An Annotated Conversation with Ramkrishna Bhattacharya
Krishna Del Toso
It was the 2009 when by chance I ran into a book just issued, whose author I already knew by name and reputation, since few years before - while I was studying the chapter devoted to the exposition of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata philosophy in Sayāṇa-Mādhava’s Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha - I had the occasion of reading with much delight one of his excellent articles published in the Journal of Indian Philosophy. This paper gathered a new collection of the extant fragments on Materialism, survived to the heedlessness of time and the - so to speak - forgetfulness of the partisans of the non-materialistic Indian philosophies.
The author was Ramkrishna Bhattacharya. I remember
that when his 2009 book, Studies on the
Cārvāka/Lokāyata, was
delivered by the postman at my home in September of the same year, I read it in one breath. Going through its pages, one
of the things that I discovered was that Ramkrishna Bhattacharya has been the
pupil, among others, of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, the great Bengali
scholar that devoted his life to the study of Indian Materialism and scientific
thought, and of Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya, colleague and collaborator of the
former. The more my eyes ran the lines of the book, the more interest and
curiosity grew in me for Bhattacharya’s ideas and perspectives on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata,
mainly for two reasons. Firstly, because all the acquaintance I had of this
school of thought – still quite neglected in the West – at this time was based
exactly on the works of Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya (which represented,
before Bhattacharya’s book, the fundamental and almost sole tools I had at my
disposal for shedding a bit of light on some passages of Sayāṇa-Mādhava’s
text). Secondly, because my very first impression was that Bhattacharya’s book
deepened the study on and of Indian Materialism far beyond what his teachers
have been able to do in their essays, letting something new emerge from the
ancient sources and the modern debate. Since almost every page of Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata aroused in me lots of questions and
interrogatives, at a certain point I felt the need to contact personally
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya for discussing and trying to understand with his help
this or that subject, matter or aspect of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata philosophy that
I considered problematic or dubious. This was a lucky opportunity for me
because, although we never met in person, I found in Ramkrishna Bhattacharya a
gentle, willing man and a strict scholar, whose sincere intention was, and is,
to outline and improve a horizon of shared knowledge. Thus, day after day,
email after email, since my first letter to him, our dialogue on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata
has never stopped, and still continues.
In what follows, the reader will
find nothing but an aperçue of my questions and Bhattacharya’s answers
that we exchanged during the year 2010.
* * *
Krishna Del Toso:
Dear Professor Bhattacharya,[1]
let me begin by thanking you very much for having accepted this interview, to
which I would like to give – if you agree – the structure of a conversation,
and in which we will try to speak about some subjects contained in, or inspired
by, your last book on Indian Materialism Studies
on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, recently published by the Società Editrice
Fiorentina.[2] Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata is a
collection of several articles that you have written during the last fourteen
years, minimally re-adapted in order to be consistently put together in a
single work. The arguments dealt with there are several: one can indeed read
about the origins of Materialism in India, about the principal exponents of
Cārvāka/Lokāyata and about some fundamental philosophical doctrines of this
school. Moreover, many fragments of Cārvāka/Lokāyata works are accurately
analyzed, and so on. But, when one goes through the book, one can find, as you
say in the Preface, a precise «line
of argument».[3] To
understand the ‘plot’ of the work, could you explain to us in which way does
this «line of argument» develop, and why have you opted for exactly this
particular ‘line’?
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya:
The ‘plot’ of the work, as you
put it, developed in course of time. I started with only one hypothesis: the
Cārvākas/Lokāyatikas have been thoroughly misrepresented by almost all
contributors to, or writers of, encyclopedias and handbooks, and historians of
Indian philosophy (not to speak of the authors of college and university text
books and popularisers). The same has been the fate of Epicurus in Europe.
Their Hedonism was not synonymous with ‘eat, drink, and be merry’ kind of
philosophy of life. The few available extracts from the commentaries on the
lost Cārvākasūtras, the basic text, convinced me that the Cārvākas
preached a more serious view of life, for they took the epistemological and
ontological issues very seriously. Then I found that there were several
materialist approaches beside the Cārvāka/Lokāyata which did not embrace
sensual enjoyment at all; on the other hand, Ajita Kesakambala, the earliest
materialist in India known to us, had embraced an austere way of living. This
emboldened me to controvert Erich Frauwallner’s view regarding the courtly
origin of Materialism in India.[4]
All this led to the ‘line of argument’ I went on developing. I took the
Cārvāka/Lokāyata as a system of philosophy which grew, not unlike other
orthodox (Vaidik) systems, having a basic work of aphorisms (the mūla-text) which in its turn generated a
number of commentaries, independent of one another, differing on some matters
of detail but adhering to the basic doctrine of the primacy of perception. Saper
vedere («To know is to see»), as Leonardo Da Vinci said.
