G Ramakrishna
The murky record of idealism as a vicious weapon on the one hand and philosophical obscurantism on the other has a shining contrast in materialism. Once again the historical limitations of the ancient Indian materialist philosophers cannot be overlooked. The rudiments of materialism are quite clear in many anti-idealist schools of though and the fundamentals quite pronounced in the case of the Lokayta School. The essential feature of materialism is the assertion that 'since this world is essentially material, the first cause that we can infer for it must also be material" (p 92). This is the position accepted by the Samkhya School. It or its variations form the antithesis of Indian idealism. The rejection of idealism in Indian philosophy is threefold at the hands of the Lokayata, Samkhya and Nyaya-Vaiseshika respectively.All
three of them defend the reality of the external world as against its unreality
posited by the idealists. They are all one in yet another manner, too; they
want “to work out an explanation of the objective world in terms of their
respective theories of the nature of matter” (p 286). But they differ among
themselves in certain details, especially in regard to their varying concepts
of matter. The Lokayata view matter as the physical elements, Samkhyua as
primeval subtle matter, and Nyaya-Vaiseshika as atoms. The commitment to the
theory that “matter is the ultimate constituent of the world” is equally firm
in all three of them (p 288). While discussing this issue, Chattopadhyaya
initiates a discussion on the correctness or otherwise of the application of
the term ‘realism’ to describe Samkhya and Nyaya-Vaiseshika positions of
anti-idealism (p 288-98). It is a term used to designate Samkhya and
Nyaya-Vaiseshika by those who take materialism’ in an extra-philosophical
sense. For some reasons best know to themselves, they shun the word ‘materialism’
because of its alleged ‘vices and vulgarities’ and reserve the term for
describing Lokayata! ‘Realism’ has a definite connotation in the context of the
history of European philosophy. It is not the same as materialisms although it is
opposed to idealism; for, it is opposed to materialism as well. Among the
idealist schools, Lokayata is the materialist school of though par excellence.
Besides holding the view that consciousness is ultimately the product of matter
and hence matter is primary and consciousness secondary (p 294), the Lokayata,
alone among the schools of Indian philosophy, is “free from sundry
superstitions” and hence “most remarkable among the Indian materialists” (p
297). The Samkhya and Nyaya-Vaisehika view regarding consciousness are very
close to the Lokayata view. From the point of view of philosophical
argumentation against idealism, however, it is the atomistic Nyaya-Vaisehika
school that develops a theory of the nature of matter to explain a wide range
of natural phenomena. The content of materialism in Nyaya-Vaiseshika is,
therefore, immense. But modern scholars fail to take note of it because of a
body of sundry superstitions forming part of it, more or less as an appendage
and not as a integral part (p 298). The theory of atomic conjunction advocated
by the Nyaya-Vaiseshika has its own problems alright. But, as Debiprasad put
it, “judged by us retrospectively, it really means that in the development of
Indian science, the satisfactory solution of one problem concerning the nature
of mater ushers in certain new and as yet unsolved problems. But this is
precisely the way in which science advances in the past, as it is still
advancing…’ Our knowledge of the nature of matter is ever-progressive; the more
we know about it the clearer do we feel that much more remains to be knows, and
therefore also grows the urge to know better. At least this is the position of
the materialists as contrasted with that of the idealists, who refuse to be
satisfied with anything short of the final and absolute truth and thus fail to
stimulate scientific inquiry” (p 400). Lenin eminently summarized it when he
said that “materialism clearly formulates the as yet unsolved problems and
thereby stimulates the attempt to solve it”. This is a wholesome recipe which
many of our scientists fail to understand and thus rush to the hypocritical
saints and self-styled saviors to learn the elements of science, thereby
betraying and insulting the basic creed of science itself.
