The Ontology and Epistemology of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

Ramkrishna Bhattacharya 

What are the ontological and epistemological positions of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata? They may be stated as follows: The whole of the material world, including the human body, is made of four basic elements, namely, earth, air, fire and water; there can be no consciousness without the living body; the spirit has no extracorporeal existence and, far from being imperishable, it perishes with the death of the body. As a natural corollary to this ontological position, all religious acts, worship of the gods, paying obeisance to Brahmin priests, performance of post­mortem rites, etc. are considered absolutely futile.

The epistemological position clearly supports this ontology. Perception is admitted to be the only valid means of knowledge. Inference, in so far as it is based on religious scriptures alone, is rejected out of hand because the scriptures are not based on perception but on revelation, not amenable to verification by the senses, and thus tend to promote irrational faith in the after­life (rebirth) and the after­world (heaven and hell), God, and the omniscient being (like the Buddha or Mahāvīra) ( R. Bhattacharya (2010),21­34). In short, the Cārvāka system appeared in the Indian philosophical scene as materialismus militans, strongly objecting to and opposing all religious dogmas (not just Vedism but Buddhism and Jainism as well). Its epistemology was fashioned to match its ontology, which consisted of a series of negations. The insistence on empirical verification is the hallmark of this system. In fact one has a feeling that the Cārvākas first provided the epistemology to the ontology already current in India at least from the Buddha’s time, when Ajita Kesakambala had come out with his proto-­materialistic ideas.

Commentaries on the Cārvākasῡtra

The question is: Do the commentators of the base text, whether or not they adhered to materialism, always reflect the intention of the author/redactor? The aphorisms in the base text, we must admit, are not self-explanatory; their brevity stands in the way oaf any satisfactory understanding. Fortunately, however, there are some aphorisms, the literal meaning of which is fairly transparent. When a commentator goes beyond the literal meaning of these aphorisms and tries to extract some other significance by resorting to grammatical and lexical acrobatics, there is every reason to suspect that he is not being true to the intention of the author/redactor. In most of the cases, however, the intention of the aphorism and its interpretations given in the commentaries are at one, although new instances and further arguments are provided to defend or to elucidate the position of the base text.

Invariance in intention and interpretation

Here is an example. There are two aphorisms: (1) “Perception indeed is the (only) means of right knowledge”, and (2) “Since the means of right knowledge is to be non­-secondary (agauṇa), it is difficult to ascertain an object by means of inference” (III.1­2. R. Bhattacharya (2009) 80, 87). This has led to a notion that the Cārvākas believed in one and only one instrument of cognition, namely, sense perception, while other schools admitted inference, word (verbal testimony), comparison, etc. in addition to perception. This gave rise to the obvious criticism that by denying inference, the Cārvākas proved themselves to be utterly naïve and unfit to be called logicians (cf. NM, I: 9, Vācaspatimiśra, Bhāmatī on Brahmasῡtra, 3.3.53; C/L 154, 243).

Did the Cārvākas really hold such a view? A fragment from the commentary by Purandara has often been cited to disabuse the critics of this notion.3 Purandara said:”The Cārvākas too admit of such an inference as is well known in the world, but that which is called inference [by some], transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited [by them].” (qtd. TSP 2: 528)

Purandara was not the only one to explain the aphorism in this way. Aviddhakarṇa, another commentator, also said: ”It is true that inference is admitted by us as a source of knowledge, because it is found to be so in general practice; (what we only point out is that) the definition of a inferential mark is illogical” (qtd. PVSVṬ 19). He further explained: “A source of knowledge means an instrument which produces an awareness of an object not (already) cognized and therefore, is not a source of knowledge, because it is not an instrument for producing a definite awareness of an object” (ibid.). Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa too said so and distinguished between the (1) probanses well established in the world (lokaprasidhha­hetu) and (2) probanses established in the scriptures (tantrasiddha­hetu) (qtd. SVR 266). He resorted to the Nyāya­Vaiśeṣika terminology to establish why inference is to be regarded as secondary.

