Supreme Court Judgment on Banning of EVR’s Booklet on Ramayana

In 1970 the Government of Uttar Pradesh passed an order, under Section 99-A of the Cr.P.C, forfeiting the book "Ramayana: A True Reading" (and its Hindi translation) authored by EVR, the legendary rationalist thinker and social activist from Tamil Nadu. The High Court of Allahabad quashed the Government Order. The Government of Uttar Pradesh filed an appeal in the Supreme Court of India against the High Court order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal holding that, to quote, "the possible invocation of the powers under Section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure by various State Governments on several occasions induces us to enter a caveat. Basic unity amidst diversity notwithstanding, India is a land of cultural contrarieties, co-existence of many religions and anti-religions, rationalism and bigotry, primitive cults and materialist doctrines. The compulsions of history and geography and the assault of modern science on the retreating forces of medieval ways--a mosaic like tapestry of lovely and unlovely strands---have made large and liberal tolerance of mutual criticism, even though expressed in intemperate diction, a necessity of life. Governments, we are confident, will not act in hubris, but will weigh these hard facts of our society while putting into operation the harsh directives for forfeiture". 

The judgement was authored by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, who passed away yesterday (04 December 2014). We reproduce the entire judgement in memory of Justice Krishna Iyer.

- Carvaka

State Of Uttar Pradesh vs Lalai Singh Yadav on 16 September, 1976

Equivalent citations: 1977 AIR 202, 1977 SCR (1) 616

Author: V R Krishnaiyer

Bench: Krishnaiyer, V.R.

Petitioner: State of Uttar Pradesh Vs Respondent: Lalai Singh Yadav

Date of Judgement: 16/09/1976

Bench: Krishna Iyer, V.R

Bench: 

Krishna Iyer, V.R, 

Bhagawati P.N

Fazalali, Syed Murtaza.

CITATION: 1977 AIR 202 1977 SCR (1) 616 1976 SCC (4) 213 

ACT: Code of Criminal Procedure, S. 99-A - Scope of - Whether 'Statement of grounds' a mandatory provision. 

HEADNOTE: The appellant Government passed an order under Section 99-A of the Cr. P.C., for the forfeiture of a book entitled 'Ramayan: A true Reading' in English and its translation in Hindi, by Periyar EVR, of Tamil Nadu, on the ground that the book intended to outrage the religious feelings of a class of citizens of India, namely, the Hindus. Thereupon, an application was made by the respondent publisher of the book. under Section 99-C of the Code to the High Court, which by its special Bench, allowed the application and quashed the notification on the ground that the State Government had failed to state the grounds of its opinion as required in Section 99-A of the Code. The appellant contended that a specific statement of grounds by the Government, is not a mandatory requirement under Section 99-A of the Cr.P.C., & that it can be made by implication. 

Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: To relieve the State from the duty to state grounds of forfeiture, is to permit raptorial opportunity for use of such power over people's guaranteed liberty. Section 99-A says that you must state the ground and it is no answer to say that they need not be stated because they are implied. An order may be brief but not a blank. A formal authoritative setting forth of the grounds is statutorily mandatory.  Section 99-C enables the aggrieved party to apply to the High Court to set aside the prohibitory order and the Court examines the grounds of Government given in the order. The Court cannot make a roving enquiry beyond the grounds set forth in the order and if the grounds are altogether left out, the valuable r ight of appeal to the Court is defeated. [610G-H, 620B-C, G-H] Harnam Das v. State of U.P.A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1662, 1666 - dictum applied. Scheneck v.U.S. (1918) 249 U.S. 47, 527_-63 L.ed. 470, 473-474: Abrams v. U.S. (1919) 250 U.S. 616, 629=63 Led. 1173, 1180; Bowmen v. Secular Society Ltd. (1917) A.C. 406, 466-7; Arun Ranjan Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (I.L.R. 1957 2 Cal., 396), Jwalamukhi v. State of A.P. (I.L.R. 1973 A.P. 114) referred to. Mohammad Khalid v. Chief Commissioner (A.I.R. 1968 Delhi 18 FB) Chinna Annamalai v. State (A.I.R. 1971 Madras 448 F.B.), Bennet Coleman & Co. v. State of J & K (1974 J & K .L.R. 591) approved. 

JUDGMENT: 

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 291 of 1971. 

(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 19-1-1971 of the Allahabad High Court in Crl. Misc. Case No. 412/ 70). 

D.P. Uniyal and O.P. Rana, for the Appellant. S.N. Singh, for the Respondent. 

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. Some cases, apparently innocent on their face and this appeal is one such--may harbour beneath the surface profoundly disturbing problems concerning freedoms, the unfettered enjoyment of which is the foundation for a democracy to flourish. 

The present appeal, by special leave, relates. to the forfeiture of a book captioned 'Ramayan: A True Reading' in English and its translation in Hindi, by the late political figure and leader of the Rationalist Movement, Periyar EVR, of Tamil Nadu, by an order of the State Government of Uttar Pradesh, purporting to be passed under s. 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the view of the appellant government this book was sacrilegiously, outrageously objectionable, being 'deliberately and maliciously intended to outrage the religious feelings of a class of citizens of India, viz., Hindus by insulting their religion and religious beliefs and the publication whereof is punishable under s. 295A IPC'. This notification contained an appendix setting out in tabular form the particulars of the relevant pages and lines in the English and Hindi versions which, presumably, were the materials which were regarded as scandalizing. Thereupon an 'application was made by the respondent who was the publisher, under s. 99C of the Code, to the High Court which, by its special Bench, allowed the application and quashed the notification. The aggrieved State has appealed to this Court, by special leave. and counsel for the appellant has urged before us that the Government notification does not suffer from the vice which, according to the High Court, invalidated it and that the impugned book makes a foul assault on the sacred sentiments of the vast Hindu population of the State since the author anathematized in unvarnished language the great incarnations like Sree Rama and disdainfully defiled the divinely epic figures like Sita and Janaka all of whom are worshiped or venerated by the Hindu commonalty. Sidestepping this issue the High Court, by majority judgment, struck down the order on the short ground that 'the State Government did not state the grounds of its opinion as required in s. 99A o[ the Code. For that reason alone the petition has to be allowed and the order of forfeiture set aside in Court'. 

The anatomy of s. 99A falls to be studied at the thresh- old so that the pathology, if any, of the impugned order may be discovered. Shorn of phraseological redundancies (from the point raised in this case) the pertinent components of the provision, empowering forfeiture of materials manifesting written expression by citizens, are threefold, as flow from a reproduction of the relevant parts: "99-A(1) ---Where-

(a) any newspaper, or book ... or 

(b) any document, wherever printed, appears to the 'State Government to contain any .... or any matter which promotes or is intended to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India or which is deliberately and maliciously intended to outrage the religious feelings of any such class by insulting the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, that is to say, any matter the publication of which is punishable under section 124-A or Section 153-A or Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code, the State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, stating the grounds of its opinion, declare every copy of the issue of the newspaper containing such matter, and every copy of such book or other document to be forfeited to Government..." 

The triple facets of a valid order therefore are: 

(i) that the book or document contains any matter;

(ii) such matter promotes or is-intended to promote feelings of' enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens. of India; and

(iii) a statement of the grounds of Government's opinion. 

Thereupon the State Government may, by notification, declare every copy of the issue containing such matter to be forfeited. 