As
you can understand, I do not agree with Sebastiano Timpanaro, the Italian
Marxist philosopher, that Hedonism and pessimism are two basic ingredients of
Materialism.[5] As to
Hedonism, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata does advise yāvaj jīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīvet
(«Live happily as long as you live») but, as Jayantabhaṭṭa has rightly said, it
is not a prescription since all humans follow this in practice. I have dealt
with these matters in my book. To think of such expert logicians such as
Purandara, Aviddhakarṇa and Udbhaṭa Bhaṭṭa as wallowing in purely sensual
enjoyment boggles the mind. As Horace had slandered Epicurus in one of his
Epistles,[6]
so have the enemies of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Incidentally, as to Hedonism, what
is more hedonistic than Kṛṣṇa’s assurance to Arjuna in Bhagavadgīta
2.37: hato vā prāpsyasi (prāpsyase) svargaṃ jitvā vā bhokṣyase
mahīm, «If slain, you attain heaven; if victorious, you enjoy the earth»?
Nothing to lose either way.
Krishna Del Toso:
And as far as pessimism is concerned?
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya:
As to pessimism, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata does not betray any inclination to it,
nor does it mention optimism. However, it considers life worth living, and
living happily. So what Timpanaro says in connection with Giacomo Leopardi does
not apply to the Cārvāka/Lokāyata.
Thus,
this in brief is my ‘line of argument’.
Krishna Del Toso:
Now, a second preliminary question pertains of course to what exactly promped
you to undertake the study of Indian Materialism. Could you tell us what or who
has been fundamental, on the one hand, for this decision and, on the other
hand, for your ‘step by step’ deepening into the philosophy of
Cārvāka/Lokāyata? This will also help us to understand the nature of your
reference background, which you have moved from in order to develop your
research.
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya:
The answer will be somewhat autobiographical.
Krishna Del Toso:
Yes, of course.
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya:
I started studying Marxism-Leninism in my precocious adolescent days. I read a
primer on Marxist philosophy in Bangla, my mother tongue, written by Saroja
Ācārya.[7]
My first initiation to the Cārvāka/Lokāyata was from this work. Before that,
all I knew about Cārvākas was that they had preached the doctrine of ṛṇaṃ
kṛtvā ghṛtaṃ pibet («Eat ghee,
clarified butter, even if you run into debts»).[8]
This was the sum and substance of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata known to almost all
educated Indians. After reading Acharya’s chapter on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, I
got interested in studying this system of philosophy in more details. Even
prior to that I had read some small volumes in Bangla called Jānbār Kathā (Things to know), meant for
schoolchildren, edited by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya. He had planned a sort of
Book of Knowledge, one of which was on philosophy. Chattopadhyaya was later
known as the author of Lokāyata and
other works on the history of science and technology in India. However, he was
a very persuasive writer in Bangla. He began his career as a poet and produced
a number of fictions for young readers. The lucidity of his style must have
stemmed from his earlier works of children’s literature. Thus Chattopadhyaya
and Acharya led me to the study of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata.
However,
I did not pursue the matter till much later.
Krishna Del Toso:
So when did your scientific work on Cārvāka/Lokāyata begin?
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya:
I started studying the Cārvāka/Lokāyata in right earnest in 1980 when I had
some leisure. First I wrote a few articles in Bangla which were received rather
well. Then, I started corresponding with Eli Franco (more of him later), and
encouraged by him I ventured to write for a wider readership, and so side by
side began to publish in English. I was by then convinced that the
Cārvāka/Lokāyata was a much misunderstood and hence unjustly maligned system of
philosophy. It deserved to be shown, by employing the method of textual
criticism, that the verse quoted by Sāyaṇa-Mādhava (Mādhavācārya) that spoke of
eating ghee was a distortion of the
original verse attributed to the Cārvākas. The paper appeared in 1996[9]
and was appreciated by some scholars, not all of them sympathetic to
Materialism.
I
had continued to correspond with Franco, when he was in Australia and then in
Europe (Austria and Germany). Though he had his own views about Jayarāśi with
which I did not agree, we became sort of pen-friends (I haven’t met him to
date) and then I came to know his wife, Karin Preisendanz (I met her only twice
when she visited Kolkata, my home city). Both of them are scholars per
excellence and helped me a lot to locate sources that are not easily available
in Kolkata or India as a whole. Exchange of off-prints proved to be extremely
useful.
