M N Roy
The spiritual revolt represented
by the Indian materialists eventually culminated in the rise of Buddhism which
all but liquidated the Vedic natural religion and freed India from Brahmanical domination
for several hundred years. Internal evidence proves that the Vedanta Sutras
were composed for combating Buddhism. Therefore, they could not be regarded as
the direct outcome of the speculative thought recorded in the Upanishads. The
composition of the earlier Upanishads and the Vedanta Sutras must have been
separated by several hundred years, during which period the spiritual development
of India
was in the direction of materialism, represented by Kanada, Kapila and many
others, and of rationalism, represented by the Buddhists and Jains subsequently.
The triumph of Buddhism and its supremacy for so many centuries prove that the metaphysical
school of thought, represented by the Vedantists, could not check the tide of
materialism and rationalism. It was only after the defeat of the Buddhist
revolution that Vedantist metaphysics and pantheism were revived as the ideology
of the Brahmanical reaction. The Sutras themselves could not have been
compiled earlier than the fourth century B.C., by which time Buddhism had become
a powerful challenge to the Brahmanical orthodoxy. Because, a considerable portion
of them is devoted to a vigorous polemic against the Buddhists. On the other hand,
the philosophical origin of Buddhism is clearly to be traced to the Sankhya and
Vaisheshika systems. The early Buddhist as well as Jain philosophers drew their
inspiration from Kanada and Kapila.
Although there is reason to
believe that those fathers of Hindu philosophy lived more or less at the same
time, a comparative study of the two systems allows the inference that Vaisheshika
was the oldest system of Hindu philosophy. Its founder lived about the same
time as the founder of ancient Greek materialism, namely, approximately, in the
Sixth century B.C. He also expounded an atomist theory for explaining the
origin of the world. The following are the main points of Kanada's atomism.
All substance is composed of
parts which are governed by their qualities of inherence and conjunction. That
thing at which the distinction of whole and the parts stops, and which
therefore marks the limit of division into minute parts, is the atom. The
atoms are the cause of the world; an effect may not be assumed without cause.
The atoms are eternal, belong to four classes which possess corresponding
qualities. The atoms of the same class and of similar quality combine to
produce the several gross dements. The combination takes place by two causes: The
material cause, inherent in the atoms themselves, and the non-inherent cause is
assumed to be the super-natural will.
All substances consisting of
parts originate from the substances connected with them by the relation of
inherence. The substance is composed of parts inherent in it. The relation of
conjunction operates in the process. Inherent parts of a substance come
together, thanks to the relation of conjunction, to produce the substance. Whatever
consists of parts, originates from those substances with which it is connected
by the relation of inherence, conjunction co-operating. The whole world is
composed of parts; because it is composed of parts, it has beginning and end;
an effect may not be assumed without a cause; therefore, the atoms are the
cause of the world. The atoms are of a spherical shape. When the atoms are isolated
and motionless, no effect is produced. After that, the unseen principle, acting
as the operative cause, and conjunction co-operating, they produce the entire
aggregate of things, beginning with binary atoms. The material cause of the
atomic compound is the constituent atoms; the conjunction is caused by the
unseen operative cause.
The materialism of the system is
evident. The only weak spot in an otherwise self-contained system of purely
physical explanation of the origin of the world, is the assumption of the
unseen, non-inherent, cause in addition to the material cause. Obviously, the
assumption is superfluous. Since the tendency to combine is inherent in atoms
themselves, there is absolutely no need for an unseen (adrishta) cause to make them coalesce. The Vaisheshika system does
not need an impulse from outside for the atoms to begin aggregating. The
tendency to combine is inherent in the atoms. “Bigness is produced from plurality
inherent in the causes.” That is to say, to combine is in" the nature of
the atoms. Kanada himself did not go so far as to visualise his atoms in a
perpetual motion. The postulation of a motionless state of isolated atoms
required the additional postulate of the action of the “unseen principle”. The
commentator Upaskar removed the defect. According to him, extension, that is,
perceptible matter, is caused by the principle of “dvitva” inherent in the primal matter; it is a natural propensity
of two atoms to unite. Indeed, the commentator makes clear an Idea to be found
in the Sutras themselves.