Does the present notification fulfill the third requisite of legal viability or is it still-born, being mortally wounded by absence of the statement of grounds ? The High Court holding this vital ingredient missing, has voided the order, but Sri Uniyal, counsel for the State, submits that though there is no express enunciation of the grounds for' Government's opinion, the appendix makes up for it. He argues that the numbers of the pages and lines of the of- fending publication supply both the 'matter' and the 'grounds', the latter being so patent that the. omission is inconsequential. More explicitly, the contention is that a mere reference to the matter, sufficiently particularised, functionally supplies, by implicit reading or necessary implication, the legal requirement of statement of grounds. The office of furnishing the reason or foundation for the governmental conclusion is substantially, though not formally, fulfilled where the appendix, an integral part of the order, sets out self-speaking materials. When the grounds are self-evident, silence is whispered speech and the law does not demand their separate spelling out as a ritualistic formality. The counter-contention is that express conditions for barricading the fundamental freedoms of expression designedly imposed by the Code cannot be whittled down by the convenient doctrine of implication, the right being too basic to be manacled without strict and manifest compliance with the specific stipulations of the provision. After. all fundamental rights are fundamental in a free Republic, except in times of national emergency, where rigorous restraints, constitutionally sanctioned, are clamped down. We are dealing with the Criminal Procedure Code and Penal Code and these laws operate at all times. We have therefore to interpret the law in such a manner that liberties have plenary play, subject of course to the security needs of the nation, as set out in the Constitution and the laws. 

Even so, counsel for the appellant contends that the references in the forfeited book, as indicated in the appendix to the order, are so loudly repulsive and malevolently calumnious of Sree Rama, Sita and Janaka that the court must vicariously visualize the outraged feelings of the Hindus of Uttar Pradesh and hold that the grounds are written in the order in invisible ink. When we assess the worth of this submission we have to notice (a) the constitutional perspective, i.e., whether the basic freedoms are sought to be legally handcuffed; and (b) the existence of alternative possibilities of popular understanding of the prescribed publication which necessitate some statement of the circumstances and the reasons which induced the government in the given conditions of ethos and otherwise to reach the opinion it has recorded. 

The State, in India, is secular and does not take sides with one religion or other prevalent in our pluralistic society. It has no direct concern with the faiths of the people but is deeply obligated not merely to preserve and protect society against breaches of the peace and violations of public order but also to create conditions where the sentiments and feelings of people of diverse or opposing beliefs and bigotries are not so molested by ribald writings or offensive Publications as to provoke or outrage groups into possible violent action. Essentially, good government necessitates peace and security and whoever violates by bombs or books societal tranquility will become target of legal interdict by the State. 

We propose to view the issue before us both from the textual angle and from the larger standpoint and are led to the conclusion, by an interaction of both, that the High Court was not wrong and the appeal must fail. The-various High Courts in India have had occasion to consider this question but have come to divergent conclusions. as will presently appear. 

A drastic restriction on the right of a citizen when imposed by statute, calls for a strict construction, especially when quasi-penal consequences also ensue. The imperial authors of the Criminal Procedure Code have drawn up s. 99A with concern for the subject and cautionary man- dates to government. The power can be exercised only in the manner and according to the procedure laid down by the law. Explicitly the section compels the government to look at the matter which calls for action to consider it as to the clear and present danger it constitutes in the shape of promoting feelings of enmity and hatred between different segments of citizens or as to its strong tendency or intendment to outrage the religious feelings of such segments (there are other proclivities also stated in the section with which we are not concerned for the present purpose) and, quite importantly, to state the grounds of its opinion. We are concerned with the last ingredient. When the section says that you must state the grounds it is no answer to say that they need not be stated because they are implied. you do not state a thing when you are expressively silent about it. To state 'is to declare or to set forth especially in a precise, formal or authoritative manner; to say (something), especially in an emphatic way to assert' (Random House Dictionary). The conclusion is inescapable 8---1234SCI/76 that a formal authoritative setting forth of the grounds is statutorily mandatory. If you laze and omit, the law visits the order with voidness and this the State Government must realize especially because forfeiture of a book for a penal offence is a serious matter, not a routine act to be executed with unconcern or indifference. The wages of neglect is invalidity, going by the text of the Code. These considerations are magnified in importance when we regard the changeover from the Raj to the Republic and the higher value assigned to the great rights of the people. Where there is a statutory duty to speak, silence is lethal sin for a good reason disclosed by the scheme of the fasciculus of sections. For Section. 99C enables the aggrieved party to apply to the High Court to set aside the prohibitory order and the Court examines the grounds of Government given in the order and affirms or upsets it. The Court cannot make a roving enquiry beyond the grounds set forth in the order and if the grounds are altogether left out what is the Court to examine? And, by this omission, careless or calculated, the valuable right of appeal to the Court is defeated. A construction of the section, fraught with such pernicious consequence and tampering with the basic structure of the statutory remedy, must be frowned upon by the Court if the liberty to publish is to be restricted only to the limited extent the law allows. This reasoning is reinforced by Harnam Das v. State of U.P.(1) wherein this Court observed: 

"What then is to happen when the Government did not state the grounds of its opinion ? In such a case if the High Court upheld the order, it may be that it would have done so for reasons which the Government did not have in contemplation at all. If the High Court did that, it would really have made an order of forfeiture itself and not upheld such an order made by the Government. This, as already stated, the High Court has no power to do under s. 99-D. It seems clear to us, therefore, that in such a case the High Court must set aside the order under s. 99-D, for it cannot then be satisfied that the grounds given by the Government justified the order. You cannot be satisfied about a thing which you do not know." We do not mean to say that the grounds or reasons link- ing the primary facts with the forfeiter's opinion must be stated at learned length. That depends. In some cases, a laconic statement may be enough, in others a longer ratiocination may be proper but never laches to the degree of taciturnity. An order may be brief but not a blank. This conclusion establishes a constitutional rapport between the penal section 99A and the fundamental right Art. 

19. To relieve the State from the duty to state grounds of forfeiture, in the face of the words of s. 99A, is to permit raptorial opportunity for use of such power over people's guaranteed liberty. Why do we say so ? Surely, security of the State and peace of society demand restrictions on individual rights and we are the slaves of the law that we may be free. 

(1) A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1662, 1666. 

The fighting faith of our founding fathers respected Mills' famous statement and Voltaire's inspired assertion. We quote: 

"If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind." (Mill in his essay 'On Liberty', pp. 19--20: Thinker's Library ed., Watts) "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." (Attributed to Voltaire in S.G. Tallentyre, The Friends of Voltaire, 1907) Rights and responsibilities 'are a complex system and the framers of our Constitution, aware of the grammar of anarchy; wrote down reasonable restrictions on libertarian exercise of freedoms. Dr. Ambedkar, in the Constituent Assembly, argued that it is incorrect to say that fundamental rights are absolute and quoted from Gitlow v. New York two self-speaking passages: 

"It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press, which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever. one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled licence that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom." 

"That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, invite to crime or disturb the public peace, is not open to question ..... " 

Section 99A of the Code, construed in this candescent constitutional conspectus, bears out our interpretation. In the interests of public order and public peace, public power comes into play not because the heterodox few must be suppressed to placate the orthodox many but because every- one's cranium must be saved from mayhem before his cerebrum can have chance to simmer. Hatred, outrage and like feelings of large groups may have crypto-violent proneness and the State, in its well-grounded judgment, may prefer to stop the circulation of the book to preserve safety and peace in society. No enlightened State, would use this power to suppress advanced economic views, radical rational criticisms or fearless exposure of primitive obscurantism but ordered security is a constitutional value wisely to be safeguarded if progressives and regressives are to peacefully coexist. This is the spirit of s. 99A of the Code. The actual exercise will depend not on doctrinaire logic but practical wisdom. While the American theory of clear and present danger as the basis of restriction on fundamental rights does not necessarily apply in India, the illuminating observations of Holmes J., serve to educate the administrator and Judge. In Scheneck v. U.S.(1) Holmes J drove home the true test: 

"We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants, in saying all that was said in the circular, would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done... The law's stringent protection of free speech, would not protect a man in falsely shouting 'fire' in a theatre, and causing panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force... The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."