This
is how, from a budding Marxist materialist I became an ardent student of Indian
Materialism. I was intrigued to find that there were more than one materialist
view prevalent in India before we come to know of the aphorisms of the
Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Hence I went on digging and unearthed several such examples.
Krishna Del Toso:
Your last sentence lends itself to the following question. Taking into account
the title of your book: Studies on the
Cārvāka/Lokāyata, the presence of a slash (/) between the two words
‘Cārvāka’ and ‘Lokāyata’ led me to infer exactly that, within a same general
framework, i.e., within the general cultural horizon represented by
Materialism, there exists at least one – but probably more than one –
distinction between Cārvāka and Lokāyata. Could you explain to us in what does
this difference in identity consist?
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya:
In my opinion ‘Cārvāka’ would be the right name. I have explained the reason in
the introductory part of Cārvāka Fragments: A New Collection in my book.[10]
At the same time we have to keep in mind that a large number of ancient Indian
philosophers and modern historians of philosophy, etc. refer to the same system
as Lokāyata. In fact Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya
(both of them my mentors since 1980) had set the precedence by calling their
work, Cārvāka/Lokāyata: An Anthology of
Source Materials and Some Recent Studies.[11]
But there is a snag. The word Lokāyata appears earlier than Cārvāka in Buddhist
works (both Pāli and Sanskrit) but in a different sense: the science of
disputation. Most probably Lokāyata in the Kauṭilīya
Arthaśāstra also means the same.[12]
Some scholars have failed to distinguish between the two meanings of Lokāyata
and in the translation of Buddhist texts they translated Lokāyata as
‘Materialism’, which is wrong and misleading. Hence I prefer to write
Cārvāka/Lokāyata.
Krishna Del Toso:
You are pointing out that there exists at least a – so to speak – historical
and/or grammatical difference between the two terms. What can we say about the
history of the use of the two words ‘Cārvāka’ and ‘Lokāyata’?
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya:
As to the history of the use of the two words, Cārvāka as the name of a
philosophical system first appears in Haribhadra’s Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya,[13]
verse 85d, and in Kamalaśīla’s Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā,[14]
gloss on verse 1885, while Śāntarakṣita in his Tattvasaṅgraha, Ch. 22, calls it Lokāyata as does Śaṅkarācārya in
his commentary on the Brahmasūtra and
elsewhere. So you see both the names were current right from the eighth century
CE. There are other names too: dehātmavāda,
bhūtacaitanyavāda, bārhaspatyamata, etc. More intriguingly, we have
allusions to one paurandaraṃ sūtraṃ as
also to a pauraṃdariya vitti (paurandarīyavṛtti).[15]
Of course Cārvāka is the name of a demon in the Mahābhārata.[16]
It may be presumed that the Indian materialist philosophers adopted his name as
a kind of nickname. Purandara, as quoted by Kamalaśīla, refers to the Cārvākas
(cārvākaiḥ). You will find many such
examples of using this name in several Brahminical, Buddhist, and Jain works.[17]
Thus
both Cārvāka and Lokāyata became a sort of ‘brand name’, meaning Materialism in
general. Franco once told me in a personal communication[18]
that the mūla text of the Cārvākas
«must have been composed before Dignāga’s time (480-540)». I don’t know whether
he is right. The Maṇimēkalai,
a Tamil Buddhist work composed between the third century and the seventh
century CE, mentions both Lokāyata and bhūtavāda
side by side.[19]
There had been materialist thinkers in India right from the Buddha’s time –
Ajita Kesakambala, for example –, or even before. Dignāga might have known some
such thinkers, not necessarily a Cārvāka. Kambalāśvatara (another nickname),
Purandara and Aviddhakarṇa (yet another nickname) as well as some unnamed
commentators are mentioned by Kamalaśīla and so they must have flourished in or
before the eighth century. After them we have Udbhaṭa, an odd kind of
commentator who uses the Cārvāka aphorisms as a peg to hang his own ideas on.
Cakradhara mentions Bhāvivikta as a cirantana
cārvāka, «old or traditional Cārvāka philosopher».[20]
So he must have been a contemporary of Kambalāśvatara and others or might have
flourished even earlier.
That
is all I can say in brief about the history of the two words, Cārvāka and
Lokāyata.