However, in assuming the
superfluous non-inherent cause, Kanada did not contradict himself any more
crassly than did, much later, the fathers of modern science like Copernicus,
Galileo, Descartes, Newton and others who paid homage to the prejudice about
God, even when they .deprived him of all functions. Today it is not possible to
say whether Kanada himself believed or not in the necessity of the obviously
superfluous assumption of the non-inherent cause. Even if he did, that would
not affect the -real implication of his hypothesis, which was purely materialistic.
 |
| MN Roy |
Kanada's system makes no room for
the soul in the metaphysical or spiritualist sense of the term. According to
it, intelligence is not an inherent property of the soul; it is conceived as a
mere adventitious quality of the atoms, arising only when the soul is joined
with an internal organ. Kanada argues: The qualities which inhere in the
substance, constituting the cause, originate qualities of the same kind in the
substance constituting the effect. Hence, if the intelligent Brahman is assumed
as the cause of the world, we should expect to find intelligence inherent in
the effect also, in the world. This is not the case. Therefore Brahman cannot
be the cause of the world. Consciousness is thus regarded as the product of a
complicated combination of atoms. Soul is merely the disposition of organism,
which is a combination of matter. At a certain stage of combination, an atomic
aggregate acquires the property of receiving impressions of external objects
and reacting to them. Consciousness develops at that stage. The constituents of
the “soul” of the Vaisheshika system are inherent in the substance which
constitutes the organism. And that substance is composed of atoms, which again
are only of four kinds - of water, earth, air and fire.
Moreover, while disputing the
immateriality of spirituality of the soul, Kanada himself throws overboard the
superfluous assumption of the non-inherent cause. He categorically declares that
the Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. And in another place, he declares
equally categorically that the atoms are the cause of the world. The early
Indian metaphysicians regarded Brahman as an intelligent being or an
intelligent principle. The materialists combated that conception. They could do
so because they did not require the postulate of an external intelligence or
force to give the first impulse for the origin of the world. Therefore, their
materialist speculation was self-contained; the formal inclusion of the conception
of Brahman or non-inherent cause was only a matter of prejudice or conformity
with venerable traditions.
The Vaishcshika system was
condemned by the Orthodox as “semi-destructive” or “semi-nihilistic”, because
of its dynamic view of nature. It regards nature not as a being but a process
of becoming. It held that the continuous change in the size of bodies involved
continuous perishing of the old and continuous rise of new substance. Even the'
idea of the indestructibility of matter is anticipated.
As a matter of fact, Kanada's atomism
was even more self-contained than that of Democritus. By visualising the atoms
as possessing the inherent property of coalescing and combining, it was free
from the fallacy which opened the Democritean system to Aristotle's attack.
Kanada's system was to a large extent free from the problem of action at a
distance. In his time, it was the dominating current of thought. The Vaisheshik
atomism was the common point of departure of a whole series of speculative
thinkers, whose contributions to the spiritual heritage of India
approximated real philosophy, and tried to free Indian society from the
domination of the Vedic priest-craft. Nevertheless, the unnecessary assumption
of a metaphysical cause was due to the priestly prejudices from which the main
currents of materialist and rationalist thought in ancient India could not
liberate themselves. The social conditions that caused in Greece the evolution of thought from natural
religion to the materialist philosophy did not ripen in India. Intellectual life remained a
priestly monopoly. The result was the weakness of the scientific and
rationalist thought which, therefore, was eventually overwhelmed, and even its
records were practically all destroyed, by the triumphant Brahmanical reaction.
Although the fundamental
principles of ancient Indian materialism were stated originally in the
Vaisheshik system, the dominating position in the intellectual life of that
period came to be occupied by the Sankhya system of Kapila. The latter deviated
largely from the strictly materialistic ground, and developed rather as a
rational-naturalist system of metaphysics. Nevertheless, the physical
principles of materialism were elaborated philosophically by Kapila. He is
known as an atheist who maintained that the existence of God could not be
proved by logical evidence. But the real merit of his philosophy is the
recognition of the objective reality of the physical world. The Sankhya system
decidedly rejects the doctrine that the external world has no objective existence,
and that nothing exists but thought. Arguing against some Earlier philosophers,
who are characterised by the commentators as “heretics” or “nihilists”, Kapila
lays down: “Not thought alone exists; because there is the intuition of the
external world.” “Then, since, if the one does not exist, the other does not
exist, there is a void”.
