G. Ramakrishna
A
significant enunciation, with copious evidences, by Debiprasad
Chattopadhyaya was that the Lokayata-s were not always looked down
upon by the elitist sections of society in ancient India.
Denunciation of the Lokayata-s based on their alleged hedonistic
approach to life is philosophically and historically quite medieval
in thinking. It is one of the heresies spread by the author of
Sarvadarshana Samgraha, a text on philosophy in Sanskrit belonging
to the 14th century. Drupada of the Mahabharata had no
qualms against them, while Kautilya included the Lokayata among the
lore that a ruler should be familiar with. Among the Brahmins said
to have called on the Buddha once was a Lokayata philosopher as well.
The inescapable truth is that the Lokayata-s got denigrated
profusely because of their unflinching opposition to the system
which protected vested interests. This system had no scruples about
superstitious beliefs providing a safety valve against possible
pritests by the masses. Let alone the masses, even an ordinary
representative of theirs had to be put down violently lest he provoke
others into his line of thinking. Why else would that solitary
individual rising his voice against the illegitimacy of Yudhisthira
getting anointed as king in Hastinapura be beheaded? Beheaded he was
according to the version we have in the Mahabharata. His only grouse
after all was that this same Yudhisthira had played havoc with the
lives of multitudes of people during the war in Kurukshetra in the
name of restoring Dharma. What kind of restoration of Dharma is
that where you have to kill a million instead of converting a few of
them into righteous persons or persuading them to follow the path of
righteousness in general. It is to the eternal credit of the
Lokayata-s that it was a person professing Lokayata philosophy who
had the boldness and decency to cry foul when such a colossal
destruction had been perpetrated. The poor Charvaka who had thus
remonstrated was unceremoniously lynched by the Brahmin mob, for
which act of ‘social gracefulness’ all the Brahmins in the mob
were duly compensated by the king with regards and gifts. The whole
episode serves as a fine metaphor for what has apparently gone on
relentlessly in our society for quite a long time. As loyal
traditionalists, large numbers of the contemporary defenders of the
so called Dharma perpetuate the crime in a more complex form today.
And that does not apply solely to our own India either, because other
parts of the globe are not free from such horrendous deeds against
the lowly in society.
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| Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya |
The Charavaka
consciousness exemplified by the episode just recalled is not by any
means an isolated occurrence. In fact, at the core of the
Bhagavadgita lies an interrogation of exactly the same kind, but much
more elaborate and disturbing. The extraordinary feat of the Gita
consists in marginalising this supremely important sociological
question of violence and destruction as an imperative for restoring
and consolidating Dharma. The first chapter of the Gita, which
incidentally also happens to be the best chapter of that
philosophico-religious text, articulates the concerns of the Charvaka
of Mahabharata fame when the remorseful Arjuna is overtaken by
mortification at the very thought of killing his own kinsmen for the
sake of obtaining the throne. It is quite another matter that the
super preceptor Krishna preaches that there is nothing like death for
the warriors on the battlefield as their souls are eternal and that
Arjuna need only be an instrument for killing the ‘unkillable’
because they have already been killed! A mesmerising play of words
to equal this philosophical fancy is hard to come by in the range of
world philosophy. Arjuna’s questions are not questions of an
anti-hero who wants to find an alibi for fleeing from the
battlefield. On the contrary, there must have been members in the
society of the days of the author of the Gita rising such awkward but
pressing questions regarding what was transpiring in society. It was
viewed as being unjust, not to speak of being irrational as well.
The principal foundational principles of those times, subjected to
criticism by a section of society, are sought to be justified and
defended by the Gita, thereby performing a philosophical task of
‘justifying the ways of God to man.’ The most touching question
of Arjuna centres round the understanding that one cannot live in
peace after killing one’s own people (BG. 1.31 and 37). He would
rather go without the kingdom for himself than have the three worlds
themselves after killing such an enormous number of people of his own
milieu. He would not mind getting himself killed instead (BG 1.41).
One need not view the entire discussion in the Bhagavadgita in the
light of the actual battlefield in Kurukshetra. After all, the
author of the Gita has chosen that particular form for highlighting
his philosophico-religious ideas in the context of his own times.