Krishna Del Toso:
You have just underlined (and you explain very well this point in the first
chapter of your book),[21]
that the philosophy of Ajita Kesakambala is actually materialistic and not, as
is generally supposed by the most part of scholars, nihilistic. On the other
hand, you add also that a real nihilist was Jayarāśi, the author of the Tattvopaplavasiṃha. As is well-known,
portions of this text has been translated and studied by Eli Franco, who
upholds that Jayarāśi was, rather, a sceptic.[22]
Now, in your book you say that you do not agree with this interpretation. On
the basis of what should we consider Jayarāśi a nihilist rather than a sceptic?
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya:
That Jayarāśi was a nihilist is amply clear from the last sentence of his book:
tad evam upapluteṣv eva tattveṣu avicāritaramaṇīyāḥ sarve vyavahārā ghaṭanta
iti («When all the principles are upset then all [human] practice are to be
understood as happening without any judgement»). Unlike Nāgārjuna or Śrīharṣa,
Jayarāśi had no system of philosophy either to establish or to uphold. In his
case it was all refutation, and refutation for refutation’s sake. The only
principle he sets out to upset, is the validity of all known instruments of
cognition, such as perception, inference, word, etc. Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya
(whom Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya always mentioned as ‘my young friend and
teacher’) has shown, in his illuminating Introduction to a Bangla
translation of the Tattvopaplavasiṃha (chapter 1) by Dilip Kumar Mohanta,[23]
that Jayarāśi’s position is diametrically opposite to Vātsyāyana’s: the latter
is intent on establishing the principle of four prakāras, namely pramāṇa,
pramātā, prameya and pramiti.
Once pramāṇa is established, the
other three are automatically accepted (see Vātsyāyana’s Introduction to
his commentary on the Nyāyasūtras).[24]
Jayarāśi, on the other hand, not only questions (as a sceptic does) but seeks
to upset the very concept of pramāṇa itself. In this sense he was a
nihilist per excellence. In fact Gangopadhyaya has rightly said that Jayarāśi
was affiliated neither to the Cārvāka/Lokāyata nor to śūnyavāda or māyāvāda: he
had a doctrine of his own, namely, tattvopaplavavāda.
As there are māyāvāda, vijñānavāda, śūnyavāda etc., so is tattvopaplavavāda, a particular type of
approach or philosophy. His Jain opponents mentioned this along with other vādas.
Krishna Del Toso:
But a possible counterargument to your position could be that Jayarāśi in his
text refers to Bṛhaspati, who is supposed to have been the compiler of the Cārvākasūtras,
and calls him bhagavān bṛhaspatiḥ, that is, «Venerable Bṛhaspati». By
relying to this reference, one could infer that Jayarāśi was a materialist.[25]
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya:
Jayarāśi’s reference to Bṛhaspati as bhagavān
does not confirm his affiliation to Bṛhaspati’s system. Śrīharṣa too uses
the same term, bhagavān suraguru.
Would that make Śrīharṣa a Cārvāka?
I
may also mention the fact that Jayarāśi is prized more in Europe and Japan than
in India. He has been criticized and presented everywhere in the Jain works as
a tattvopaplavavādin, never as a
Cārvāka. Those who have criticized him have also sought to refute the
Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Erich Frauwallner too never considered the Tattvopaplavasiṃha to be a Cārvāka work.[26]
Franco’s
translation of, and notes on, the Tattvopaplavasiṃha
are indeed excellent, but his view of Jayarāśi as a kind of Lokāyatika and his
polemics against Chattopadhyaya in the Preface to the second edition of
his book Perception, Knowledge and
Disbelief have not found favour even in the West.[27]
Karel Werner in his review of this edition proposes to steer a middle way
between Chattopadhyaya and Franco.[28]
Earlier still, Walter Ruben and K.K. Dixit pointed out many a flaw in assuming
Jayarāśi as a Cārvāka. Their articles have been reprinted in Cārvāka/Lokāyata.[29]
Chattopadhyaya was too modest to include his views on the Tattvopaplavasiṃha in this volume. He had in fact written two
articles in Bangla in 1963, refuting the notion that Tattvopaplavasiṃha was a materialist philosophical text (as Arthur
Llewellyn Basham had said
in his The Wonder That Was India).[30] Chattopadhyaya
reiterated his opposition to this misconception in his populariser Indian Philosophy[31]
and In Defence of Materialism in Ancient
India.[32]
Franco was apparently unaware of Basham’s claim and therefore unhesitatingly
declared in the preface to the second edition of his Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief that «no one ever claimed that
Jayarāśi was a materialist».[33]
Basham
was not alone in making this regrettable mistake. Those who work on the basis
of secondary sources have all followed suit and represented the Tattvopaplavasiṃha as a Cārvāka
materialist work. They even ignore the fact that Franco, along with Sanghvi and
Parikh, labels him cautiously as representing «a minority (ekadeśa) within the Lokāyata school»[34]
and admits that «Jayarāśi rejected some of the traditional Lokāyata doctrines
and interpreted some of the sūtras of
Bṛhaspati as reflecting opinions which are not Bṛhaspati’s own».[35]
The very notion of a non-materialist
Lokayata as proposed by Sanghvi and others, is alien to the Indian
philosophical scenario. The Cārvāka/Lokāyata
has been referred to by all ancient and medieval philosophers in India as a
materialist system, no one speaks of such a non-materialist school. Franco once told me
in a letter[36] that
if I can accept both Buddhist idealists and Buddhist realists, why can’t I
accept the sceptic Lokāyatikas and materialist Lokāyatikas? This is inference
by analogy which is always doubtful.