Developing this theory in a famous passage in Abrains v. U.S.(2) he said: 

"Persecution, for the expression of opinions, seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care wholeheartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment." 

Again in Bowmen v. Secular Society Ltd.,(2) Lord Summer underscored the dynamism of liberty and safety at once luminous and, elegant, in a purple passage: 

(1) (1918)249 U.S.47.52=63 L.E.d.470.473-474. (2) (1919) 250 U.S. 616, 629=63 L. ed. 1173, 1180.

(3) (1917) A.C. 406, 466-7. 

"The words, as well as the acts, which tend to endanger society differ from time to time in proportion as society is stable or insecure in fact, or is believed by its reasonable members to be open to assault. In the present day meetings or processions are held lawful which a hundred and fifty years ago would have been deemed seditious and this is not because the law is weaker or has changed, but because, the times having changed, society is stronger than before. In the present day reasonable men do not apprehend the dissolution or downfall of society because religion is publicly assailed by methods not scandalous. Whether it is possible that in the future irreligious attacks, designed to undermine fundamental institutions of our society, may come to be criminal in themselves, as constituting a public danger, is a matter that does not arise. The fact that opinion grounded on experience has moved one way does not in law preclude the possibility of its moving on fresh experiences in the other; nor does it bind succeeding generations, when conditions have again changed. After all, the question whether a given opinion is a danger to society is a question of the times and is a question of fact. I desire to say nothing that would limit the right of society to protect itself by process of law from the dangers of the moment, whatever that right may be, but only to say that, experience having proved dangers once thought real to be now negligible, and dangers once very possibly imminent to have now passed away, there is nothing in the general rules as to blasphemy and irreligion... which prevents us from varying their application to the particular circumstances of our time in accordance with that experience." Such is our constitutional scheme, such the jurisprudential dynamics and philosophical underpinnings of freedom and restraint, a delicate area of fine confluence of law and politics which judges by duty have to deal with. The journey's end has now arrived. Government has the power and responsibility to preserve societal peace and to forfeit publications which endanger it. But what is thereby prevented is freedom of expression, that promoter of the permanent interests of human progress. Therefore, the law (s. 99A) fixes the mind of the Administration to the obligation to reflect on the need to restrict and to state the grounds which ignite its action. To fall here is to fault the order. That is about all. 

Before concluding, we clarify that we express no view on the merits of the book or its provocative vitriol. It depends on a complex of factors. What offends a primitive people may be laughable for progressive communities. What is outrageous hearsay for one religion or sect or country or time may be untouchably holy for another. Some primitive people may still be outraged by the admonition of Swami Vivekananda : 'Our religion is in the kitchen, our God is the cooking pot, and our religion is don't touch me, I am holy' (quoted at p. 339 by Jawaharlal Nehru in Discovery of India). The rule of human advance is free thought and expression but the survival of society enjoins reasonable curbs where public interest calls for it. The balance is struck by governmental wisdom overseen by judicial review. We speak not of emergency situations nor of constitutionally sanctified special prescriptions but of ordinary times and of ordinary laws. 

A parting thought which we put to appellant's counsel may be stated here. If the State Government, judging by current circumstances, feels impelled to invoke s. 99A against the book in question it is free to do so, subject of course to fulfillment of the requirement to state the grounds of its opinion and the operation of s. 99C of the Code. Our detailed discussion disposes of the question of law and resolves the conflict immanent or apparent in the rulings of the various High Courts ranged against each other. They are: Arun Ranjan Ghose v. The State of West Bengal(1); and Jwalamukhi v. State of A.P. (2) which support the view propounded by the appellant; and Mohammad Khalid v. Chief Commissioner(3); China Annamalai v. State(4) and Bennet Coleman & Co. Ltd v. State of J & K(5) which held with the Allahabad judgment under appeal. Perhaps there is no need to discuss the ratio in each of the above cases as the rival points of view have been already covered in the earlier part of this judgment. 

The possible invocation of the powers under s. 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure by various State Governments on several occasions induces us to enter a caveat. Basic unity amidst diversity notwithstanding, India is a land of cultural contrarities, co-existence of many religions and anti-religions, rationalism and bigotry, primitive cults and materialist doctrines. The compulsions of history and geography and the assault of modern science on the retreating forces of medieval ways--a mosaic like tapestry of lovely and unlovely strands---have made large and liberal tolerance of mutual criticism, even though expressed in intemperate diction, a necessity of life. Governments, we are confident, will not act in hubris, but will weigh these hard facts of our society while putting into operation the harsh directives for forfeiture. From Galileo and Darwin, Thoreau and Ruskin to Karl Marx, H.G. Wells, Barnard Shaw and Bertrand Russel, many great thinkers have been objected to for their thoughts and statements-avoiding for a moment great Indians from Manu to Nehru. Even today, here and there, diehards may be found in our country who are offended by their writings but no Government will be antediluvian enough to invoke the power to seize their great writings because a few fanatics hold obdurate views on them. (1)I.L.R. [1957] 2 Cal. 396. (2) I.L.R. [1973] A.P. 114. (3) AIR 1968 Delhi 18 (F.B.). (4) AIR 1971 Madras 448 (FB). (5) 1974 J & K L.R. 591. 

A well-known Mao thought aptly expresses the liberalist approach to divergent schools of philosophy: 

"Letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend is the policy for promoting the progress of the arts and sciences." 

HaroldLaski, who influenced many Indian progressives, in his 'A Grammar of Politics' states a lasting truth: 

"There is never sufficient certitude in social matters to make it desirable for any government to denounce it in the name of the State. American experience of the last few years has made it painfully clear that there will never be present in constituted authority a sufficient nicety of discrimination to make R certain that the opinion attacked is one reasonably certain to give rise to present disorder." 

"It is no answer to this view to urge that it is the coronation of disorder. If views which imply violence have a sufficient hold upon the State to disturb its foundations, there is some- thing radically wrong with the habits of that State." 

"Almost always - there are rare cases in which persecution has proved successful - the result of free expression is such a mitigation of the condition attacked as to justify its use; almost always,' also, to prohibit free speech is to drive the agitation underground. What made Voltaire dangerous to France was not his election to the Academy, but his voyage to England. Lenin was infinitely more dangerous to. Czarist Russia in Switzerland than he would have been in the Dume. Freedom of speech, in fact, with the freedom of assembly therein implied, is at once the catharsis of discontent and the condition of necessary re- form. A government can always learn more from the criticism of its opponents than from the eulogy of its supporters. To stifle that criticism is--at least ultimately--to prepare its own destruction." 

A note of circumspection. In the current context of constitutionally proclaimed emergency, the laws have perforce to act in the narrow limits inscribed in the Emergency provisions and this decision relates to the pre-Emergency legal order. We dismiss the appeal. 