The disintegration of society that would inevitably ensue from war is
abhorring for Arjuna. Of course, disintegration is here conceived of
in terms of caste barriers being broken and women being led astray
(BG 1.41).It is somewhat intriguing that Arjuna who is so much
worried about what might happen if women went astray does not seem to
be equally concerned about what might happen if men went astray. But
that is beside the point. The orthodox opinion that stratification
of society along caste lines is divine dispensation is repeated
parrot-like by Arjuna when he expresses consternation about
‘permanent values’ getting dislocated by war which creates
intermixture of castes, as a consequence of which the prescribed
death rites would also be a casualty (BG 1.42). The fortress of
rituals must not be allowed to be desanctified, come what may. But
that was precisely the target of the Lokayata-s, for which reason
they were shunned and demonized. The demonization went so far as to
deny basic ethical norms being sacrosanct for the Lokayata-s. So
much so, it was averred that these pestilences personified by the
Charvaka-s would go so far as to make merry recklessly, throwing to
the winds any sense of social obligation. They might not steal, but
definitely borrow from others unmindfully for having a swell time for
themselves. It is a paradox that the very people who raised crucial
questions about social ethics were portrayed as a socially
irresponsible crowd. The Gita promised hope under distressing
circumstances by assuring that God would descend on earth to
straighten things out whenever they became unbearable (4.7). But no
serious philosopher in the Indian tradition ever thought it fit to
introspect as to why almighty God never tried to instill hope by
persuading the unrighteous to be otherwise instead of taking the
extreme step of bumping them off at one stroke. Secondly, how come
that God incarnate is unable to install a just society once and for
all so that he does not have to undergo the ordeal of incarnating
himself now and again? Idealist schools of thought were annoyed
continually, as they are even now, for no other reason than that
such questions were raised by the Lokayata-s.
This is not to
suggest that the Gita presents a view of the Lokayata school. But
the point is that the Indian philosophical tradition and its impact
cannot be viewed as if it were a monolithic structure. We have
karma, adrishta (the unseen), bondage and liberation on the one hand,
and the thought of the common folk untainted by such doctrines on the
other. One of them imposes a burden on the individual by making him
helpless and subordinate and the other prompts the person to action.
It is this latter tradition which interrogates the rationale of the
beliefs and practices of the other tradition. The principal
postulate of the interrogators is that man has the potential to
intervene creatively to change the order of things in society if
only he interacts with his milieu and understands the principles
governing it. Naturally, the two traditions have been polaric
opposites, one accepting the reality of the world and the other
negating it. Even among those who do not reject the reality of the
world, there are some like Ramanuja and Madhva who preach surrender
to the supreme deity as the single authentic means for attaining what
they call emancipation. Social emancipation is definitely not there
on the agenda of these philosophers whose company is quite
formidable.
It is a
commonplace truth that primitive societies try to come to grips with
reality rather than negate it stoutly, or else posit the reality of
the world with the rider that there is something more real than
reality which ought to be the real aim in the quest of man. Fear and
mystery are the two outstanding experiences that we find recorded in
primitive societies as evidenced by their belief-systems and
ritualistic practices. Fire, rain, thunder, darkness, wild beasts
and the like stare primitive men in the face. The means to survival
in the confrontation is the ancient magical act. Through this, he
gradually moves on to the recognition of some law ingrained in
movements within nature that he perceives all around himself. The
spelndour of the morning, the starry sky of the night, the warmth of
the sun, the occasional floods, wild fires, seasonal fluctuations and
similar other phenomena mesmerise him as he gropes in darkness to
figure out the law, if any, governing these phenomena. Even a cursory
glance at the Rigveda brings out this element quite vividly. How
then can he deny reality of it all like some future day sophisticated
philosophers of the idealist school of thought? The latter, after
all, belonged to a period when there were more material advancements
along with the knowledge to thus advance.
What Lokayata
philosophy does is to retain both the awe and the reality of things
around man as experienced by all primitive societies. It is needless
to say that the full ramifications of a philosophical school of
thought are nowhere to be seen in primitive societies and their
rituals. Nevertheless, it is necessary to cognize proto-materialism
in its form, scope and evolution. We shall then be able to
disentangle ourselves from the inane characterization of Indian
philosophy as a whole as something exclusively idealistic and
spiritualistic. It is for historians to discern when and under what
circumstances the spiritual discourse struck roots in Indian
philosophy. The signal contribution of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya
consists in unraveling this mystery, if mystery it is reckoned to be.
It is an infamy, therefore, to consider an anti-idealistic
philosopher as a philosophical untouchable in the Indian tradition.