It
has already been mentioned above that the relationship between matter and
consciousness is a cardinal question tackled by different systems of Indian
philosophy. The importance of this question cannot be overstated. It is not
simply a curious theoretical question in ontology. The material origin of
consciousness properly understood “open few horizons for the real understanding
of human history” (p 492). Nowhere is it dogmatically argued in materialism
that consciousness, as evolutes of social being or materials conditions, has no
creative role to play. All that is stressed is that it “is not the sole
creative force, as imagined by the idealists: (p 493). The theory of the
material origin of consciousness, attributed to the Lokayatas universally, is
as old as the Chandogya Upanishad where Uddalaka Aruni, through experimental
demonstration, instructs his son Svetaketu regarding the first principle for
the explanation of nature (p 476). Devoid of any religion-orientation and
obscure mysticism, this theory of Uddalaka reminds one of the Samkhya
philosophy, “the starting point of which is that, since being cannot be
produced from nonbeing, the essential nature of the cause is to be inferred
from the essential nature of the effect” (p 477). Mind, by which Uddalaka means
consciousness, is viewed as having a distinct material origin and this is
supported by a number of illustrations. The idealists cleverly remain silent
while commenting on the passages in which Uddalaka gives the above exposition
(p 481).
The
Nyaya-Vaiseshika view is that consciousness “is essentially a transient
phenomenon, somehow or other temporarily produced by the peculiar collocation
of a number of intrinsically unconscious (jada) entities, most of which
are material” (p 404). That doyen among
the interpreters of Indian philosophy, Professor M. Hiriyanna, recognizes this
phenomenon in Nyaya-Vaiseshika as a position “scarcely distinguishable from
htat of the Charvakas” (p 411). If the Nyaya-Vaiseshka did not take a leap
forward from this position to explain how consciousness emerges from the
essentially unconscious, it was only because of their reluctance to be
identified with the outspoken materialists, namely the Loakayatas, who were the
special target of attack from orthodox schools. But still they went far enough
when they accepted consciousness as a property of the soul under certain given
conditions of matter (p 407). The Samkhya, which has the unique distinction
of being tampered with at will by the
‘repairers’ of Indian philosophical tradition, views matter a primary and
consciousness as secondary. The boldest theoretical formulations on this matter
comes from the Lokayats. The Samkhya position is so close to the Lokayata view
that the irritated Sankara brands the Samkhya an equivalent of Lokayata
materialism Nothing could be more sacrilegious than to be identical with
Lokayata! So, no refutation is really neded in that case, concluded Sankara.
The dog has been branded mad; and that is as good as having been shot! Queer
logic that to demolish the Lokayata and Samkhaya views of consciousness as a
product of matter. The Lokayata view,
according to Sankara’s observation, is that consciousness belongs to the body,
and is hence not the characteristic peculiarity of the spirit. The decisive
question for the Lokayata is whether the material elements alone, in spite of
each of them being intrinsically unconscious, go to the making of living bodies
possessing consciousness. Can, in other words, consciousness emerge from
unconscious matter? (p 426). The
remarkable thing about the Lokayatas is that notwithstanding the severe
limitations imposed on them by the lack of elaborate scientific data, they do
make a bold theoretical attempt at an explanation of the origin of
consciousness from matter (p 427). In explaining their position, the Lokayatas
draw the analogy of the non-intoxicating ingredients giving rise to an
intoxicating liquor. Where did the intoxicating (or the intoxicating quality)
come from? Even so, consciousness emerges from the unconscious elements. It is
significant that the Lokayatas fall back on naturalistic phenomena and not
spiritualistic ones to explain the enigma. The basic assumption of the
Lokayatas that life (consciousness) originates from inorganic matter
(unconscious) is a postulate of present day science also and this speaks
volumes for the science-orientation of the Lokayata system. Faced with a stout and determined defence of
this position by the Laokayats, the refutation of the theory at the hands of the idealists only shows their
puerility and pedantry “as all defence of superstition against science is
perhaps destined to be” (p 446). So much is the inconvenience and discomfort
for the idealist that as the only avenue of escape they impute some ugly and
unreasonable philosophical opinion to the Lokayatas and devastatingly refute
them with triumph, much in the fashion of the present-day enemies of Marxism
‘obliterating’ Marxism by attributing fancy theories to the doctrine. This is
somewhat unusual for Indian idealist photospheres who normally represent the
opponents’ view points fairly accurately in their treatises and even anticipate
the further points likely to be made by the opponents on the basis of their
accepted positions. It only underlines the invincible quality of the Lokayata
theory. The potential of Lokayta is realized in the much later scientific
materialism know as Marxism (p 491).