In
spite of so many dissenting voices, the false notion that the Tattvopaplavasiṃha is a Cārvāka work
persists in the form that it is the only full-length book on Indian
Materialism! Franco did not claim so, but who cares? In some universities the Tattvopaplavasiṃha is the prescribed
text for studying the Cārvāka/Lokāyata system! Recently an Indian referee
advised me to consult the Tattvopaplavasiṃha
in connection with my paper on humanism and the Cārvāka/Lokāyata![37]
Can folly go any further?
Krishna Del Toso:
Well, dear professor, on the basis of these arguments it is undoubtedly clear
that the Tattvopaplavasiṃha is not to
be considered a Cārvāka work. Taken this for granted, the elimination of the Tattvopaplavasiṃha from the list of the
Cārvāka/Lokayata texts makes us face up to the serious problem of the lack of
direct sources of Indian Materialism. Indeed, the original sūtras, commentaries and other ancillary works written by the
exponents of Cārvāka/Lokāyata schools unfortunately have not reached us. Or,
the problem could be put in a more optimistic way – which I guess to be better
in line with your views –, by saying that we do not still have found out
manuscripts of these texts somewhere in temples or libraries or elsewhere.
Anyway, all that we can make use of at present is some quotation reported in
writings compiled by exponents of other philosophical traditions, such as
Buddhists, Jains, Vaidikas, etc. Now, as regards this paucity of sources at our
disposal, a first problem to be tackled concerns obviously why and when the
texts of Indian Materialism have stopped circulating. This issue acquires even
more substance when we consider that the materialistic perspectives have been
seriously discussed on and on in many philosophical works – some of which were
written also after the, as it were, decline of Materialism – like for instance
Sayāṇa-Mādhava’s Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha,
Jayantabhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjari or
Vādidevasūri’s Syādvādaratnākara, and
so on.
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya:
It is an interesting question. As for Sāyaṇa-Mādhava you are right: the Cārvāka
mūla text and its commentaries were
not available to him, as all the Cārvāka/Lokāyata works were lost before the
fourteenth century CE. But Kamalaśīla apparently possessed the commentaries of
Purandara and Aviddhakarṇa and some unnamed commentators. Jayantabhaṭṭa,
Cakradhara and Vādidevasūri must have had a copy of Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s commentary
on the Cārvākasūtras, for they either quote or paraphrase
longish extracts from it. Aviddhakarṇa’s commentary was known to Karṇakagomin
too. Our forefathers cultivated memorising to an amazing degree, but it was
mostly confined to the Vedic texts. Philosophers must have resorted to the
manuscripts of their opponents and quoted from them, not always from memory.
Materialism,
as I have said before, always had a living presence in India right from the
ancient times and have continued to be so in our own days. As Debiprasad
Chattopadhyaya shows in his Science and Society
in Ancient India,[38]
the philosophical basis of the two old medical compilations, the Carakasaṃhitā and the Suśrutasaṃhitā, was out-and-out
materialistic. Their Materialism, however, was not of the Cārvāka kind: they
believed in five primordial elements instead of four. Space, ākāśa or vyoma, is not tangible to the senses yet it was admitted by them.
Everything on earth, they believed, was composed of these five primordial
elements. Later writers often use the term, cārvākaikadeśin,
meaning «some sort of Cārvāka», that is, materialists other than a Cārvāka.