Here, for example, is a specimen of the tirade against the Lokayata:
“….With the single exception of the Lokayata which insists that
all moral conventions and ethical theories have been invented by
clever weaklings, no other philosopher would seriously support the
view that the preservation of one’s earthly existence at all costs
is the summum bonum of our life.” This is penned by a reputed
author in one of the early issues of the prestigious Philosophical
Quarterly and it is quite easy to pick out any number of such
declarations by our allegedly pious philosophers of yesterday and
today. (But let us first be clear that the Lokayata does not speak of
weaklings cleverly inventing moral conventions and ethical theories;
what they do attribute to the ‘clever weaklings’ is the
diabolical rituals to bamboozle the layman.) The purport of
statements like the one just quoted is as much to eulogise the
idealist schools as to deride the Lokayata school. If the litmus
test is social ethics, how do idealistic philosophers fare in our
tradition? Unfortunately, there is nothing spectacular in their mien
if the justification advanced by them in favour of social
stratification is any indication. Whatever the veracity of the
accusations laid at the door of the Lokayata-s, one thing is for
sure, and that is that they never sullied themselves by advancing
preposterous and phoney theories to explain the alleged divine
ordinance concerning the vertical social hierarchy perpetuated for
centuries in our country. On the contrary, they relentlessly laid
bare the philosophical emptiness of the idealist schools of thought
which professed loftily but practised meanly.
It does not
redound to the credit of philosophy to make acceptance of Vedic
authority as the sole criterion for categorizing philosophical
schools as either theistic or atheistic. And yet this is constantly
harped upon as the ultimate court of justice to decide what is
acceptable and what is not in the realm of philosophy. What is
worse, many an Indian philosopher bows down in reverence to the
dictates of even ordinary mundane law-givers (hopefully, they are not
law-makers, too) as if they were profound philosophers, which they
were not. It is strange that our philosophers did not for a moment
doubt that truth could be the child of authority and not of time,
contemplation, observation, analysis and logic. The Lokayata
philosophers sought to move towards that methodology even if they did
not conceptualise it in so many words. Of some curiosity is the
question of the Jaina school. Where does philosophy end and religion
gain ground? This question is as much relevant in the context of the
Shaiva and Vaishnava traditions as in the case of Jainism.
Contemporary Buddhism is no exception either. With all the elaborate
rituals of worship, the Jaina school could as well have been
designated a thoroughly theistic religion, had it not been for the
ridiculous criterion of Vedic authority being the yardstick for the
classification. The only difference between the Jain school and the
so called Vedic schools is that the Tirthankara-s take the position
of the Veda in Jainism. Both authorities could well be considered as
being subject to the limitations of time and perception. It would
have been more reasonable philosophically had the views of Jain
philosophy concerning the origin of the universe, theory of knowledge
and conditions for Arhantship been considered instead. The identity
or otherwise of views regarding Pudgala and Padartha respectively in
Jain and Nyaya schools of philosophy, for example, could better serve
as distinguishing marks. Even so, what exactly does it mean to
accept Vedic authority in philosophy? Does the Veda enunciate any
specific idea regarding, say, the five elements as constituents of
the real world for schools of philosophy to accept it as a postulate
and then proceed further in philosophical disquisition? Likewise
about other propositions that fall within the scope of philosophy.
It is obvious, therefore, that issues alien to philosophy have been
tagged on as limitations for a free philosophical discussion. It is
one thing to refer to an idea adumbrated in some Upanishad or the
other and accept it and corroborate it, and quite another to be bound
by it. Is there one stream of philosophy in the Rigveda, for
example? Are the hymns addressed to Agni, Indra, Savitr, Varuna and
Ushas fundamental to philosophical speculations? What does one make
of the gambler’s hymn of the Rigveda as source material for
philosophy? Or, of the frog-hymn where the budding disciple recites
the Veda like a frog just back from hibernation? How can one convert
a piece of good poetry into authoritative philosophy? Further, even
granting that there is some very significant philosophical doctrine
in the just mentioned hymns, is it consistent with speculations in
the Upanishads? And why should it be, indeed? Is there no scope for
divergent views in the world of philosophy on questions for which we
do not possess final answers? It certainly is not a sound method to
telescope the history of thought over a few centuries into one
supposedly infallible doctrine, for the simple reason that it would
make efforts over centuries to understand Reality irrelevant, as one
obviously is already in possession of authentic ‘final answers’
to all questions concerning man and the world. The problem of
philosophy has been resolved and hence there is no further need for
exercising the intellect any more regarding the perennial questions
of philosophy. In other words, one makes philosophy redundant by
making some apparently divine text as the final authority on
questions for which we do not have any single final answer even now!