Some anonymous commentator4 further distinguished between two kinds of inferential cognition: (1) “some in case of which the inferential cognition can be acquired by oneself” (utpanna­pratīti ) and (2) “some in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired on somebody else’s advice” (utpādya­pratīti ) (NM, 1:184). He thereby suggests that the first kind is valid, the second is not.

Did all these commentators then desert the original position of the base text? Some modern scholars indeed think so (Frauwallner (trans.) 2:225, Franco (1991)159, and Franco­Preisendanz (1998)180). They postulate that the commentators who appeared in the wake of Dharmakīrti were forced to turn away from the original position of the Cārvākas, and the admission of inference in howsoever limited a way is a pointer to this Abkehr (Frauwallner’s word, 2:308).. What is proposed is that this acceptance of inference was a later development, not exactly consistent with the intention of the original author and his audience.

It can, however, be demonstrated that such a view is not well founded. When the philosophers of other schools speak of inference, word, comparison, etc., they never deny that perception is the foremost (jyeṣṭha) of all instruments of cognition (cf. NM, I:164). What they indeed assert is that inference, etc. are all independent means of knowledge, on a par with perception, not subservient to it: co­ordinate, not subordinate. Yet, as the Nyāyasῡtra (1.1.5) declares, inference has to be preceded by perception. Hence, inference not based on perception cannot be admitted. Vātsyāyana in his commentary on the very first Nyāya aphorism (1.1.1) added “scripture” to “perception” (pratyakṣāgmāśritam anumānam, sā ’nvīkṣā, pratyakṣāgamābhyāmīkṣitasyānvīkṣaṇam anvīkṣā), which is unwarranted and amounts to interpolation pure and simple. The base text never speaks of scripture in connection with inference; it mentions perception alone. The independent status of perception is an admitted fact in all realist philosophical systems. So, when the Cārvākas denied the status of inference as an independent means of knowledge, they ipso facto did not reject all kinds of inference but accepted only such inference as was found true in everyday practice (lokavyavahāra). Thus, in the Cārvāka conception perception includes both what is sensually apprehended and inference based on such apprehension. Only such inferences as derived from the scripture, Veda and Smṛti, are not admitted. Therefore, all the four commentators, Purandara, Aviddhakarṇa, Udbhaṭa and the anonymous one, were not deserting the original stand of the base text by admitting inference of a particular sort but only explicating the view of the base text on inference in relation to perception. Other non­-Cārvāka authors too were aware of this,5 as this was the view of earlier, pre­-Cārvāka Indian materialists too.

How do we know all this? A passage in the Mbh, Śāntiparvan (crit. ed. 211.26; vulgate 218.27) says:

The conclusion based on inference and tradition – both are rooted in perception. Perception and testimony (what we are told to believe in) are identical; reasoned­-out truth (=inference) too is nothing but perception.6

In the Anuśāsanaparvan too (147.9) three instruments of cognition are mentioned: (a) direct perception confirmed by the world (lokataḥ siddhaṃ pratyakṣaṃ), (b) doctrines propounded by the scriptures, and (c) the practice of eminent people (śiṣṭa). Dandekar, the editor of this parvan, observes: “Presumably, anumāna is to be understood to have been included in pratyakṣa ” (crit. ed., 1119).

It was only later, when the philosophical debates between the Vedists and the non­Vedists (the Buddhists and the Jains in particular) were raging, that the question of inference as an independent means of knowledge along with word (scripture) assumed a focal position. Both Vātsyāyana and Jayantabhaṭṭa spent much of their time and energy to establish the independent status of inference (cf.C/L, pp. 76ff and 128ff). Inference in fact is the chief, if not the sole, concern of the Nyāyasῡtra itself.