Although the term is often employed to disguise the writers’ ignorance of who
are meant by the author of the original text, sometimes they are right. There were other materialists besides the
Cārvākas. The source of such other proto-materialists can be traced back to the
Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. In the very
second verse of the work, svabhāva (own
being) and bhūtāni (elements) are
mentioned as rivals of the creator of the universe. There are several such
references in the Mahābhārata, Jain
canonical works and Buddhist Sanskrit works, and the Tamil epic Maṇimēkalai.
The idea of pañcabhūta (five
elements) has been current through the ages. Idealist and fideist philosophers
had to reckon with materialist views even after the works of the Cārvākas were
lost. Materialism is not only as old as philosophy but also lokeṣu āyata, extended among the people
in this world!
[1]
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya was born in Kolkata (Calcutta) in 1947. Educated at the
Scottish Church Collegiate School, Vidyasagar College and the University of
Calcutta. Graduated with Honours in English (1966); M.A. (1968) and Ph.D.
(1986). Retired on 31.12.2007 as Reader, Department of English, Anandamohan
College (Kolkata), and Guest Lecturer, Post-graduate Faculty of English,
University of Calcutta. He acts as resource person in refresher courses on
various disciplines (Bangla, English, Sanskrit, Political Science, etc.)
organized by several universities. He is Emeritus Fellow in English
(2009-2011), University Grants Commission, New Delhi, Fellow at Pavlov
Institute of Kolkata and has been Visiting Professor of the Indian Council of
Philosophical Research (2009-2010), New Delhi. Author of
nineteen books and more than one hundred thirty research papers, he regularly
participates in national seminars and international conferences, workshops and
across-the-board discussions. He writes articles and reviews in both scholarly
journals and other periodicals on literature (Indian and European),
text-criticism (Bangla and Sanskrit), history of ideas, and philosophy
(specially on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata system, Materialism and Rationalism). Among his recent books, see References:
Bhattacharya (2005a), (2009a), (2010a), (2010b), (2010c),
(2011a), (2011b), (2011c), (2012).
[2] Bhattacharya
(2009b).
[3] Bhattacharya
(2009b: 9).
[4]
Frauwallner (1956).
[5]
Timpanaro (1975: 18 note 1, 66).
[6]
Epistle 1.4 (ad Albium Tibullum),
line 16. See Wilkins (1888: 12).
[7] Ācārya
(1987, first published in 1943).
[8] Bhattacharya
(2009b: 201-5).
[9]
Bhattacharya (1996). Reprinted in Bhattacharya (2009b: 201-5).
[10]
See Bhattacharya
(2009b: 76-7). This paper was originally published:
Bhattacharya (2002). Reprinted Bhattacharya (2009b: 69-104).
[11]
Chattopadhyaya, Gangopadhyaya (1990).
[12] Bhattacharya
(2009b: 131-5).
[13] Collection
of Six Philosophies.
[14] Notes
on the Tattvasaṅgraha (Assemblage of Philosophical Principles).
[15] Bhattacharya
(2009b: 109-11).
[16]
See for instance Śāntiparva XXXIX.
[17] Bhattacharya
(2009b: 80-3).
[18] Hamburg,
13.04.1997.
[19] Bhattacharya
(2009b: 39).
[20] Bhattacharya
(2009b: 81, 88).
[21] Bhattacharya
(2009b: 27-9). This paper was originally published:
Bhattacharya (1997). Reprinted as ‘Origin of Materialism in India: Royal or
Popular?’, in Bhattacharya (2009b: 21-32).
[22]
Franco (1994).
[23] Mohanta (1998: 1-16).
[24]
Jhā (1999: 1-3).
[25]
Franco (1994: 228).
[26]
Frauwallner (1956.2: 257).
[27]
The second edition: Delhi 1994.
[28]
Werner (1995).
[29]
Chattopadhyaya, Gangopadhyaya (1990: 505-19 [Ruben], 520-30 [Dixit]).
[30]
Basham (1954: 297).
[31]
Chattopadhyaya (1964: 22-3 note 4).
[32] Chattopadhyaya (1989:
39-40).
[33] Franco (1994: XII-XIII).
[34] Franco
(1994: 14).
[35] Franco
(1994: 46).
[36]
Hamburg, 20.07.1997.
[37]
‘Humanist Thought in Lokayata’ (in press).
[38]
Chattopadhyaya (1977).
This
interview was first published in Annali, (Volume No.71), publication of Università degli studi di Napoli.
Reproduced with the permission of Krishna Del Toso &
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya
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