvāka Materialism in Vasudevahiṃḍī”. Jain Journal, 43.3, pp. 102-09, 2009.

“Cārvāka/Lokāyata”. Eds. D. Chattopadhyaya and M. K. Gangopadhyaya. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1990.

DASGUPTA, S. “A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. 1” (1922). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975.

“Dīghanikāya, The”. General Editor Bhikkhu J. Kashyap. Patna: Pali Publication Board, 1958. (contains Brahmajāla Sutta, and Pāyāsirājañña-suttanta)

“Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads”. Eds. V. P. Limaye and R. D. Vadekar. Poona: Vaidika Samsodhana Mandala, 1958. (Contains Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Kaṭha Upaniṣads)

ENGELS, F. “The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State”. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n. d.

FRANCO E. “Lokāyata”. In: Brill Encyclopedia of Hinduism. Vol. IX. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2011. (also available online-www.brill.nl).

FRANCO, E., PREISENDANZ, K. “Materialism, Indian School of. Edward Craig (general editor)”. In: Routledge Enclopedia of philosophy. Vol. 6. London: Routledge, 1998.

FRAUWALLNER, E. “History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2”. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.

GANGOPADHYAYA, M. “Nyāya”. Calcutta: Indian Studies, 1982.

GERMANOVA, A. “Logic”. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989.

GONDA, J. “Remarks on Similes in Sanskrit Literature”. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1949.

JACOBI, H. “The Place of Jainism in the Development of Indian Thought” (1922). Extracted from his “Studies in Jainism”, 1946, pp. 61-85, reprinted in: Heraus. Bernhard Kölver “Kleine Schriften”. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1970. pp. 765-89.

JAYATILLEKE, K. N. “Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge” (1963). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980.

“Majjhimanikāya, The”. Editor Mahapandita Rahula Sankrityayana. Patna: Pali Publication Board, 1958.

NAMAI, C. M. “Two Aspects of Paralokasādhana in Dharmakīrtian Tradition. Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition”. Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna, June 11-16, 1989. Ed. Ernst Steinkellner. Wien: Verlag Österrichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991, pp. 227-41.

PRAJÑĀKARAGUPTA. “Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraḥ”. Ed. Tripitakacharya Rahula Sankrityayana. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.

RUBEN, W. “Die Nyāyasūtra’s”. Leipzig: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, 1928.

“Ten Suttas from Dīgha Nikāya”. Varanasi: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1987.

TUCCI, G. “Linee di una Storia del Materialismo Indiano” (1923). Opera Minora. Ed. Giovanni Bargi. Parte 1. Roma: Università di Roma, 1971.

VIDYABHUSANA, S. C. “A History of Indian Logic” (1920). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988.

Acknowledgements: Sourav Basak, Amitava Bhattacharyya, Vandana Dasgupta, Siddhatha Datta, Sunish Kumar Deb and Krishna Del Toso.

Prof Ramkrishna Bhattacharya taught English at Unversity of Calcutta, Kolkota and was an Emeritus Fellow of University Grants Commission. He is now Fellow of Pavlov Institute, Kolkota

This essay was first published in kriterion, Belo Horizonte, nº 133, Abr./2016, p. 177-187 

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The Jayarāśi Question [A History of Materialism From Ajita to Udbhaṭa - Part IV]

Ramkrishna Bhattacharya   

The Jayarāśi Question

The Lion Assailing the Verities (Tattvopaplavasiṃha), written by Jayarāśi probably in the ninth century, has been claimed by some scholars to be the only surviving Cārvāka work. Others have challenged this view[i]. Since there is no external evidence to settle the question, the debate continues solely on the basis of internal evidence and intrinsic probability. No near-unanimous conclusion has been reached to date. Instead of summarizing the whole debate, a few issues are raised here. They go against branding Jayarāśi a Cārvāka, but identify him rather as a founder/follower of a totally new doctrine, which is quite distinct from both materialism on the one hand and any form of illusionism (māyāvāda) or nihilism (śūnyavāda) on the other. His is “the doctrine of assailing the verities,” tattvopaplava-vāda. This is the name used by Jayarāśi’s critics; nowhere is he called a Cārvāka or “one belonging to a section of the Cārvāka” (Cārvākaikadeśīya)[ii]. Although Jayarāśi is sometimes called a skeptic, there is little room for such a thing as doubt in his work. He is convinced that there can be no verities, tattvas, because there is no such thing as means of knowing, pramāṇa.

Now, Vātsyāyana in the exordium of his commentary to the Nyāya-sūtra, states that one has to admit not only the means of knowing, pramāṇa, but also knower (pramātṛ), the object rightly known (prameya), and knowledge of the object (pramiti): “With these four, tattva reaches its fulfillment.” Gangopadhyaya suggests that, in contrast with “the doctrine of assailing the verities,” Vātsyāyana’s view may be called “the doctrine of establishing the verities” (tattva-vyavasthāpanavāda)[iii]. It seems Vātsyāyana had a predecessor of Jayarāśi in mind, and against such an opponent he felt it necessary to assert all the four factors stated above, for this assertion can be understood only against the backdrop of an opponent who denies pramāṇa as such.