The
chapter on “Refutation of idealism” (ch 7) is another very important section of
the book. The main philosophical thrust against idealism comes from the Nyaya-Vaiseshikas
and Kumarila, an exponent of Purva-Mimasa. The crushing blows of
Nyaya-Vaiseshika against idealism are really breath-taking. The idealist is
invited to accept the inviolable truth that “it is obligatory for the
philosophers to operate with the pramanas (means of valid knowledge),
ie. to depend on experience and reason” (p 306). On both these counts, namely
experience and reason, idealism stands shattered. If the idealist argues that
things have no independent existence or reality, it means that he has
recognized the existence of the proof for his conclusion, if of nothing else;
if he does not argue thus, his basic theory that the objective world has no
reality stand defeated. The dilemma of the idealist is further analyzed by
Kumarila (p 373). Not being satisfied with the above line of argumentation
alone, Kumarila launches an attack on the incredible claims of yogic
supernormal experience and denounces the same as fictitious (p 319). A
subjective hallucianation may come to be branded as ‘supernormal’ experience
and Kumarila is not obliged to accept it as valid. “Only standard experience
has relevance for philosophy” (p 321). He has nothing but contempt for
mystery-mongering and with detailed
arguments he disposes of the idealist position that objects of
experience have no reality (p 323). The Indian idealist philosopher thus
scoffed at by the opponents of idealism takes shelter under his special
brainchild’s roof, namely the differing levels of reality. Howe the opponents
of idealism reject this notion, we have already seen above.
The
next and last major question for Indian Philosophy is the concept of freedom.
The spiritualistic orientation of Indian Philosophy, which according to many an
Indian and western analyst of Indian philosophy is its distinguishing feature,
is as inescapable as it s nauseating. It is almost used liked a drug, one might
say. The oppressing class has used and still uses the concept of freedom in
idealist Indian philosophy as the final, apparently unvanquishable, missile against
the rising masses of the people. The law of karma acts as an accessory to this.
The damage done by the two together is simply infuriating. The pet theory is
that the whole stupid world is an illusion and that emancipation pertains to
the hereafter. To be worthy of the ‘hereafter’, one should be properly averse
to the ‘here’, so that one might overcome the endless cycle of births and
deaths. Freedom in idealist Indian philosophy means the absolute extinction of
the illusion about the world. “This is the essence of the metaphysical
monstrosity which all idealists proclaim as the right understanding of
freedom”. “There remains nothing to be done about the world, except to
cultivate a philosophical contempt for it as the product of perverse
imagination” (p 571). The dangerous machinations of a perverse philosophy of
reedome like this cannot be lost onus, because in real life we see real men and
women groaning under this philosophy which has given such power to the
oppressing class. Bondage, slavery and serfdom being perpetuated under the
sweet nomenclature of freedom is what this concept is all about.