M.R. Appeal dismissed

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Indian Philosophy – Melody and Millstone: PART III

G Ramakrishna

The murky record of idealism as a vicious weapon on the one hand and philosophical obscurantism on the other has a shining contrast in materialism. Once again the historical limitations of the ancient Indian materialist philosophers cannot be overlooked. The rudiments of materialism are quite clear in many anti-idealist schools of though and the fundamentals quite pronounced in the case of the Lokayta School. The essential feature of materialism is the assertion that 'since this world is essentially material, the first cause that we can infer for it must also be material" (p 92). This is the position accepted by the Samkhya School. It or its variations form the antithesis of Indian idealism. The rejection of idealism in Indian philosophy is threefold at the hands of the Lokayata, Samkhya and Nyaya-Vaiseshika respectively.All three of them defend the reality of the external world as against its unreality posited by the idealists. They are all one in yet another manner, too; they want “to work out an explanation of the objective world in terms of their respective theories of the nature of matter” (p 286). But they differ among themselves in certain details, especially in regard to their varying concepts of matter. The Lokayata view matter as the physical elements, Samkhyua as primeval subtle matter, and Nyaya-Vaiseshika as atoms. The commitment to the theory that “matter is the ultimate constituent of the world” is equally firm in all three of them (p 288). While discussing this issue, Chattopadhyaya initiates a discussion on the correctness or otherwise of the application of the term ‘realism’ to describe Samkhya and Nyaya-Vaiseshika positions of anti-idealism (p 288-98). It is a term used to designate Samkhya and Nyaya-Vaiseshika by those who take materialism’ in an extra-philosophical sense. For some reasons best know to themselves, they shun the word ‘materialism’ because of its alleged ‘vices and vulgarities’ and reserve the term for describing Lokayata! ‘Realism’ has a definite connotation in the context of the history of European philosophy. It is not the same as materialisms although it is opposed to idealism; for, it is opposed to materialism as well. Among the idealist schools, Lokayata is the materialist school of though par excellence. Besides holding the view that consciousness is ultimately the product of matter and hence matter is primary and consciousness secondary (p 294), the Lokayata, alone among the schools of Indian philosophy, is “free from sundry superstitions” and hence “most remarkable among the Indian materialists” (p 297). The Samkhya and Nyaya-Vaisehika view regarding consciousness are very close to the Lokayata view. From the point of view of philosophical argumentation against idealism, however, it is the atomistic Nyaya-Vaisehika school that develops a theory of the nature of matter to explain a wide range of natural phenomena. The content of materialism in Nyaya-Vaiseshika is, therefore, immense. But modern scholars fail to take note of it because of a body of sundry superstitions forming part of it, more or less as an appendage and not as a integral part (p 298). The theory of atomic conjunction advocated by the Nyaya-Vaiseshika has its own problems alright. But, as Debiprasad put it, “judged by us retrospectively, it really means that in the development of Indian science, the satisfactory solution of one problem concerning the nature of mater ushers in certain new and as yet unsolved problems. But this is precisely the way in which science advances in the past, as it is still advancing…’ Our knowledge of the nature of matter is ever-progressive; the more we know about it the clearer do we feel that much more remains to be knows, and therefore also grows the urge to know better. At least this is the position of the materialists as contrasted with that of the idealists, who refuse to be satisfied with anything short of the final and absolute truth and thus fail to stimulate scientific inquiry” (p 400). Lenin eminently summarized it when he said that “materialism clearly formulates the as yet unsolved problems and thereby stimulates the attempt to solve it”. This is a wholesome recipe which many of our scientists fail to understand and thus rush to the hypocritical saints and self-styled saviors to learn the elements of science, thereby betraying and insulting the basic creed of science itself.

It has already been mentioned above that the relationship between matter and consciousness is a cardinal question tackled by different systems of Indian philosophy. The importance of this question cannot be overstated. It is not simply a curious theoretical question in ontology. The material origin of consciousness properly understood “open few horizons for the real understanding of human history” (p 492). Nowhere is it dogmatically argued in materialism that consciousness, as evolutes of social being or materials conditions, has no creative role to play. All that is stressed is that it “is not the sole creative force, as imagined by the idealists: (p 493). The theory of the material origin of consciousness, attributed to the Lokayatas universally, is as old as the Chandogya Upanishad where Uddalaka Aruni, through experimental demonstration, instructs his son Svetaketu regarding the first principle for the explanation of nature (p 476). Devoid of any religion-orientation and obscure mysticism, this theory of Uddalaka reminds one of the Samkhya philosophy, “the starting point of which is that, since being cannot be produced from nonbeing, the essential nature of the cause is to be inferred from the essential nature of the effect” (p 477). Mind, by which Uddalaka means consciousness, is viewed as having a distinct material origin and this is supported by a number of illustrations. The idealists cleverly remain silent while commenting on the passages in which Uddalaka gives the above exposition (p 481).

The Nyaya-Vaiseshika view is that consciousness “is essentially a transient phenomenon, somehow or other temporarily produced by the peculiar collocation of a number of intrinsically unconscious (jada) entities, most of which are material” (p 404).  That doyen among the interpreters of Indian philosophy, Professor M. Hiriyanna, recognizes this phenomenon in Nyaya-Vaiseshika as a position “scarcely distinguishable from htat of the Charvakas” (p 411). If the Nyaya-Vaiseshka did not take a leap forward from this position to explain how consciousness emerges from the essentially unconscious, it was only because of their reluctance to be identified with the outspoken materialists, namely the Loakayatas, who were the special target of attack from orthodox schools. But still they went far enough when they accepted consciousness as a property of the soul under certain given conditions of matter (p 407). The Samkhya, which has the unique distinction of  being tampered with at will by the ‘repairers’ of Indian philosophical tradition, views matter a primary and consciousness as secondary. The boldest theoretical formulations on this matter comes from the Lokayats. The Samkhya position is so close to the Lokayata view that the irritated Sankara brands the Samkhya an equivalent of Lokayata materialism Nothing could be more sacrilegious than to be identical with Lokayata! So, no refutation is really neded in that case, concluded Sankara. The dog has been branded mad; and that is as good as having been shot! Queer logic that to demolish the Lokayata and Samkhaya views of consciousness as a product of matter.  The Lokayata view, according to Sankara’s observation, is that consciousness belongs to the body, and is hence not the characteristic peculiarity of the spirit. The decisive question for the Lokayata is whether the material elements alone, in spite of each of them being intrinsically unconscious, go to the making of living bodies possessing consciousness. Can, in other words, consciousness emerge from unconscious matter? (p 426).  The remarkable thing about the Lokayatas is that notwithstanding the severe limitations imposed on them by the lack of elaborate scientific data, they do make a bold theoretical attempt at an explanation of the origin of consciousness from matter (p 427). In explaining their position, the Lokayatas draw the analogy of the non-intoxicating ingredients giving rise to an intoxicating liquor. Where did the intoxicating (or the intoxicating quality) come from? Even so, consciousness emerges from the unconscious elements. It is significant that the Lokayatas fall back on naturalistic phenomena and not spiritualistic ones to explain the enigma. The basic assumption of the Lokayatas that life (consciousness) originates from inorganic matter (unconscious) is a postulate of present day science also and this speaks volumes for the science-orientation of the Lokayata system.  Faced with a stout and determined defence of this position by the Laokayats, the refutation of the theory at  the hands of the idealists only shows their puerility and pedantry “as all defence of superstition against science is perhaps destined to be” (p 446). So much is the inconvenience and discomfort for the idealist that as the only avenue of escape they impute some ugly and unreasonable philosophical opinion to the Lokayatas and devastatingly refute them with triumph, much in the fashion of the present-day enemies of Marxism ‘obliterating’ Marxism by attributing fancy theories to the doctrine. This is somewhat unusual for Indian idealist photospheres who normally represent the opponents’ view points fairly accurately in their treatises and even anticipate the further points likely to be made by the opponents on the basis of their accepted positions. It only underlines the invincible quality of the Lokayata theory. The potential of Lokayta is realized in the much later scientific materialism know as Marxism (p 491).