Therefore, the explication of the two Cārvāka aphorisms (III.1­2) made by the commentators merely reiterates and reinforces the position of the ancient Indian materialists, both pre­Cārvāka and the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. The commentators, regardless of their differences of opinion concerning other issues, are unanimous in this regard: they do not admit the independent status of inference as a means of knowledge, and at the same time they clearly state that inference based on perception is definitely admissible and is actually admitted by the Cārvākas. Once we understand this, much of the lampoon and derisive remarks of its opponents such as Hemacandra (cf. AYVD, v.20) and others turn out to be mere calumny.

When commentators differ

So far, so good. The position of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata vis-­à­-vis inference is made crystal clear by the commentators. The problem arises when the same set of commentators differ in their interpretations of certain aphorisms.

Udbhaṭa’s interpretation of the aphorism, “Earth, water, fire and air are the principles, nothing else (iti)” (I.2. R. Bhattacharya (2009) 80) is a case in point. The word iti denotes the end.7 Since the Cārvākas accept only these four elements, not “space” (ākāśa) as the fifth, as some earlier materialists (cf. R. Bhattacharya (2009) 33­41 for sources) and many others did, they are called four ­elementalists (bhῡta­catuṣṭaya­vādins) as opposed to the five­elementalists (bhuta­pañcaka­vādins). Udbhaṭa, however, claimed that it was impossible to lay down any fixed number and essential characteristic of the sources of knowledge (NM, I:52), and objects of knowledge too are more than four: ‘the word, iti, in the (aphorism), “earth, water, fire and air iti ” indicates also the possibility of similar objects of knowledge, other than the earth, etc.’ (qtd. GrBh 1:100).

Vādidevasῡri quotes more extensively from Udbhaṭa’s commentary:

The word, iti, does not denote the end (but) it is illustrative. There are other principles such as consciousness, sound, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, impression and others (SVR 1087).

Not satisfied with these categories, Udbhaṭa further writes:

“There are also prior non­existence of the earth, etc., posterior non­existence, the mutual difference which are quite apparent and distinct (from the principles, viz., earth, etc.).” (qtd. SVR 1087).

Cakradhara clearly stated that Udbhaṭa was here forsaking the conventional interpretation (yathāśrutārtha­tyāgena) (GrBh 1:100).

Apparently Udbhaṭa was referring to issues that are well known to the Nyāya­Vaiśeṣikas. He knew full well that iti cannot be equated to ityādi (etc.).Yet he attempted to fit the Cārvāka aphorism into the Nyāya­Vaiśeṣika frame.

This may be considered ingenious, as is his defence of the Cārvāka position of viewing inference as secondary (see above). But there is nothing to show that the Cārvākas ever thought in terms of Nyāya­Vaiśeṣika categories. Udbhaṭa does not adduce any new argument in support of his novel explication (as he does in relation to inference). On the contrary, he flies in the face of the accepted meaning of iti and, maybe with the best of intentions, introduces Nyāya­Vaiśeṣika categories which are quite alien to the original Cārvāka/Lokāyata.

All this does show marks of what is sometimes viewed as “growth” or “radical innovation”, but at the same time it exhibits alien addition as well.8

The Cārvāka view on inference in the SDS

It is well known that all the Cārvāka/Lokāyata works, the base text and the commentaries, had disappeared from India before the SDS was composed. Not a single verbatim quotation from any Cārvāka work is found in the whole of the SDS, not even a single name (excepting that of Bṛhaspati). Whatever the author of the first chapter of the SDS (Sāyaṇa­Mādhava himself or someone else) knew about the system was not based on his reading but most probably on what he had heard from his guru. (It may be added in parentheses that in ancient India gurumukhavidyā was sine qua non; no amount of reading would be considered a fitting substitute for it. See Aiyangar 10. Cf. Jha’s regret, 1:x). Moreover, it is doubtful whether the guru himself had ever glanced at an authentic Cārvāka work. Apparently there was a guru­śiṣya paramparā (a continuum from preceptors to disciples) and that was the only source to learn anything about the Cārvāka. Yet a very cogent argument is found in the SDS (7­10;C/L, 250­-51) to justify the Cārvāka position regarding the admissibility of perception alone as a valid instrument of cognition, rejecting summarily the claims of all others (inference, word, comparison, and upādhi or absence of a condition).