There is indeed a Cārvāka introduced at the very beginning of the The Lion Assailing the Verities. He is not Jayarāśi, but someone who is presented as a Cārvāka out to challenge Jayarāśi’s doctrine of upsetting principles as such. This objector has to be a Cārvāka, for who but a Cārvāka would refer to the basic premises of materialism and stand upon them? The presence of this objector and the way Jayarāśi gets into controversy with him clearly indicate that Jayarāśi himself was not a Cārvāka. He prided himself in claiming that he could understand Bṛhaspati’s sūtras better than the Cārvākas themselves, Jayarāśi referring to Bṛhaspati, the mythical guru of the gods, never to real-life philosophers like Purandara or Aviddhakarṇa, as Kamalaśīla, Karṇakagomin, Anantavīrya, Cakradhara, and Vādidevasūri do. Thus Jayarāśi supports the purāṇic story of the origin of materialism. At the end of his work he claims that 

Even those (questions) which could not become the object of knowledge of even the preceptor of the gods have been raised by Bhaṭṭa Śri Jayarāśi, for the sake of removing the pride of the infidels.[iv]

On the basis of this declaration, and the Cārvāka aphorisms quoted at the beginning of the work, he has been called a Bārhaspatya (follower of Bṛhaspati, the legendary founder of materialism) or a Cārvāka or Lokāyata. To this identification D. Chattopadhyaya objects that “[A]ccording to the Indian philosophical tradition no real representative of a system would ever dream of boasting intellectual superiority to the founder of the system itself. Jayarāśi, who claims to be intellectually

superior to Bṛhaspati, could thus hardly be a follower of Bṛhaspati himself, i.e., could hardly be the leader of any imaginary offshoot of the Cārvāka or Bārhaspatya system.”[v] Gangopadhyaya endorses this view and adds that “[t]he way Jayarāśi uses the honorific plural in mentioning his own name along with Bṛhaspati, bhaṭṭaśrījayarāśi-devagurubhiḥ …, places him in the seat of the preceptor of the gods, which goes against the Indian tradition. Jayarāśi further claims that all his opponents will be defeated by his arguments. This too is not the style of the explicators of Indian philosophy. The way of writing of later writers, even if they express views of their own, is suave and modest, as if they mean to suggest that this significance was inherent in the text itself.”[vi]

So, in conclusion, we have seen that materialism in India is not one homogeneous school. On the contrary, there have been several materialist schools through the ages. The Cārvākas (fl. c. eighth century) are the last school known to us. As with older materialisms, this new materialism too, after a long and turbulent period with refutation and counter-refutation stretching from the eighth century to the twelfth or thereabouts, seems to vanish. Like the extinction of species, both the pre-Cārvākas and the Cārvākas, with all their primary and secondary works once current from Kashmir to the regions beyond the Vindhya hills, disappear without trace. Even the oft-used doxographical work, Mādhava’s Compendium of All Philosophies, marked by profuse quotations in its exposition of all other philosophical systems, offers no direct quote from any commentary, nor does it even name any adherent of the Cārvāka in its terse summary of the system. The authors of other doxographical works appear to have no access to any primary or even secondary source; they merely echo or refer to those earlier opponents of the materialist system in whose works their views are quoted or paraphrased. The doxographers merely reproduce a few aphorisms and verses of dubious origin that have been quoted and re-quoted many times before. The pundits of north India who in the sixteenth century provided Abūl Fażl with the material concerning some of the philosophical systems fare no better. None of the other compendia refers to a single author or work, although we have several such names and even extracts quoted from their works written before the twelfth century.

The situation is partly similar to what happened to the Presocratics. Time, and lack of continuity due to the absence of disciples, may be held responsible for the unavailability of the works of Thales and Anaximander, of Democritus and Heraclitus, although they are known to have composed an impressive number of books. The rise of Plato and Aristotle as the two most influential philosophers, each having his school and a number of brilliant students to carry on their works, may also be the reason why the works of their predecessors and contemporaries have not survived[vii]. The Cārvāka could and did withstand the onslaught of Śaṅkara and Madhva, two influential Vedāntic philosophers who had a large following even after their deaths. As to the conjecture of a deliberate destruction of all materialist works by some unknown agency, royal or brahmanical, proposed by some scholars[viii], there is no evidence to support it. On the other hand, the fate of Āryabhaṭa’s geo-kinetic theory amply bears out the fact that another way of damning any contrary opinion is not to exterminate it, but to alter the text in an extremely subtle manner and misinterpret it deliberately so as to blunt its edge[ix]. At the present state of knowledge, the disappearance of the Cārvāka is as inexplicable as the disappearance of the old Sāṃkhya and old Lokāyata as enunciated by Brahman, Gargya and others.[x]

Bibliography

Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Firenze: Società Editriche Fiorentina, 2009; London: Anthem Press, 2011.

Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. “The Social Outlook of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata: A Reconstruction.” Indologica Taurinensia 36 (2010): 37–42.

Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. “The Wolf’s Footprints: Indian Materialism in Perspective.” Interview with Krishna Del Toso. Annali 71 (2011): 183–204.

Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. “Svabhāvavāda and the Cārvāka/Lokāyata: A Historical Overview.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 40, no. 5 (2012): 593–614.

Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. “Verses Attributed to Bṛhaspati in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha: A Critical Appraisal.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 41 (2013): 615–630.

Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad. In Defence of Materialism in Ancient India. New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1989.

Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad, and M. K. Gangopadhyaya, eds. Cārvāka/Lokāyata. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1990.

Dixit, K. K. “The Ideological Affiliation of Jayarāśi—The Author of Tattvopaplavasiṃha.” In Cārvāka/Lokāyata, edited by D. Chattopadhyaya and M. K. Gangopadhyaya, pp. 520–530. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1990.

Franco, Eli: Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief: A Study of Jayarāśi’s Scepticism. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1994; 1^st edition, Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 35, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1987.

Jayarāśibhaṭṭa. Tattvopaplavasiṃha of Jayarāśibhaṭṭa. Tr. Esther Solomon; ed. Shuchita Mehta: Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa’s Tattvopaplavasiṁha. An Introduction, Sanskrit Text, English Translation and Notes. Parimal Sanskrit Series 111. Delhi: Parimal Publications, 2010.

Saṁghavī, Sukhlāljī; Pārīkh, Rasiklāl C., eds. Tattvopaplavasimha of Shri Jayarasi Bhatta. Edited with an introduction and indices. Gaekwad Oriental Series 87, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1940; reprinted, Bauddha Bharati Series 20, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1987.

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[i] Eli Franco, Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief: A Study of Jayarāśi’s Scepticism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994; first published, Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 35, Stuttgart Franz Steiner Verlag, 1987), modifies this assertion by calling Jayarāśi a skeptic Lokāyata rather than a materialist (xii–xiii), but very few pay attention to his distinction. They call Jayarāśi a Cārvāka or a Lokāyata, apparently meaning a materialist.

[ii] For instance, Vidyānandasvāmin, Aṣṭasahasrī (Mumbapuri: Nirnayasagara Press, 1915), 37: tadime tattvopaplavavādinaḥ … ; idem,Tattvārthaślokavārttika (Mumbapuri: Nirnayasagara Press, 1918), 80, 195; Anantavīrya, Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā (Kashi: Bharatiya Jnanapith, 1959), 277–278 all treat the Cārvāka and tattvopaplava-vāda separately. For a survey of the Jayarāśi controversy, see Piotr Balcerowicz, “Jayarāśi against the Philosophers,” this volume.

[iii] “Mukhavandha” (Foreword) to D. K. Mohanta, Tattvopaplavasiṃha: Jayarāśibhaṭṭer Saṃśayavāda (Kolkata: Sanskrita Sahitya Bhandar, 1998), [xiii].

[iv] Sukhlāljī Saṁghavī and Rasiklāl C. Pārīkh, eds., Tattvopaplavasimha of Shri Jayarasi Bhatta. Edited with an introduction and indices, Gaekwad Oriental Series 87, (Oriental Institute, Baroda 1940; reprinted, Bauddha Bharati Series 20, Varanasi 1987), 124.

[v] Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad, Indian Philosophy: A Popular Introduction (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1965), 223. Even earlier, in two essays in Bangla published in 1963 (see his Saṃghaṃ Śaraṇaṃ Gacchami ityādi agranthita racanā [Kolkata: Ababhas, 2010] 74–84) Chattopadhyaya stated the same point.

[vi] M. K. Gangopadhyaya, “Mukhavandha,” [xi].

[vii] See W. H. S. Jones, Hippocrates, vol. 1 (London: William Heinemann, 1972), 8–9; T. W. Rhys Davids, Introduction, Mahānidānasuttanta, Dialogues of the Buddha (London: Oxford University Press, 1910), 47.

[viii] D. R. Shastri, A Short History of Indian Materialism, Sensationalism and Hedonism, in Cārvāka/Lokāyata, ed. D. Chattopadhyaya and M. K. Gangopadhyaya, 423.

[ix] For details see R. Bhattacharya, “The Case of Āryabhaṭa and His Detractors,” Indian Historical Review 17 (1990–1991): 35–47.

[x] T. Ganapati Shastri, The Arthaśāstra of Kauṭalya with the Śrīmūla Commentary (Dilli: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1984), 27.

Prof Ramkrishna Bhattacharya taught English at Unversity of Calcutta, Kolkota and was an Emeritus Fellow of University Grants Commission. He is now Fellow of Pavlov Institute, Kolkota

 

This essay is published in four parts: Part I, Part II, Part III, & Part IV

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