The chapter on “Refutation of idealism” (ch 7) is another very important section of the book. The main philosophical thrust against idealism comes from the Nyaya-Vaiseshikas and Kumarila, an exponent of Purva-Mimasa. The crushing blows of Nyaya-Vaiseshika against idealism are really breath-taking. The idealist is invited to accept the inviolable truth that “it is obligatory for the philosophers to operate with the pramanas (means of valid knowledge), ie. to depend on experience and reason” (p 306). On both these counts, namely experience and reason, idealism stands shattered. If the idealist argues that things have no independent existence or reality, it means that he has recognized the existence of the proof for his conclusion, if of nothing else; if he does not argue thus, his basic theory that the objective world has no reality stand defeated. The dilemma of the idealist is further analyzed by Kumarila (p 373). Not being satisfied with the above line of argumentation alone, Kumarila launches an attack on the incredible claims of yogic supernormal experience and denounces the same as fictitious (p 319). A subjective hallucianation may come to be branded as ‘supernormal’ experience and Kumarila is not obliged to accept it as valid. “Only standard experience has relevance for philosophy” (p 321). He has nothing but contempt for mystery-mongering and with detailed  arguments he disposes of the idealist position that objects of experience have no reality (p 323). The Indian idealist philosopher thus scoffed at by the opponents of idealism takes shelter under his special brainchild’s roof, namely the differing levels of reality. Howe the opponents of idealism reject this notion, we have already seen above.

The next and last major question for Indian Philosophy is the concept of freedom. The spiritualistic orientation of Indian Philosophy, which according to many an Indian and western analyst of Indian philosophy is its distinguishing feature, is as inescapable as it s nauseating. It is almost used liked a drug, one might say. The oppressing class has used and still uses the concept of freedom in idealist Indian philosophy as the final, apparently unvanquishable, missile against the rising masses of the people. The law of karma acts as an accessory to this. The damage done by the two together is simply infuriating. The pet theory is that the whole stupid world is an illusion and that emancipation pertains to the hereafter. To be worthy of the ‘hereafter’, one should be properly averse to the ‘here’, so that one might overcome the endless cycle of births and deaths. Freedom in idealist Indian philosophy means the absolute extinction of the illusion about the world. “This is the essence of the metaphysical monstrosity which all idealists proclaim as the right understanding of freedom”. “There remains nothing to be done about the world, except to cultivate a philosophical contempt for it as the product of perverse imagination” (p 571). The dangerous machinations of a perverse philosophy of reedome like this cannot be lost onus, because in real life we see real men and women groaning under this philosophy which has given such power to the oppressing class. Bondage, slavery and serfdom being perpetuated under the sweet nomenclature of freedom is what this concept is all about.

A close analysis of this concept in Nyaya-Vaiseshika shows that it is grafted on the system and is accepted as a safety measure against the otherwise inevitable onslaught of the ever-menacing law-givers (p 588). It is a concept which is totally inconsistent with the Samkhya standpoint (pp 592 and 596). It is extraneous to the Purva-Mimasmsa also (p 597-608). “Among the opponents of Indian idealism, the Lokayatas are the only philosophers to call for a total rejection of the idealist view of soul and its salvation…The first precondition for moving towards a sensible conception of freedom is to scrap all nonsense about it” (p 609). The Lokayatas recognize that ‘certain view and attitudes admirably suit the economic interest of the parasitical class, or, as they put it, are created to be the source of their livelihood’ (p 613). A  faith-oriented philosophy taking cudgels against logic may naturally be expected to abhor the Lokayata position. But the precarious position of the Nyaya exponents like Vatsyayana is understandable. Being the ideological propagandists on behalf of the oppressing class, they were hampered in taking a suitable view of freedom as a genuine need of the people. They willingly surrendered to the opium of spiritualism. If the positive factors in Nyaya-Vaiseshika are overwhelming, this negative formulation is not only unfortunate but positively misleading and disastrous (p 619). The subservience to the law-givers makes even an eminent scientist like Prasastapada of the Vaiseshika School a split personality and he is thus the prototype of our contemporary scientists taking a dip in the Ganges to save the moon or the sun from the clutches of Rahu and Ketu at the time of the eclipses.  ‘Where traditional Indian philosophy really fails is thus in its effort to solve the problem of freedom. But this failure can be explained and hence it is possible for Indian today to overcome the most serious limitation of our philosophical tradition’ (p 629). It is to be specially noticed that in the Chandogya Upanishad, Uddlaka Aruni did not refer to any possibility of ‘final release’ while imparting instruction to his son about the first principle behind the multiplicity of nature. His more immediate concern was an intellectual or essentially scientific curiosity (p 486). It was reserved for the more leisured class of people like king Janaka and court-saint Yajavalkya to discuss immortality of the soul, ultimate freedom of the soul, and allied questions.

Dialectical materialism has its own way of resolving the age-old tangles in society. In our context, when the Indian working class is increasingly being guided by the doctrine of dialectical materials9m in its movement, there can only one development to be expected. And that is, ‘caste society, which is only a form of class society, meets its ultimate historical destiny – the destiny of making room for classless society, towards which millions of working men and women are marching today’ (p 532). This course is irreversible. The brighter aspects forming part of the anti-idealist enunciations of the systems of Indian philosophy also serve as ideas assisting us to reach that destiny. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya deserves our gratitude for having dealt with these in a masterly and purposeful manner. This book, What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy, like the earlier works of Chattopadhyaya, is a challenge to the academic world of India and also a call to understand the path correctly and scientifically. It is but natural, therefore, for us to eagerly look forward to his next book entitled “Science and Society in Ancient India’.

This is Part III of the essay first published in  Marxist Miscellany, No.7, March 1977.

It also appears in The Living Marx, Ma-Le Prakashana, Bangalore, 1983 (Page 9 - 28)

Dr. G Ramkrishna is the Chief Editor of Hosatu, a progressive periodical in Kannada. He was Professor of English at National College, Bangalore and a Visiting Professor at Kannada University, Hampi. He is the author a number of books in Kannada and English including The Strange Culture of M.S. Golvalkar,  The Living Marx, and Philosophy in China (in English), The features of the Anti-Fascist Movement, RSS – A Poisonous Tree, On Hindutva (Kannda)

Email ID: dgrkrishna@gmail.com

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Aligarh Muslim University, Raja Mahendra Pratap and Attempts of Polarization

Ram Puniyani

 

Those resorting to communal politics have not only perfected their techniques of polarizing the communities along religious lines, but have been constantly resorting to new methods for dividing the society. On the backdrop of Muzzafar nagar, where ‘Love Jihad’ propaganda was used to enhance the divisive agenda, now in Aligarh an icon of matchless virtues, Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh is being employed for the similar purposes (Nov 2014).

The attempt by BJP and associates to hold the memorial function in his honor within campus was successfully deflected by the Vice Chancellor of the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) University with the plan for a seminar befitting his contribution to the freedom movement of this AMU alumnus. BJP dug up this icon from pages of history and gauzing prevalent respect for him after the lapse of decades after his death. The answer to why now at this particular juncture is very revealing. Mahendra Pratap died on 29 April 1979, and now out of the blues BJP seems to have felt that his Jat, Hindu identity can be pitched as a flag of their politics. Pratap was a freedom fighter extraordinary, a journalist and a writer. He was a humanist, believing in International federation of nations transcending the national and religious boundaries. He was a Marxist who called for social reforms and empowerment of Panchayats. He was president of Indian Freedom Fighters' Association He was also the first one to form the provisional Indian Government in exile by establishing it in Kabul in 1915. Just to recall the Indian National Congress adopted the goal of complete freedom for India much later in its 1929 session. This Provisional Government was called Hakumat-i-Moktar-i-Hind, and was constituted with Pratap as the President, Maulvi Barkatullah as prime minister and Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi as interior minister. 