A
close analysis of this concept in Nyaya-Vaiseshika shows that it is grafted on
the system and is accepted as a safety measure against the otherwise inevitable
onslaught of the ever-menacing law-givers (p 588). It is a concept which is
totally inconsistent with the Samkhya standpoint (pp 592 and 596). It is
extraneous to the Purva-Mimasmsa also (p 597-608). “Among the opponents of
Indian idealism, the Lokayatas are the only philosophers to call for a total
rejection of the idealist view of soul and its salvation…The first precondition
for moving towards a sensible conception of freedom is to scrap all nonsense
about it” (p 609). The Lokayatas recognize that ‘certain view and attitudes
admirably suit the economic interest of the parasitical class, or, as they put
it, are created to be the source of their livelihood’ (p 613). A faith-oriented philosophy taking cudgels
against logic may naturally be expected to abhor the Lokayata position. But the
precarious position of the Nyaya exponents like Vatsyayana is understandable.
Being the ideological propagandists on behalf of the oppressing class, they
were hampered in taking a suitable view of freedom as a genuine need of the
people. They willingly surrendered to the opium of spiritualism. If the
positive factors in Nyaya-Vaiseshika are overwhelming, this negative
formulation is not only unfortunate but positively misleading and disastrous (p
619). The subservience to the law-givers makes even an eminent scientist like
Prasastapada of the Vaiseshika
School a split
personality and he is thus the prototype of our contemporary scientists taking
a dip in the Ganges to save the moon or the
sun from the clutches of Rahu and Ketu at the time of the eclipses. ‘Where traditional Indian philosophy really
fails is thus in its effort to solve the problem of freedom. But this failure
can be explained and hence it is possible for Indian today to overcome the most
serious limitation of our philosophical tradition’ (p 629). It is to be
specially noticed that in the Chandogya Upanishad, Uddlaka Aruni did not refer
to any possibility of ‘final release’ while imparting instruction to his son
about the first principle behind the multiplicity of nature. His more immediate
concern was an intellectual or essentially scientific curiosity (p 486). It was
reserved for the more leisured class of people like king Janaka and court-saint
Yajavalkya to discuss immortality of the soul, ultimate freedom of the soul,
and allied questions.
Dialectical
materialism has its own way of resolving the age-old tangles in society. In our
context, when the Indian working class is increasingly being guided by the
doctrine of dialectical materials9m in its movement, there can only one
development to be expected. And that is, ‘caste society, which is only a form
of class society, meets its ultimate historical destiny – the destiny of making
room for classless society, towards which millions of working men and women are
marching today’ (p 532). This course is irreversible. The brighter aspects
forming part of the anti-idealist enunciations of the systems of Indian
philosophy also serve as ideas assisting us to reach that destiny. Debiprasad
Chattopadhyaya deserves our gratitude for having dealt with these in a masterly
and purposeful manner. This book, What is Living and What is Dead in Indian
Philosophy, like the earlier works of Chattopadhyaya, is a challenge to the
academic world of India
and also a call to understand the path correctly and scientifically. It is but
natural, therefore, for us to eagerly look forward to his next book entitled
“Science and Society in Ancient India’.
Dr. G Ramkrishna is the Chief Editor of Hosatu, a progressive periodical in Kannada. He was Professor of English at National College, Bangalore and a Visiting Professor at Kannada University, Hampi. He is the author a number of books in Kannada and English including The Strange Culture of M.S. Golvalkar, The Living Marx, and Philosophy in China (in English), The features of the Anti-Fascist Movement, RSS – A Poisonous Tree, On Hindutva (Kannda)
Email ID: dgrkrishna@gmail.com
This
is Part III of the essay first published in Marxist Miscellany, No.7,
March 1977.
It
also appears in The Living Marx, Ma-Le Prakashana, Bangalore, 1983 (Page 9 - 28)
Dr. G Ramkrishna is the Chief Editor of Hosatu, a progressive periodical in Kannada. He was Professor of English at National College, Bangalore and a Visiting Professor at Kannada University, Hampi. He is the author a number of books in Kannada and English including The Strange Culture of M.S. Golvalkar, The Living Marx, and Philosophy in China (in English), The features of the Anti-Fascist Movement, RSS – A Poisonous Tree, On Hindutva (Kannda)
Email ID: dgrkrishna@gmail.com
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