And that is what has been done in respect of the entire range of
Upanishadic literature produced over a period of a few centuries at
geographical areas largely distant from each other. It is grossly
unfair to aver that after a few centuries of philosophical exercises
over vastly separated areas, our ancestors arrived at just one
philosophical view as the Brahma Sutra-s understood it. Indian
philosophy is much more than this one text. Variety in thinking and
viewing is what anyone immediately recognizes in the Upanishads. It
must have been quite boring for anyone to produce so many texts for
conveying one uniform idea! This kind of misplaced adulation for the
Upanishads reduces the abundantly rich texts into a poorly composed
copy-book. Let us put it a little more bluntly thus: The veracity
or otherwise of a Physicist’s formulation can hardly be judged by
the totally extraneous factor as to whether he or she reads his or
her Bible regularly or not. A third alternative is not to read it at
all at any time and still be a knowledgeable Physicist. The glorious
strides that Indian philosophers so valiantly made in their attempt
to understand Reality have been pygmied by the brownie and the pixie
called Vedic authority for the corroboration of philosophical ideas.
It is not only strange but also shameful that our traditional
scholars, old and new, have never once given thought to this somewhat
elementary detail concerning the history of Indian Philosophy.
For once,
the Lokayata school liberated philosophy from this uncalled for
encumbrance by looking at the world straight without the ‘Vedic
glasses’ and by calling the bluff of those who foisted elaborate
rituals on philosophy. Even if one does not agree with an oriental
scholar who described the Brahmana texts that succeeded the Samhita
texts as ‘theological twaddle’, it must unhesitatingly be
accepted that there is not much philosophical analysis therein for a
philosopher to fall back upon. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya almost
single-handedly, or as ‘a one man brigade’ as he was once
described, put Indian Philosophy on its legitimate course by
establishing in no uncertain terms that there are two concrete
traditions in Indian Philosophy, like in world philosophy. The
relationship between the elements of nature and human consciousness
discussed so passionately in some schools of Indian ohilosophy
received its due at the hands of Debiprasad more than in anybody
else’s hands, although it must be conceded that many others before
him had called attention to it. For example, M. Hiriyanna, to
mention just one. The other thing that Debiprasad did was to
ostracise the self-proclaimed dictatorial authorities, namely, the
law-givers (or Dharmashastrakara-s), from the domain of a critical
and historical study of Indian Philosophy. Considering that even
historians of science at the Academy of Science have no more than the
rigmarole that is popular with others, it is significant that a
pathbreaking role has been played by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya by his
focus on what is central to Lokayata as a philosophy. The cliché
about the Lokayata being hedonistic or ‘Charvaka’ being a
‘sweet-tongued’ fellow no longer seems to have any place in
philosophy.
Madhava’s
stanza in the Sarva Darshana Samgraha which is what has started the
game needs to be understood copiously. The stanza runs thus:
Yavajjivet sukham
jivet rinam kritva ghritam pibet;
Bhasmibhutasya
dehasys punaragamanam kutah.
The
literal meaning of the stanza is well-known: Live happily as long as
you live; enjoy by being a debtor if need be. Once turned to ashes
after death, where is there any return at all?
Firstly, the
first part of the stanza is not much different from the oft-repwated
incantation: Jivema Sharadah Shatam (May we live for a hundred
years). Modama Sharadah Shatam (May we partake of joy for a hundred
years) is among the aspirations voiced. This is sanctified, but
“Yavajjivet sukham jivet” is condemned as blasphemy, which is
rather odd. Secondly, do we take all such stanzas literally always?
If not, why castigate this one for its ‘rinam kritva ghritam pibet”
part? A devotional poem attributed to Shankaracharya says among other
things that it does not help to know your grammar and roots of
Sanskrit verbs (Na hi na hi rakshati dukrun karane). Do we take it
literally and stop learning grammar in order to attain emancipation?