After independence he also participated in the electoral arena where he defeated Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Mathura in the 1957 Lok Sabha election. His commitment to being opposed to communal forces could not be more evident than this opposition of his to the leader of Bhartiya Jansangh, Vajpayee. Ironically same person is being lifted up as the icon, who opposed their politics. BJP leaders like Yogi Adityanath are claiming that had Mahendra Pratap not donated the land the AMU would not have come up. This is contrary to the facts. The predecessor of AMU, Mohammadan Anglo Oriental College was formed in 1886, with a land bought from British cantonment (Nearly 74 Acres) and much later Pratap had leased 3.04 acres of land, this is called Tikonia ground and is used as a playground by the City High School of AMU in 1929. He joined the Mohammedan Anglo Oriental College in 1895, but could not complete his graduation. He left MAO College in 1905. MAO became Aligarh Muslim University in 1920, which regards Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh as an alumnus. In 1977, AMU, under V-C Prof A M Khusro, felicitated Mahendra Pratap at the centenary celebrations of MAO.

He wasn’t born when MAO was established, and there is no record of any donation of land from him. Mahendra Pratap’s father Raja Ghanshiam Singh of Mursan had got a hostel room constructed, which continues to stand as Room Number 31 in Sir Syed Hall (South).

BJP demanded that Mahenra Pratap’s birthday should be celebrated as AMU celebrates the birthday of Sir Syed, the founder of the University RSS Functionaries and BJP leaders put pressure on the VC. VC pointed out that AMU cannot celebrate birth day of every donor or alumnus, while recognizing their contribution to the building up of the University. As such already AMU in recognition of Pratap’s contribution to the University has put up his photo in University along with the photo of Sir Syed.

On November 17 (2014), BJP chief of UP  Mr. Laxmikant Bajpai and general secretary Swatantra Dev Singh visited Aligarh and directed their district unit to celebrate the birth day of Mahendra Pratap’s within the MU campus. The raja is a also Jat icon, In popular perception AMU is seen as a Muslim institution. The Jat-Muslim conflict instigated by communal forces, which erupted in the form of violence in Muzaffarnagar continues to affect in western part of UP. The BJP through its machinations allegedly wants to restore the glory of a Jat ‘king’. As such the idea is to appropriate one more of icons and in the process if the state government puts curbs on the celebration, the BJP can benefit by accusing the state Government of “Muslim appeasement”.

As the matters stand VC, Gen. Shah’s suggestion of celebrating the birth anniversary of Raja Mahendra Pratap by organizing a seminar on his contribution to freedom movement of India is a welcome initiative. The situation seems to have been diffused for the time being. BJP had planned a rally outside the gate of AMU, which would have precipitated the unwarranted incidents.

This whole episode has many lessons for the society. To begin with, the national icons are being modulated to suit the interests of communal politics. Be it Sardar patel, Swami Vivekanand, Mahatma Gandhi or in this case Raja Mahendra Pratap, they are being presented in the light which suits the communal politics. In case of Mahedra Pratap, who was a Marxist internationalist; is being presented as a mere Jat leader. He was a person who opposed the politics in the name of religion, as is evident by his electoral fight against BJP’s previous avatar, Bhartiya Jan Sanghs’ Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

Secondly BJP associates are manipulating people’s identity as primarily being religious identity, Hindu or Muslim. In case of Muzzafarnagar, the Jats who were instigated in the name of ‘love Jihad’ came to stand more for Hindu identity. This identity is then made to stand opposed to the ‘other’ religious identity in particular, the Muslim identity and sometimes Christian identity. Same game is also being experimented in parts of Delhi, where Dalits are being made to pitch against Muslims, in a way two deprived communities being made to fight for’ their’ religion’ on the pretext of some issues related to faith.

The communal politics not only manipulates the identity of the people but also that of the icons, as is clear in the case of Raja Mahendra Pratap. The third major lesson for society to learn is that the search is on to find more and more issues to pitch one religious community against the other to strengthen the politics of a particular type. While the top leadership will talk of moratorium on violence, the associates of the same leadership will stoke the processes which will lead to the process of violence in due course.

A great amount of restraint is needed to ensure that we learn the values of the icons, e.g. the likes of Mahendra Pratap teach us the basic lessons of love and amity, peace and universal humanism. To use the techniques of conflicting religious identities is a gross violation of human morality, irrespective of the religion in whose name it is done.

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Men and Godmen

G Ramakrishna

India, like many other countries, has produced luminaries of great repute. They have blazed the path of their successors. The illumination that they have provided has been a beacon of light for many a pathfinder. 

Every age has its own 'prophets' who, through their identification with the struggling people and consciousness for a change, have worked along the path of emancipation of the people. They have professed that there is no shortcut to salvation either of the individual or of the people as a whole. The rigours and the challenges must be faced before one realizes the pleasing and glorious objective.

The arduousness of the path and the dreamy quality of the mind might, however, occasionally make one averse to facing the challenges vigorously and boldly. This may lead to different forms of escapism and romanticism. Subjectivism and susceptibility to hallucinations also flow from this. Illusory notions of godmen are one of the manifestations of this irrational outlook.

Wittingly or otherwise, both the alleged godmen and their votaries bring fine grist to the huge mill of the exploitative machinery and perpetuate the evils of the class system. The tragic aspect of it all is that they persuade others to believe that any disgusting phenomenon could be sold as wholesome provide that the garb of spiritualism is used to mask the ugliness of the said phenomenon. The monopoly press and their proprietors are only too gleeful when they find some stuff which answers to this need.

The above observation is relevant in the context of the recent publication of a series of articles by the agents and spokesmen of an alleged godman in our country. It is interesting to note that India has the unique distinction of being infested with the maximum number of these godmen. Not to be accused of discrimination on the basis of sex, we have a good sprinkling of godwomen also. Whether these godmen and godwomen are also good men and women is beside the point, for they have declared in no uncertain terms that any such analysis of their personalities is only foolhardy, and only the arrogant attempt it.

After the Bangalore University initiated a programme of investigating the alleged miracles performed by some godmen who, incidentally, abound in the State of Karnataka, there has been a wild fire raging on behalf of one of hem, namely Sai Baba. The Brindavan, where the Baba lives while in Bangalore, is the abode where congregations of demonstrative and dubious natures take place. It is blessed with the presence of the divine Baba and those who like to bask in the sunshine of the Baba’s presence. Quite harmless as far as that. But the tall claims and the stunting of the sharp weapon of the people’s struggles that are planned and executed there from make us apprehensive.

The coterie which gathers around the Baba consists of heavily paid scientists of the country, who learn their science at the fee of the Baba, ignoring the fundamentals they might have learnt earlier (and also oblivious of the fact that they are being paid out of the public exchequer), top executives of the administration, a few public servants called Ministers, retired and serving educationists, and the mentors of all these, namely, the enterprising industrialists, monopolists, landlords, stooges who serve the imperialist machinations, and the immediate henchmen of all these. That is the real danger of the godman called Baba, although the devotees of the Baba may not recognize this ramification.

Nor do the innocent investigators of the alleged miracles of the Baba seem to recognize this. The manner in which the superstructure is being fortified for making the base of the most heinous variety of exploitation in our country stable at least for the time being is several times forgotten by even some well-meaning critics of the Baba and his ism which is ardently publicized by such stalwarts like Dr. V.K.Gokak, former Vice-Chancellor of the Bangalore University.

Dr. Gokak is an oxford product, eminent professor of English, Ex-director of the Central Institute of English, reputed literary critic and also a poet, exponent of Aurobindo, admirer of Coleridge, and ever so many other things. But he is now best describved as the disciple of the Baba. All his scholarship is utilized to ‘justify the way of the Baba to man’.

His second in this role is Dr. S.Bhagavantam, formerly connected with India’s Defence in an important capacity. A few other incumbents of the Indian Institute of Science holding very responsible positions are close to the Baba brotherhood.