Nevertheless it will not be advisable to accept the passage in the SDS as a statement reflecting the genuine Cārvāka/Lokāyata view. The reason is this: there is no supporting evidence in favour of such a representation. Since no authority is mentioned, the passage should be taken as a formulation made by the learned author of the SDS, not by a Cārvāka. This is an instance in which the view of the digest­-maker is not to be admitted because of the lack of any corroborative evidence.

Moreover, no mention is made in the SDS of the limited validity of inference, as Purandara and others have unequivocally declared (see above). This is another reason why the passage, like the so­-called Lokāyata aphorisms in the Kāmasῡtra,1.2.26­-30, is unacceptable (see R. Bhattacharya (2009), 94­-95).

Contradictory interpretations offered by commentators

Now we come to an example of contradictory explanations. After stating that the principle is the four elements and that their combination is called the body, sense and object, the base text says, probably in the very next aphorism, tebhyaś (that is, bhῡtebhyaś) caitanyam (I.2­4). Literally it appears to mean:”From them (the elements), consciousness.” As is evident, there is no supplementary verb to complete the sentence (technically called adhyāhāra). What was in the mind of the redactor/s of the base text can only be guessed. Two different suggestions were made by two commentators. One (anonymous) said: the missing verb should be “is born”; the other (again anonymous) proposed “is manifested” (TS v.1858, TSP 2: 633­34). The two proposals are contradictory, for, if the first is admitted, the second cannot be true and vice versa. The first would assert that there can be no consciousness prior to the existence of a living human body. The second, on the other hand, would suggest that consciousness is already existent, apart from and quite independent of the human body; it is manifested when the human body is formed and born. The second proposal then would mean desertion of the monistic materialist position traditionally ascribed to the Cārvākas.

This is not all. Udbhaṭa, writing at least a century or so after these two anonymous commentators, reopened the issue by challenging the common understanding of the word tebhyaḥ as “from these”, taken in the sense of ablative case (fifth declension). In Sanskrit tebhyaḥ can mean “for these” as well. Preferring the second meaning, Udbhaṭa explained the aphorism as: it is for the sake of the four elements that consciousness comes into being.9 He did not concern himself with the missing verb but sought to establish a dualist view that consciousness existed apart from and even prior to matter. He had apparently taken his cue from the second interpretation (or it may have been derived from Sāṃkhya) and explained this aphorism as follows: “Consciousness is for (the sake of) elements; consciousness is independent and aids the physical elements which constitute the body” (qtd. GrBh 2:257).

Udbhaṭa’s interpretation is not grammatically invalid. There is indeed a rule in Kātyāyana’s Vārttika (on Aṣṭādhyāyī 1.4.44) that provides for the use of the fourth declension to suggest purpose or intent (tādarthye caturthī vācyā, Vasu 352). But by saying that consciousness is independent of the four elements that constitute the human body Udbhaṭa leaves the door open to a non­-materialist position. The Cārvāka position was essentially monistic: no body, no consciousness. Even if we take Udbhaṭa to be a dualistic materialist, it clearly involves desertion of the original Cārvāka position.

All this does show signs of growth but at the same time exhibits a tendency to move away from the original doctrine. Quite appropriately, therefore, Cakradhara contrasts Udbhaṭa with Bhāvivikta and other ancient Cārvāka teachers (GrBh 2:257). Unlike them, Udbhaṭa did not uphold the old, traditionally accepted position. On another occasion, too, Cakradhara notes that Udbhaṭa forsook the conventional interpretation (GrBh 1:100).