The point is that literary devices are abundantly employed by
philosophers for driving home their message; they may grow rhetorical
aso at times. No student of Literature need be taught that
rhetorical expressions are not to be taken too literally. “Rinam
kritva ghritam pibet” is one such fine expression and it does not
intend to portray a Charvaka as a hedonist, much less a morally
irresponsible being. There are umpteen literary devices employed by
Shankara in his commentary on the Brahma Sutra-s. Students of Purva
Mimamsa know what they refer to as ‘arthavada’ by which is meant
the laying of emphasis on a particular prescription in an indirect
suggestive way. The usual example given is that 'the serpents
performed a sacrifice.’ When you say “sarpah satram asata” you
are not making a factual statement about the serpents having
performed a sacrifice; what you mean to convey is that man has the
obligation to perform a sacrifice. When the serpents themselves have
performed a sacrifice, how much more becoming is it for man to do so!
Arthavada may be a technical term in the Purva Mimamsa, but it is
akin to any literary device having a similar purport. It is only for
denigrating the Lokayata school that a simple commonplace literary
device has been twisted and is being relentlessly continued even now
What the ‘’arthavada’ of the passage under reference conveys is
simply this: Ingrain in yourself the way to remain happy in life;
don’t you be a slave to the barren belief and ritual that have been
held before you as the path to happiness; instead, you had better
develop the discretion to be happy at all times and at all costs.
Ordaining
thus is not a terrible deviation from what is commended in the
Ishavasya Upanishad which says that you should live for a hundred
years with activities, meaning desirable actions. (It is quite
superfluous to suggest like Shankara does that action here means
various rituals (karmani agnihotradini). Supposing that the
‘arthavada’ connotation is not acceptable for some prejudicial
reason, the further question arises whether a Charvaka will be
allowed by his fellow social beings to keep incurring debts to be
happy when they also are expected to be doing exactly the same thing
as fellow Charvaka-s. Today the World Bank prescribes
conditionalities which our sovereign government accepts, but a
Carvaka society will have none to accept the conditionalities when
each member of the group here is prescribing conditionalities, the
sole condition being ‘give me the loan on condition that you don’t
het it back.’ It is not graceful to call the dog mad and shoot it
and that applies as much to the world of philosophy as it does to
other departments of life. The priestly class has the prerogative to
tell its votaries that it is safe to perform the Jyotishtoma
sacrifice for attaining heaven (Jyotishtomena swargakamo yajeta), but
the Charvaka philosopher has no such elixir-like formula to tell
anyone that it is safe to give loans to a Charvaka. There are two
snags there: firstly, he does not have votaries like the priestly
class has and secondly the Charvaka does not have a heaven to entice
his votaries with! We have yet to hear of a Charvaka Bank which is
totally unmindful of its non-performing assets, a euphemism for
unreturned loans, like some of our nationalized banks seem to be.
Debiprasad
Chattopadhyaya drew the attention of the students of Indian
Philosophy to Shantarakshita’s Tattavasamgraha commented
upon by Kamalasheela. This work mentions a certain Purandara as the
author of a text on Lokayata philosophy but the text is extinct.
What we understand from Shantarakshita is that the philosophical
doctrines of Purandara are considerably different from the one
attributed to the Lokayata school by the ‘Sarva Darshana Samgraha’.
It is another matter, of course, that Shantarakshita does not accept
Purandara’s doctrines. But he does not dismiss the school as
inconsequential after making some sniding remarks about its doctrines
like some latter day ‘philosophers’ do. The current crop of
critics of the Lokayata school with no analytical approach whatsoever
needs to be included among such philosophers. The reason for
Shantarakshita in so doing may be that he is, like Purandara, one who
does not recognize the authority of the Veda for validating
philosophical positions. Madhava, on the other hand, is incensed with
the gumption of the Lokayata philosopher in making light of Vedic
authority and even lampooning it lavishly. In tune, therefore, with
the masters of Vedic rituals who had no love lost for the Lokayata-s,
Madhava repeats parrot-like what had been traditionally said about
the Lokayata school by orthodox schools. That is no sound method for
a philosopher, to say the least. It is the examination and
evaluation of the epistemology and ontology of a school of philosophy
that should be the deciding factor for a philosopher when he is in
disagreement with a school of philosophy. That is what Shankara
does, for example, when he refutes the position of the Samkhya school
which to him is the finalist in philosophical debate. Defeating
Samkhya means defeating Lokayata as well, according to him. In other
words, Lokayata, like Samkhya, is a school of materialist philosophy
and Shankara is prepared for a confrontation with them
simultaneously. Had the works of Purandara, Bhaguri and the likes of
them come down to us, the ridiculous argument against Lokayata
philosophy advanced by Madhava and his ilk might not have been there.