Baba has devotees from the most unexpected quarters like, to wit, the editor of a Bombay weekly, R.K.Karania who has declared that salvation for the world is possible only through the good offices of the Baba. This editor is in the distinguished company of the “reputed” parliamentarian, industrialist and keyman of the Express group of newspapers, namely Sri Ramnath Goenka, who himself wrote a letter in the Indian Express pointing out the glory of the Baba and followed it up with a series of “scholarly” and “original” articles by Dr. Gokak, Dr. Bhagavantham and a host of other. A neat certificate from Goenka must be enough to accept the credibility of the Baba!

The Bangalore University launches a campaign and immediately the Goenka-KK Birla press launches a counter-campaign. Draw your own conclusions, and if you cannot explain the role of the Bombay weekly, Blitiz, (not of the Jain group, though) it is your headache. The Indian Express came out with a series of four articles by Gokak, and then Bhagavantham wrote on the scientific explorations into the lore of the Baba. And now Gokak has come out with a book on the Baba already reviewed with enthusiasm in the Baba press.

This hyper-activity is rather intriguing and, thus, it may be interesting to analyze the thesis presented so copiously by Gokak in what he might rightly consider to be his masterpiece. His breath-taking discoveries about the Baba, his analysis of spiritualism, his thoroughgoing master of the sciences and the social sciences whose total embodiment the Baba is, the immaculate ethics that Baba stand for and that Gokak understands, and other details are all worthy of the greatest attention if not also of the least acceptance.

It is rather strange that all these crusades should have become necessary for the Baba – a godman – simply because some man called the bluff abut the god! He needed the Gokaks, the Bhagavanthams and the Goenkas to defend himself. How could the Bombay editor Karanjia remain on the sidelines when so many worthies were battling for saving the honour of god alimighty?

Gokak avers that this godman called Sai Baba is an irresolvable enigma for any sincere analyzer. His countenance displays unfathomable expression climaxed by the aura created by the hair on his head. What Gokak seems to forge to tell us is what there might be or not be in the head of the Baba. But that need not be doubted at all because the Baba himself reads the letters addressed to him., no matter what language it is written in. Why the Baba should read them instead of simply divining the whole thing which would be so much more simple, we do not quite know.

The Baba also replies to the letters himself; provided presumably, that they are not about his alleged miracles as the letter of the Bangalore University which went unreplied, was. The present author’s letter about the affairs of the Sai Baba college remained unreplied, too. But that was theree fyears ago when the college had it whims unregulated. The problem must have been solved in the meeting the Baba reportedly hold to discuss matters relating to the college and hospital that the Baba runs.

It is a mild surprise that the godman cannot communicate his decisions or will in the best interests of the institutions without holding committee meetings in the afternoon like mundane mortals. It is unfortunate that some meetings of this kind should have proved abortive considering the way the institutions are run in some respects.

Gokak also give us a glimpse of the daily routine of the Baba. The itinerary reads like that of a philanthropic playback singer of the film world, which the Baba would have been if the illusions of godhood had been dispensed with.

The mission of life that the Baba has set for himself is “to uphold Dharma and the law, restore India to her former glory of spirit, and bring the world back to the message of Sprit” as Gokak puts it. The first part of it was also the life’s mission of the venerable M.S.Golwalkar who has left others to accomplish the task unfinished by him, and among them the total revolutionary Sri Jayaprakash Narayan.

Developing aversion towards the present because it involves hardship, to overcome which one has to fight collectively, is one avenue of escapism; it also serves the purpose of rationalizing the present as irredeemable, in which case the best compromise is acceptance of the situation as it presents itself. This is the philosophy which has chained the people of this country through the ages and the Baba and his cronies are the contemporary instruments of this ignoble philosophy which is given a fine coloring to hide its wretchedness. From this to the romanticisation of poverty and its causes is not a long road.

Further, the glib talk of the restoration of the glory of the past may sound nauseating to all students of history because of its being contrary to the laws of development of society, its civilization and culture. But Gokak and his likes need not bestow any attention to all these things, intoxicated with the godman consciousness as they are. And, thus, he resorts to the poetic flights of fancy when he declares with a flourish that in the Baba “one can find the healing touch of the Christ and the heart-easing speech of the Buddha”. We have no right to accuse Gokak of being a realist anyway.

The learned Dr. Gokak proceeds to point out that “the uniqueness of Baba lies in the fact that he did not have to practice any penance or achieve any Siddhi or realization in this life. He was born with them”. Like the Baba, possibly the disciples of the Baba are also born disciples!

How can they then acquire any new trait? Siddhis are hindrance to the development in the path of the achievement of Kaivalys (liberation) according to the author of the Yoga Sutras, whether the Siddhis are inborn or acquired. The right spiritual mould is also blunted with the manifestation of the Siddhis and if they are employed.

The Baba must have been fascinated by the Siddhis overmuch in order to sacrifice the higher spiritual path! If you claim that he is also the highest spiritual giant in spite of, or because of, the Siddhis, then it must be said that the Baba is caught in a bundle of contradictions in the traditional view.

All the same, the Baba is reputed as having performed the most astounding medical feats which are inexplicable in the background of the medical knowledge that we possess. Some skeptics might say that it is incredible more than being inexplicable.

In this connection, one could refer to the evidence tendered by a certain lad in the Bombay weekly which is giving publicity to the Baba. The lady “proved” that the Baba is divine in content by saying that her husband, a devotee of the Baba, was saved from getting killed in an accident by the will of the Baba. The said gentleman was to have traveled by some bus which later met with an accident. Lo and behold, the will of the Baba had intervened and the man had not traveled by that bus at all. Thus the man was saved. The lady visited the spot of the accident and found that the driver and other in the bus had been very badly injured.

The crucial question to prove the divinity of the Baba is not whether X was saved or not; the question is, why was the accident itself not averted? What a monstrous partiality of the godman if the saves his acquaintance and abandons the other one, a worker!

Such accidents take place only now; god did not ordain that such accidents should take place even now, say, in our villages which have yet to witness that change towards mechanization. God did not allow anyone to be killed in such accidents before the machine was invented by man. Man thus seems to be the ordainer of himself. And yet the Baba must be credited with the saving of some life. The incident really proves nothing about the Baba.

Added to that, the products of the alleged miracles of the Baba doled out as gifts to the coteries of his are not unknown or novel products. He gives, to wit, the Swiss Watches. The interesting part of it is that the disciples of the lower classes invariably get only ash; those of the higher classes may get gold rings, wrist watches, and images for worship. There is unfortunately no instances of the Baba having presented a meal as a miracle-products gift to anyone.

Dr. Gokak asserts that these gifts are made by the Baba only for drawing the disciples to the world of Spirit. What did Sri Ramakrishna present as gifts to draw other to the path of the spirit?

In this connection, we may refer to a rather reveling story. Adjacent to the Baba’s hermitage in Bangalore is a factory which makes ice-cream. The Baba gets his supply of ice cream from here. The erstwhile President of the Employees’ Union who dies in a tragic accident in May 1976, Comrade Gopi, once made a hold suggestion: “Why does the Baba take the ice-cream made by us, the workers? Let him come here and we shall give him all the raw materials used in the making of the ice-cream Let him then make his own cream. If he cannot make it with all the raw materials, what are the chances of his making without them? If he cannot make even ice cream with his much talked about miracles, are not the worker more skilful and useful?” The Baba, let us hope, will some day accept the challenge which is only a suggestion.