Vādidevasῡri too writes, “This respectable veteran twice born (sc. Udbhaṭa) is revealing to us a novel way of answering criticism.” (SVR 764).

Here the assertion made by LaFrague is of seminal importance. Surely the redactor(s) of the base text could not have meant all three interpretations when he/they framed the aphorism. Since we have no way of knowing the author’s mind, we must go for a reasonable conjecture. If he had the second or the third interpretation in mind, the very basis of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata doctrine would be compromised. The first two aphorisms clearly state the primacy of the four elements as the principle (tattva). If consciousness were the principle or one of the principles, the second aphorism would have said so instead of naming all the four elements individually and stopping there with a decisive word, iti. So the second and the third interpretations of the third aphorism are unacceptable. What led the second and the third interpreters to defy the spirit of the first three aphorisms is not known to us. But one point is evident: the aphorisms could mean, both to the author and to his audience, only what the first interpretation says. The second and the third interpretations definitely suggest different lines of development away from the intention of the author.

Conclusion

Development and growth are only to be expected of all philosophical systems that continue to exist over the centuries. Thus we have the development of Sāṃkhya, which becomes allied to Yoga and becomes a syncretic theistic system. The same story is repeated when the atheistic Nyāya merges with Vaiśeṣika and becomes a theistic system. Such syncretic doctrines doubtless reflect development and growth. Nevertheless, they are not to be identified with the original Sāṃkhya or the original Nyāya or the original Vaiśeṣika. When we speak of development and growth, which are admittedly inevitable, we should not turn a blind eye to the fact that later works often move away from the original position of the system. It is not the case that all forms of development and growth necessarily reflect the original intention of the author.

The critics of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, we have seen, knew only too well that Udbhaṭa had taken a position that was quite different from the original one. Are we to call this development? When new facts and arguments are proposed to affirm the contention of the base text in order to reassert its validity, as viewed by its later adherents or explicators, such events may very well be called development. On the other hand, when quite novel but contrary positions are proposed, presumably to support the contention of the aphorisms in a different way, the event cannot but be called inconsistency. Such inconsistencies may gain currency over the course of time and become a part of the tradition of this or that system, but they evince inconsistency all the same.

This happened to Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and other systems. The Brahmasῡtra in fact has been interpreted in a dozen different ways by its commentators, so much so that it is impossible to assert what Bādarāyaṇa, to whom the authorship of the base text is attributed, had in mind. Yet it cannot be denied that he must have had something in his mind which the commentators in their zeal to establish their own philosophical systems have more than once misused, sometimes going against the position he held. After all Bādarāyaṇa could not have been a dualist, a non­-dualist, a modified non­-dualist, a realist, a subjective idealist, etc. all at the same time! It is therefore futile to think of the Vedānta doctrine. We have several Vedānta doctrines. That is all.

Vedanta is of course an extreme case. But Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and the Cārvāka systems also exhibit several different approaches, not all of which can be considered consistent with the view of the original authors and their audiences. In order to study these systems, instead of concentrating solely on the doctrine, a historicist approach is essential in order to trace their developments and note where and how some commentators moved away from the original position. Whenever there is a sign of any forced explanation, inconsistent with grammar and conventional use, it has to be taken as a case of inconsistency. The more the commentator tries to hold fast to the words of the aphorism but interprets them by doing violence to these two criteria (grammar and conventional use), the more certain it is that he is moving away from the original position. Udbhaṭa’s interpretations of iti and tebhyaḥ are cases in point. Polemicists like Jayantabhaṭṭa may not distinguish between the original position and the new position, but a student of philosophy cannot afford not to do so. Having no axe to grind either in defense or reputation of any system,10 one should first ascertain, as best as one can, what the doctrine meant to its author and its audience, and then proceed to study the development of the system over the ages. No other approach can do justice to the systems of philosophy in India that flourished and continued to hold sway over one or the other section of the people for several centuries.