[1]
The most authoritative
commentator, Vijnana Bhikshu, interprets the Sutras as follows: “The reality is
not thought alone; because external objects also are proved to exist, just as
thought is, by intuition. If external things do not exist, then, a mere void
offers itself. Because, if the external world does not exist, then, thought
does not exist; for, it is intuition that proves the objective; and, if the
intuition of the external did not establish the objective, then, the intuition
of thought also would not establish the existence of thought”.
The analogy with the point of
departure of Descartes' rationalism – “
Cogito,
ergo sum”-is obvious. But there is more than pure rationalism. The theory
of cognition is definitely materialistic. The underlying principle of the
Sankhya theory of knowledge is identical with the modern materialist principle
that consciousness is determined by being. The defenders of the religious doctrine
of creation tried to silence the enquiry about the origin of things by denying
the reality of the world itself. They argued that a thing of dream - an
unreality - did not need a substantial origin. Kapila retorted: “The world is
not unreal; because there is no fact contradictory (to its reality), and
because it is not the (false) result of depraved senses (leading to a belief in
what ought not to be believed)”. This is clear enough. But Kapila goes farther-to
the extent of stating the fundamental principle of the rationalist-materialist
view of the world. “A thing is not made out of nothing”.
[2]
The bottom is knocked oft the
doctrine of creation. The origin of the physical world is traced to an endless
process of causality, and that process is inherent in nature. Existing
eternally by itself, the world does not need a creator or creation. Nor is
there any beginning. Because, in that case also, something would come out of
nothing. Thus, the Sankhya system rejects even “emanent teleology”, a doctrine
made fashionable by some philosophers of our time.
The materialist essence of the Sankhya
system is confused by its apparent rejection of atomism. But the very argument
advanced for the purpose implies a more perfected form of materialism: “What
is limited cannot be the substance of al”. Together with the Vaisheshika, the Sankhya
system also reduces the “gross elements” to atoms; but Kapila traces the
severally existing atoms down to a still simpler all-pervading substance. This
is very much the same as done by Aristotle; but there is no evidence whether
he resorted to this expediency to avoid the baffling problem of action at a
distance. However, by seeking the
ultimate substance beyond the atoms, Kapila anticipated the most modern
conception of substance instead of rejecting materialism.
Kapila visualised existence as a
hierarchy, so to say, composed of twenty-five realities. In addiction to the
soul, nature, mind and self-consciousness, there are “subtle” elements, sense
organs and “gross elements”. The pyramid stands on the apex. Reverse the order,
and you have a process of evolution. But Kapila conceived the process in the
Hegelian fashion: as “Idea expressing itself”. Although the process of evolution
is set on its head, the “realities”, however, are derived inductively from the
immediately perceptible gross elements. The existence of the “subtle elements”
(sound, colour, touch, taste and smell) is inferred from the “gross elements”
which are directly perceptible. The logic is obvious: Everything that is gross
is formed of something which is less gross. The process is traced to the
primal state of nature in which everything lies in a state of inaction. But Nature
is not only eternal, but self-operative. “Since the root has no root, the root is
rootless”.
[3] Thus,
Nature is the Final Cause. Since mind and self-consciousness are placed within
the scheme of nature, they are included in the materialistic system. Only the
soul stands outside, but like
Newton's
deux ex machina, it is completely
unnecessary for explaining the being and becoming of the world. The existence
of nature is inferred from its perceptible phenomena. These are real; they must
therefore have a real cause. That is to say, the constituents of the world
exist eternally. Those ultimate elements are called, in the Vaisheshika and
Nyaya systems, atoms. Kapila reduces them to an all-pervasive existence, and
calls it the Nature in a state of inaction.
The Nature of the Sankhya in its primal
state is like Spinoza's “beseelte
Materie” (animated substance). Three qualities (goodness, passion and
darkness), inherent in nature, are the lever of all natural operations. Atomism
is rejected, because pain and pleasure are not properties of the atom.
Everything in existence is an aggregate of pain, pleasure, delusion etc. which
are clearly perceptible. But here arises a very pertinent question: What is the
cause of these categories or qualities? Kapila himself asserts that something
cannot come out of nothing. Obviously to avoid this dilemma, he makes his
Nature an all pervading primal substance, having the three qualities in a state
of equilibrium. The atomists would contend that the atom could just as well
represent the equilibrium of qualities. However, Kapila's rejection of atomism
leads him to a position where the materialness of Nature appears to disappear.