But Dr. Gokak is not given to this kind of a rational outlook. For him the colorful sentences of his are the last word. It seems to be forgotten that big imposing sentences by themselves do no not become convincing, in spite of Dr. Gokak. Hence his statement that “he (the Baba) can sport and prattle away like an innocent child and at the same time, be a more shrewd judge of men and events than any statesman or diplomat” remain unsubstantiated and unsubstantiable.

Gokak adds that the Baba is self-effacing and thus advised an American to wait for ten years before writing the biography of the Baba lest haste make for unpleasantness later on. It is surprising that the Baba did not tender the same advice to the Bombay editor or to Gokak. The latter has come out with a biography of the Baba with top speed after the controversy about the godman assumed a sizable proportion. Presumably, it was thought desirable to do so in order to somother “the vicious attack” on the godman!

The self-effacing Baba rose to the level of any ordinary being only the other day when he openly declared in a meeting in Lalbagh, Bangalore, that the moon does not blush if the dogs bark at it. He was referring to his moonness to justify his pride, and he is self-effacing, according to Gokak.

This world must, however, suffer the godman for a long time yet to come. Because he has decided to live on till the age of 96. He will be decaled to be 96 on the day of his death, we may guess. In any case, it means that his commitment to play the role of the saviour during the twentieth century is irreversible.

We no longer need be haunted with thoughts of the annihilation of the world consequent to a nuclear holocaust, because the world, we are assured, will be there for the Baba to save it. Even détente is unnecessary concept considering that the Baba is there to save us. Baba believes in planning also as may be deduced from the fact that he has plans to take birth in a village in the Manya district of Karnataka after his death at 96. Whether this plan will end up the way the plans of the “socialist republic of India” have is anybody’s guess.

The painful thing for us is that the godman should also think only in terms of the small world of Karnataka for taking birth in order to save humanity. What an ugly limit to the manifold scope of the godman! Why not go to America to take birth because most of the person whom the Baba is now “saving” come from that land? Or is it that it is predestine that he must “save” them by being in Karnataka?

“Saving” means “serving the interests”, if there is any confusion in anybody. We are indeed flattered here in Karnataka. Every saviour comes to us first. Dom Moraes is presently here to serve us. We are assured of the continued presence of the Baba. Only those Krishna-cultists have gone to West Bengal first. The Bangla border must have attracted them; but later they may also go over here.

Baba is an incarnation, Gokak tells us. What might that be now? Gokak explained it avidly and vividly to an American newspaperman in 1974. Poor mortals like us cannot understand such intricate matters even if we know some English. The wonder of wonders that Gokak sreports reltes to the dropping of ash from photograph of the Baba in America also. Why is there so much marveling about the ash? Is ash such a rare commodity to marvel at in this world? You can collect a sack of it from any railway station in this country on any day of your choice!

Not so the alchemy providing the Baba’s cure for the incurable diseases. He cures such diseases with dynamism of love. If in Charles Bradlaugh’s tradition, we are to tell the godman: “I can’t believe; strike me dead if you dare”, the dynamically loving Baba in his mercy will only quip like the Christ: “Forgive them, my Lord; they know not what they say”. What a refreshing thing to know. And yet the Baba became furious and called names only recently when it was put to him that his claims might have to be investigated before being accepted.

The tenor of Dr. Gokak’s thesis being now familiar to us, we may run through his second and subsequent articles on the Baba with greater ease. To listen to the singing of the Bab is “to experience the process of a social revolution in progress before our eyes and in our very ears”. “The divine ashes the Baba gives is an austere symbol of what he wishes to suggest”.

To some, however, he suggests through gold! The meaning obviously is that some will go to dust and other will wallow in the ill-gotten wealth. A millionaire was once presented with a gold ring to admonish him. “To those who have, more shall be given”. “Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Love and Power are abstractions and one does not know where to find them”, say Gokak. One may hope that they may not be found in the Baba also.

But the ingenuity of the Baba is simply maddening. He “created for a biologist, an image of the missing link”. Whose prototype was that? Such mischievous questions cannot be encouraged. Baba “uses water as petrol and transforms particles of sand into a beautiful golden image”. There are those amongst us who use petrol as water and they are the nearest disciples of the Baba. With Baba to assist us, there is no longer any sense in going in for Indo-Soviet collaboration to improve our oil potential through further explorations. Instead, we must sign an Indo-Sai pact and do away with the rigs because the Baba believes only in ragas.

Baba has made a tree in his orchard the receptacle of fruits of all kinds. The merchants of Bangalore being fools, they still write to Kashmir and obtain them to sell here. Baba  is an economist par excellence and he know the solution for solving the problems of our economy. Only he will not do it as some of us do not allow him to do it the way he choses.

Let us quote Gokak at some length as it unmasks the Baba and his masquerading disciples once and for all: “Baba has spelt out his own version of the social sciences. His version is not the socialism of under-payment. It is rather an economics based on love – putting the rich on his guard and making him realize, in his bones, that he is the trustee, and not the owner of his wealth. A trusteeship based on love is the foundation on which the science of economics should be reared”. The cat is out of the nasty bag now. All Babaism ultimately is to justify the way of capitalism to the suffering of oppressed people!

The oppressed also want to make the exploiters realize in their bones that exploitation will not be tolerated and will be done away with. One-third of the world has already made its erstwhile exploiters realize this concretely. Even the Gandhian economists have more or less stopped talking about the trusteeship theory. Baba is certainly not the first to come up with the profound theory of trusteeship, His beguiling trick will not work as those of other have failed in the past.

The oppressing classes have always advised the oppressed to abjure the class war and Gokak is now playing that role on behalf of the Baba in the name of spiritualism, godhood of the man called Baba, and other such deceptive stratagems. Nobody will be taken in by these clever but disgusting tricks. Status quoism is more prevalent in the Baba than in any other brand of politicians. And that is the gist of Babaism.

The spokesman of the Baba, namely Dr. Gokak, must be thanked profusely for frankly admitting what lies behind all the intriguing designs of the Baba. Saying that the Baba is the best medicine-man, sociologist, psychologist, philosopher and what have you, will be so much of nonsense when we know that all these and other disciplines have evolved through the ages and will continue in the centuries to come.

Knowledge at any given state of history is incomplete and imperfect and that is why there is the quest to expand the vista of knowledge and thereby acquire greater freedom for mankind. This is what stimulates man to ever new adventures in the sphere of knowledge. If there are a few questions or even thousand of them for which we do no know the answers today, we need not jump to the conclusion that the answers will never be fund. Past history is an indication of the way future history will shape itself.

The earthquake in China has proved beyond any doubt that in a planned society relief measure are better designed than in an unplanned society. The future society will be increasingly of that fashion. Knowledge will be the strongest weapon in the hands of man to civilize himself and rise to a higher level. That is what no Baba will or can accomplish. That is what man collectively achieves.

Dr. Gokak obviously does not want this to be recognized. For him the wisdom of the Baba is the beginning and the end. Hypothesis is never the substitute for correct knowledge. The stalwarts who take the Baba as their ultimate guide have taken the hypothesis for the ultimate truth and that is precisely where they are wrong and also dishonest to the precepts of Science. A few barren articles in the Goenka press or even in a Bombay weekly by men however reputed they be, will not make any difference to this incontrovertible phenomenon.

The cloak of spiritualism for swindling the gullible masses has been stained with blood in the past and it is too late in the day for the Baba and Gokaks to use it again. Man’s destiny is more glamorous and inviting and he shall not stop short of reaching that enchanting and just state.

This essay, first published three decades back (Main Stream, October 23, 1976), though outdated in certain respects, continues to be relevant in India today, when all sorts of godmen and godwomen have a field day swindling the gullible people.  This essay was later reproduced (page 162 – 174) in “Living Marx” published by Ma-Le Prakashana, Bangalore.

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