Let me reiterate: there is no gainsaying that some changes are inevitable in any system of philosophy because of its constant interface with other systems. But we should not view all such changes on a par with one another. Doctrinal or religious bias should not make us forget that in pre­-modern India a master of philosophy was supposed to be a master of all philosophical systems, living or dead, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata not excepted. Consider, for instance, the praise of Vyomaśiva (or Vyomaśambhu or Vyomeśa) in the Ranode stone inscription (Epigraphia Indica, 1:358) in which Vyomaśiva is eulogized as lokāyate sadgurur bbuddho buddhamate jinoktiṣu jinaḥ, Sadguru (Brhaspati) in the Lokayāta, the Buddha in the doctrine of the Buddha, and Jina (Mahāvīra) in the sayings of the Jina (line 37). Had it been otherwise, the authors of philosophical digests and compendia from Haribhadra (eighth century) down to Cimaṇabhaṭṭa (nineteenth century) would not have included in their works all systems, both orthodox and heterodox, known to them.

Notes

3. S. Mookerjee (368­69), S. N. Dasgupta (3:539) and others (for instance, M.K. Gangopadhyaya, 32, 55 n1, 56 n4, 66 n51, and D. Chattopadhyaya, 52) drew attention to this significant passage from time to time, which however was completely ignored or overlooked by many modern scholars, as by ancient authors. They continued to ascribe the one­pramāṇa position to the Cārvākas (more appropriate to Bhartṛhari, who considered āgama (scripture) to be the one and only valid means of knowledge. See R. Bhattacharya (2009) 117­18, 152).

4. Jayantabhaṭṭa ascribed this view to “the more learned ones” (NM 1:184). The use of plural may not be honorific but satirical. The identity of this commentator (or commentators) is not known. Cakradhara, however, mentions that by “cunning Cārvāka” and the “learned ones” Jayanta meant Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa (GrBh 1:52,100). Most probably the designation, “more learned ones,” refers to some commentator(s) other than Udbhaṭa, signified by the use of the comparative degree. It may mean Purandara and his followers.

5. Guṇaratna (TRD on ṢDSam, v. 83), Ratnaprabhā (on PNTA 540. See R. Bhattacharya (2010) 30), and the anonymous authors of Avacῡrṇi (on ṢDSam, v. 83) and SMS (15) (R. Bhattacharya (2009) 116­17, 168) quite unambiguously refer to this interpretation. 

6. Bronkhorst translates this verse somewhat differently (310) but his interpretation too refers to direct perception as the root of all true knowledge.

7. Explaining KA 1.2.10 (sāṃkhyaṃ yogo lokāyataṃ cetyānvīkṣikī ) Jacobi says: ”According to Kautilya the essence of philosophy lies in systematic investigation and logical demonstration; in his judgement these conditions are satisfied only (iti) by Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata” (102) .

8. Karin Preisendanz (2008) apparently does not consider such alien additions to be of much significance. She classifies commentaries into two kinds: i) creative, ii) philosophically unproductive (609­11). In her usage Udbhaṭa would be considered creative in the sense of being “philosophically productive”. But as both Cakradhara and Vādidevasῡri noted (see below), Udbhaṭa was known to be an innovator and hence was contrasted to Bhāvivikta who apparently remained true to the spirit of the base text (GrBh 2:257­58). Udbhaṭa was not treated on a par with Bhāvivikta and others, since he did not represent the views of the ancient (cirantana) Cārvāka teachers. Similarly, when Solomon calls Udbhaṭa “a progressive Cārvāka” (990) she implicitly admits that he did not adhere strictly to the original stand of the school. 