The primal existence appears like the Brahman of the Vedantist, or the Hegelian
Non-Being - Absolute Nothing. But that is far from what Kapila desires to
establish. Therefore, he concludes his arguments against atomism by reaffirming
the materialness of Nature.
“Nothing can be produced from a
non-entity like man's horn”.
“There must be some material of
which the product may consist”.
[4]
The Sankhya system, with its
rigid rationalism, cannot do without a material substratum of the world, because,
if that is dispensed with, everything may happen everywhere, which is an
absurdity according to itself. Consequently, the Sankhya conception of primal
nature cannot be essentially different from the conception of “matter in motion”.
Its rejection of atomism, therefore, could not be a repudiation of materialism;
it was done with the motive of making the physical explanation of the world
free from - all possible logical fallacies. An all-pervasive primal substance
obviate the difficulty of original combination, and consequently, for securing
the first impulse, the postulate, the postulate of a metaphysical agency is
not necessary.
Indeed, a mechanistic conception
of nature is not only logically inherent in the Sankhya system, but becomes
explicit in the definition of the properties of the “Pradhan”. Kapila holds that just as mother's milk and' water flow
mechanically, just so “the Pradhan
also, although non-intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature”.
Motion, as distinct from conscious movement or intelligence, is thus clearly
visualised as inherent in the Pradhan, which is the name for the all-pervading
material substratum of the world. This again shows that the metaphysical elements
in the Sankhya system are altogether superfluous, the system being
self-contained as a mechanistic-materialist conception of the world.
As regards the soul, it is
explicitly ruled out as the Final Cause of things; and the obvious logical
deduction' that the origin of things is material, is clearly drawn from the
superfluity of the conception of soul.
“While both (Nature and Soul) are
antecedent (to all' products), since the one (Soul) is devoid (of this
character of being a cause), it is applicable only to the other of the two
(Nature)”.
[5]
Having divested soul of all
qualities, and ascribed to nature all active properties and the status of the
Final Cause, Kapila finds it very difficult to prove how the nondiscrimination
between the two originates. The difficulty lies in the fact that his conception
of the Nature as a self-operative entity renders soul only an empty conception
- a concession to traditional prejudice. He extricates him-· self from the
position by going still another step farther away from metaphysical dualism
towards materialistic monism. Understanding, mind, reason, and even ego, are
all discriminated from the Soul as products of Nature. Thus, the Soul is left
without any function. Indeed, by its very nature (absolute, immutable etc.), it
cannot have any connection with anything. Thus, there is an unbridgeable gulf
between the two ultimate categories of existence. The gulf could be bridged
only by abandoning the dualist position. It is difficult to ascertain if
Kapila himself did that. The Sutras are not very clear on the point. One of the
commentators cuts the Gordian knot.
“These two (Nature and Soul) are
alike without antecedent, like seed and sprout of which it is needless to ask
which is the first; the old puzzle, which was the first, the acorn or the oak?
being a frivolous question”.
The relation between Soul and
Nature (prakriti and purusha) thus interpreted, the Sankhya
system becomes free of the dualist fallacy, and stands out as a self-contained materialist
system. Either simultaneous existence of the two uncreated beings is admitted,
or Soul ceases to exist except as an attribute of Nature. Then, the logic of
“seed and sprout” is faulty. The removal of this logical defect leads to
monism. Of the Soul and Nature, one must be the cause of the other. By its very
nature, the Soul of Sankhya cannot be the cause of creation; because, in that
case, it would cease to be what it is and could never be emancipated. So, there
remains Nature as the only real source of existence. and Kapila conceives
Nature as a purely material entity, self-originating and functioning
mechanically. Even the so-called vital forces are the products of the mechanistic
operation of the material entity, Nature.
The most important contribution
made to the development of philosophical thought by the Sankhya system,
however, is its sensationalist theory of knowledge. Kapi1a was an out and out
empiricist. He holds, with an admirable logical rigour, that sense perception
is the only reliable source of knowledge.
“Determination (right
apprehension) of something not previously known is right notion (knowledge).
What -is in the highest degree productive thereof, is evidence”.