The prime
question then is why the texts of the Lokayata philosophers
disappeared in the course of history. It is not tendentious or
simplistic to suggest that a crucial reason for it was the social
philosophy which the Lokayata school underlined. It was against this
that idealist philosophers had to fight in order to defend what their
philosophy sought to defend. The innate connection between
materialism and the people involved in human endeavours is borne out
by the history of civilization throughout the world. A world –
denying philosophy may be sweet for an intellectually astute
philosopher, but a person who has to live with the sweat of his brow
does not have much love for it. What is ‘ultimately real’ may be
a fine academic question, but ploughing and sowing are not mere
academic matters. Plato was neither the first nor the last to demean
the labourer while making merry with the products of the labour of
others. The Lokayata school of philosophy has happily remained at
the receiving end in this unequal bout.
Not to be left
far behind some philosophers, texts like the Vishnu Purana castigated
the Lokayata-s in strong terms which are more indicative of anger and
apprehension than any philosophical justification. It might also be
said that some philosophers took the cue from the Purana-s while
attacking the Lokayata system. It is interesting to note that the
Vishnu Purana has nothing against Lokayata philosophy; its whole ire
is occasioned by the fact that the Lokayata does not accept Vedic
authority and has no special regard for sacrificial rituals. That
the Lokayata-s have a severe banter for death rituals is an
indication of the demonaic element in the Lokayata system according
to this Purana. The text further bemoans that the Lokayata-s are
under a delusion because of which they allegedly declare that ‘the
world has no basis or support’ external to itself, that the world
is primordially evil, and so on. It is because of this that the
lokayata-s are inimical to the Brahmins in the view of the Vishnu
Purana. It is obvious whose interests within the caste hierarchy
the Purana seeks to defend and also why orthodoxy has always found
the lokayata as a bush of thorns in the otherwise pleasant garden of
vertical social hierarchy. Those who wonder whether the Lokayata
system of philosophy has anything at all to do with ethics may like
to consider if consciousness of social equality is not a fundamental
ingredient of ethics in the specific Indian context. The Lokayata-s
were not satisfied with mere consciousness against a social stigma,
they were crusaders against it as well, which is saying a lot about
their ethical values. As crusaders, of course, they did not
perpetrate any crime like their counterparts of medieval Europe did,
and yet the Vishnu Purana liberally consigns all the Lokayata-s to
the burning hell out of sheer indignation, but the society at large
might not have enthusiastically shared its misplaced spirit for
‘punishing’ the Lokayata-s. Vachaspati Mishra follows the Purana
edict as a great loyalist, casting to the winds his true calling as a
philosopher. He is more royal than the king when he proclaims that
the Lokayata-s are ‘more brutish than brutes’ thereby again
proving that his first interest is not philosophy but defence of the
social pyramid of his times. Why would so many ‘authorities’
rave against the lokayata-s if their system had not been part of the
popular legend of those days?
If it is not
some Purana like the Vishnu Purana that guides some Indian
philosophers in the evaluation of philosophy, then it is some
law-giver who directs them how to distribute their favours. In
either case, it is an extraneous thing that makes them evaluate
philosophical schools. The whole thing reminds one of the medieval
age in Europe when the Church in Rome either frowned upon Science or
favoured it depending upon how it might or might not affect papal
authority. The only difference is that perhaps India did not resort
to the foul act of burning heretics at the stake like Europe did.