9. This second position is reminiscent of Sri Aurobindo’s realist but anti­materialist stand regarding matter vis­à­vis consciousness . Unlike the non­dualist Vedantins like Śaṅkara he admitted this world to be real but added: 

[T]here is a course of life and consciousness originally alien to Matter which has yet entered into an occupied Matter, – perhaps from another world. From whence, otherwise, can it have come…nothing can evolve out of Matter which is not therein already contained. (96­-97).

Sri Aurobindo does not accept the dualist position of Sāṃkhya either, nor does he regard Śaṅkara’s theory of illusion as valid (11).

10. No less a savant than Louis de Vallée Poussin, because of his idealist mindset, calls materialists “philosophers without philosophy” (8:494). Speaking of the parable of the Wolf’s Footprint (ṢDSam, v.81), he writes: ‘A man who wanted to convert – let us say “pervert” – a woman to his materialist opinion…’ (ibid.). All this in an encyclopaedia article!

To cite another example, nearer home: B. Bhattacharya proposed to identify Kambalāśvatara of theTS with the Kambalāśvatara mentioned in the Saṅgītāloka on the following ground: “It is not at all strange that a member of a materialist sect should devote himself to music; disbelieving in transmigration of soul or in a future life the cultivation of pleasure in this life should seem logical and entirely proper” (xxxviii).

Abbreviations and Bibliography

Avacūrṇi (1969), Anon. in ṢDSam, edited by M.K. Jain, Calcutta: Bharatiya Jnanapith. 

Bhattacharya, B. (1926).“Foreword” to Tattvasaṅgraha, ed. E. Krishnamacharya, Baroda: Oriental Institute.

Bhattacharya, R. (2009). Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Firenze: Società Editrice Fiorentina.

Bhattacharya, R.(2010).” Lokāyata Darśana and a Comparative Study with Greek Philosophy” in: Partha Ghose (ed.). Materialism and Immaterialism in India and the West: Varying Vistas. New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 21-­34.

Bronkhorst, J. (2007). Greater Magadha. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Chattopadhyaya, D. (1989). In Defence of Materialism in Ancient India. New Delhi: People’s Publishing House,.

C/L. Cārvāka/Lokāyata (1990), eds. D. Chattopadhyaya in collaboration with M. Gangopadhyaya. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. 

Dasgupta, S. (1975). A History of Indian Philosophy, Vols. 1­5, Delhi: MLBD (reprint).

Epigraphia Indica (1892), ed. J. Burgess. Vol. 1. Calcutta.

Franco, E. (1991). “Paurandarasūtra” in M. A. Dhaky (ed.), Aspects of Indology. Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania Felicitation Volume, Varanasi: Sagarmal Jain P.V. Research Institute, , Vol. III.

Franco, E. (1997), Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth, Arbeitkreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, Wien. 

Franco, E., K. Preisendanz (1998). “Materialism, Indian School of”, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 6. London: Routledge.

Frauwallner, E. (1973). History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.2. Delhi: MLBD (trnslation of Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Band II. Salzburg: Otto Muller Verlag, 1956). 

Gangopadhyaya, M.K. (1984). Indian Logic in Its Sources: The Validity of Inference. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.

Guṇaratna. Tarka-­rahasya­-dīpikā (1905­14), comm. on Haribhadra, ṢDSam, edited by L. Suali, Calcutta: The Asiatic Society. 

Goldin, Paul. R (2008). Review of Teaching the Daode Jing, eds. G. D. DeAngelis and W. G. Frisina, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Journal of the American Oriental Society, 128:4 (October­December 2008), 479-­52. 

GrBh. Cakradhara. Granthibhaṅga. See NM. 

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Acknowledgements: Dipak Bhattacharya, Amitava Bhattacharyya, Johannes Bronkhorst, Sanjib Mukhopahyaya.

This is the Part-II of the paper initially published in Journal of Indian Philosophy (Springer Netherlands) in 2010.   You can read Part I of the essay here

Posted in: Carvaka,Indian Materialism,Indian Philosophy,Lokayata,Ramakrishna Bhattacharya