[6]
Evidence is defined as perception,
inference and testimony (scriptural). By admitting inference in the category of
evidence, Kapila anticipated the rise of inductive logic. His contribution to
the scientific mode of thought, therefore, is very considerable. The above
Sutra is interpreted by one of the commentators as follows: “The proof or evidence,
or whatever we may choose to call that from which right notion results, is just
the conjunction of an organ (with the appropriate object)”.
The Sutras themselves are very
categorical about the role of perception in the process of acquiring knowledge.
A decisive answer to the questions raised even by modern epistemological nihilists
was given by Kapila.
“Perception is that discernment
which, being in conjunction (with the things perceived), portrays the forms
thereof”.
[7]
It is held that the organs
(external, that is, of perception, and internal, that is, of inference) are
products' of Nature. They are not “depraved”; that is, they do not portray as
real what is not real. Therefore, whatever is established on their evidence is real.
Since the organs bear testimony to the existence of the external world its reality
is established.
While the Sankhyas thus expounded
an atheistic naturalism, the Vaisheshik and Nyaya, systems tended clearly
towards materialism. That very significant evolution of thought out of the
background of the Vedic religion and the metaphysical speculations of the
Upanishads, in the fullness of time ushered in the Golden Age of India, that
is, the Buddhist period. The latter Upanishads and early Buddhist literature
are full of references to “heretics, atheists and materialists”.
When Buddha was a young man, the
great halls and vast forests of northern
India were echoing with disputations denying the divine origin of the Vedas and the authority of the Brahmans, and
preaching agnosticism, atheism and materialism. And it was during the several centuries
of the Buddhist era that
India
really attained a very high level of material and moral culture.
The long process of the development
of naturalist, rationaiist, sceptic, agnostic and materialist thought in ancient
India found culmination in
the Charvak system of philosophy, which can be compared with Greek Epicureanism,
and as such is to be appreciated as the positive outcome of the intellectual
culture of ancient
India.
The greatest of the Paribrajaks mentioned in the earliest Buddhist literature,
those Sophists and Stoics of ancient
India, was one Brihaspati.
[8] He
was the founder of Indian Epicureanism - the Charvak system. The Brihaspati
Sutras are referred to frequently in contemporary Buddhist and Brahmanical texts.
But only some remnants of the Sutras themselves survived the downfall of Buddhism.
From them we learn that Brihaspati condemned Brahlnans as “men devoid of
intellect and manliness, who uphold the authority of the Vedas because they
yield them the means of a comfortable livelihood”.
The Charvaks laughed at the
notion that the Vedas were divinely revealed truth; they held that truth can never
be known except through the senses. Therefore, the idea of soul is a delusion.
The Charvaks thus anticipated the modern philosophical thought of ultra-empiricism.
They held that even reason was not to be trusted, because every inference
depended for its validity not only on accurate observation and correct reasoning,
but also upon the assumption that the future would behave like the past, and of
this there was no certainty. That was anticipating modern agnosticism more than
two thousand years before Hume. But the Charvaks were not mere nihilists,
agnostics and sceptics. They developed an elaborate system of positive
philosophical thought.
“All phenomena are natural. Neither
in experience nor in history do we find any interposition of supernatural
forces. Matter is the only reality; the mind is matter thinking. The hypothesis
of a creator is useless for explaining or understanding the world. Men think religion
necessary only because, being accustomed to it, they feel a sense of loss and an
uncomfortable void when the growth of knowledge destroys faith. Morality is
natural; it is a social convention and convenience, not a divine command. There
is no need to control instincts and emotions; they are commands of nature. The
purpose of life is to live; and the only wisdom is happiness."
[1] Book I,
Sutras 42 and 43
[3] Book I,
Sutras 114 and 115
[4] Book I,
Sutras 114 and 115
[7] Book I,
Sutras 89
[8] The name Brihaspati occurs in the ancient Indian Literature frequently in various connections over a period of many hundred years during which naturalist, rationalist and materialist thought developed and wielded a considerable influence. Brihaspati is mentioned as the founder of Swabhavavad of Lokayata and also of the Charvak system. While it is quite possible that Brihaspati was a legendary figure, it also proves a continuity of naturalist thought.
This
essay is Chapter III of MN Roy’s Materialism:
an Outline of the History of Scientific Thought (First Edition: July,
1940; Second Revised Edition: February, 1951).
Due
to its length we have decided to upload it in parts. Click here for
Part I