Possibly the Indian philosophers believed in a more humane way of
killing! As far as killing the idea is concerned there is a fine
similarity of purpose. A typical instance of the Indian philosophers
signing on the dotted lines drawn by the law-givers can be seen in
the commentaries on what is called the “Apashudradhikarana” of
the Brahma Sutra-s. The Taittiriya Samhita (2.2.10.2) had earlier
averred that the “words of Manu are like a medical potion”
(Yadvai kincha manuravadat tadbheshajam). Not many Indian
philosophers have raised the question as to why or how the words of a
law-giver could be the final verdict on a question of philosophy when
it is well-known that such law-givers are by mo means pre-eminent
philosophers in their own right. Another way of saying this is that
philosophy must dutifully subserve the purpose of the existing
unequal social order. Shankara has said that a particular statement
of Manu (namely, 12.91) implies the refutation of the views of the
Samkhya doctrine of Kapila. The exact words are here: Manuna …
sarvatmatvadarshanam prashamsataa kaapilam matam nindyata iti
gamyate, meaning that while edifying the soul as the substratum of
everything Manu has refuted the view of Kapila regarding the
elements. Should one not have the integrity to pronounce outright
that it is not edifying for a philosopher to lay philosophy
prostrating at the feet of a law-giver whose sole purpose is to keep
the stultifying social order static? P.V. Kane has hit the nail on
the head by saying, perhaps ironically, that “according to
Shankara, the author of the Vedanta Sutra-s has Manusmriti for one
of his sources.” It passes one’s understanding how Manu could be
of great help in understanding the true nature of ‘what is’
(sat), which is the principal preoccupation of the philosopher
Shankara. This question may sound quite scandalous to our adherents
and irrational admirers of Shankara, ‘the Himalayan philosopher’
as they like to describe him. But the Himalayan philosopher is not
disinterested in the conservation of the social hierarchy of his
times. Both the philosophical and the sociological stances of
Shankara are evident from his commentary on the Brahma Sutra-s. The
world as experienced by us in our day to day life may be ephemeral
according to Shankara, but the vertical social hierarchy in it is not
so; it must be defended to the last hilt.
As an
illustration for this, we may go to the ‘Apashudraadhikarana’ of
the Brahma Sutra-s. That it is the opinion of the Upanishadic
passage concerned and not necessarily that of Shankara as well does
not hold water. The point at issue in this section (adhikarana) is
that the philosophical view highlighted in the Upanishad is not
available to the ‘low born’ (shudra). If that is what the
contention of the Upanishadic passage, namely, the Chandogya
Upanishad 4.2.3, also is, then that too becomes an example for
calumny, leaving the slandering Shankara unexonerated. The paradox
of it all is that the philosophical view under reference is a sine
qua non for liberation, but that view is, however, not available for
a Shudra, which means that a Shudra is condemned to eternal bondage.
It is quite another matter that the Shudra in spite of such
ignominious strictures continues to struggle for liberation with the
help of some other philosophy as evidenced by history. If there is
any hope for the so called low born, it is solely in the form of
service to the ‘high-born’, as Manu has said and as Shankara has
endorsed!
In the first
place, why does the ‘low-born’ not have the right to gain the
philosophical view so much tattooed? The answer is simple: “Because
he has no right to study the Veda.” And why so? ‘Because he is
uninitiated’ as per law and he is also uninitiable as per the law
of the ‘high-born’ rulers. The ‘low-born’ is duly warned that
any transgression of this ordinance could be suicidal as molten lead
might be poured into his ears if he dares to so much as hear the
recitation of the Veda, let alone recite it himself. It is hard to
believe that a philosopher could be so irrational as this, but
Shankara quotes these words of the Gautama Dharma Sutra (2.3.4) with
unbashful approval. And why should the ‘low-born’ not hear the
recitation of the Veda? “Because he is similar to the cremation
grounds.” Pray, what logic is this? Suppose one goes and recites
the Veda right on the cremation grounds, then what? Oh, no. It is
sheer blasphemy. “There is a clear injunction that his tongue must
be cut if he recites the Veda and that his body must be rendered
asunder if he comprehends the Veda,” says Shankara, the mighty
philosopher. But, are we reading a philosophical text or some nasty
edict of a tyrannical Roman emperor? May we submit that the great
champions of Shankara’s philosophy who want us to accept Shankara
lock, stock and barrel should answer that question to themselves
first? It is not without some substance that some present day
followers of Shankara liken him to Plato. There are many
similarities between the two; both consider the world to be somewhat
unreal and both uphold slavery, albeit in slightly different forms.
Without
going into the details of the context in which all this discourse on
the curse heaped on the Shudra figures in Shankara’s commentary on
the relevant portions of the Chandogya Upanishad (4.2.3), it may be
mentioned that Raikva, endowed with sublime knowledge although living
in harsh straits, condescends to teach the Truth to Jaanashruti, a
wealthy non-shudra, when he offers to gift a damsel if need be to
receive the famed knowledge in possession of the former. While doing
so, he addresses the non-shudra as a shudra, which is what propmpts
all the commentators on the Brahjma Sutra-s to launch a tirade
against the shudra-s and pay rich obeisances to the law-givers in the
name of interpreting a philosophical point. The multi-million rupee
question for the commentators unhappily is whether philosophical
knowledge could be imparted to someone like Jaanashruti who had just
been addressed as if he were a Shudra. After taking the literal
meaning of the word ‘shudra’ to begin with, the commentators hold
forth eloquently about the prescriptions of the law-givers
approvingly and then argue that the literal meaning is not of any
consequence in the given context. What else does the word ‘shudra’
mean then in the given context? The etymology of the word from the
root ‘shuk’ suggests that ‘shudra’ is one who is perpetually
in a pathetic condition, but that Jaanashruti is momentarily a
‘shudra’ because of his remorseful condition. Whatever the
usefulness or otherwise of the excursion into etymology, one thing
remains clear and that is that there was no sense of pathos evoked in
Shankara for the ‘low-born’ and yet he was a lofty philosopher.
Ramanuja,
Madhva and other greats in the world of Indian Philosophy might have
differed among themselves on any number of issues concerning
philosophy, but they were all one in equating the ‘low-born’ with
the cemetery. They vied with each other, if anything, in
surrendering to the dictates of the law-givers without ever venturing
to dictate the law-givers about humanist philosophy, social equality
and universal appeal of knowledge. Likewise, they are all strongly
united in their opposition to the Lokayata school of thought. There
is, for example, a myth bandied about in respect of Ramanuja that he
was for embracing everyone into his fold in a truly liberal fashion.
But here is a sample of his ‘liberalism’ (in loose translation)
which should be an eye-opener: The low-born are not entitled to
perform any sacrifice. It is not something which one can perform by
virtue of the material wealth that one possesses. Everyone should
follow the course of action prescribed for the different varna-s
(that is, broadly, castes). … The low-born ought to understand the
Brahman by taking recourse to the epics and legends only. (Commentary
on the Brahma Sutra-s, 1.3.36).
Not to be
left behind, Raghavendratirtha, the much venerated miracle-man of the
Madhva tradition in his “Tattvamanjari” (144) has said all that
Shankara has said about the Shudra-s. He, however, goes a step
further to point out that Jaanashruti of the Chandogya Upanishad was
not a Shudra, for, he possessed a chariot which he could not have
done had he been a Shudra! Nothing, therefore, could prevent Raikva
from imparting sublime knowledge to him.
The
intellectual acrobatics that Shankara, Ramanuja, Madhva and many
other Indian philosophers willingly resorted to was occasioned not
by any demand of philosophy but by the dogmatic concern for
justifying and consolidating social hierarchy which is not an
ennobling function of philosophy. If anything, philosophy has the
unenviable task of serving humanity by upholding equality,
rationality and happiness. To suggest that in the ‘ultimate sense’
happiness so called is only unhappiness is to be clever by half
because even the Bhagavadgita speaks of the worldly imperatives when
it acknowledges ‘lokasamgraha’ (norms of the actual world) as a
value. The Lokayata school of philosophy had no need for such crafty
arguments and rationalization. The Lokayatika, that is, a follower
of the Lokayata school, had Reason on his side when he boldly accused
his accuser of non-philosophical considerations while discussing
philosophy. The deft strokes of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya have
restored the right of the Lokayata school to stand head and shoulder
above many another Indian school of philosophy while also buttressing
the philosophical schools of Samkhya, Vaisheshika and Nyaya. Little
wonder, therefore, that shaken savant unsuccessfully moved a
resolution once at an Al India Philosophical Congress stating that
the ‘pernicious influence of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya must be
cried a halt to’ in order to save Indian Philosophy. Unfortunately
for him, history is not on his side. There is no ‘pernicious
influence’ to fear from Debiprasad. All that he meant to do was to
drive some sanity into the heads of students of Indian Philosophy.
Nobody claims that he succeeded a hundred per cent in this endeavour.
But as Bhavabhuti assured us a long time ago, the world is vast and
time endless. Kaalohyayam niravadhih vipulaa cha prithvi. History
does not run out of time and the time of Lokayata will dawn one day.
Dr. G Ramkrishna is the Chief Editor of Hosatu, a
progressive periodical in Kannada. He was Professor of English at
National College, Bangalore and a Visiting Professor at Kannada
University, Hampi. He is the author a number of books in Kannada and
English including The Strange Culture of M.S. Golvalkar, The Living Marx, and Philosophy in China (in English), The features of the Anti-Fascist Movement, RSS – A Poisonous Tree, On Hindutva (Kannda)
Email ID: dgrkrishna@gmail.com
